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ABSTRACT 
 
The security of hardware implementations is of considerable importance, as even the 
most secure and carefully analyzed algorithms and protocols can be vulnerable in their 
hardware realization. For instance, numerous successful attacks have been presented against 
the Advanced Encryption Standard, which is approved for top secret information by the 
National Security Agency. There are numerous challenges for hardware security, ranging 
from critical power and resource constraints in sensor networks to scalability and 
automation for large Internet of Things (IoT) applications. 
The physically unclonable function (PUF) is a promising building block for hardware 
security, as it exposes a device-unique challenge-response behavior which depends on 
process variations in fabrication. It can be used in a variety of applications including random 
number generation, authentication, fingerprinting, and encryption. The primary concerns for 
PUF are reliability in presence of environmental variations, area and power overhead, and 
process-dependent randomness of the challenge-response behavior. 
Carbon nanotube field-effect transistors (CNFETs) have been shown to have excellent 
electrical and unique physical characteristics. They are a promising candidate to replace 
silicon transistors in future very large scale integration (VLSI) designs. We present the 
Carbon Nanotube PUF (CNPUF), which is the first PUF design that takes advantage of 
unique CNFET characteristics. CNPUF achieves higher reliability against environmental 
variations and increases the resistance against modeling attacks. Furthermore, CNPUF has 
a considerable power and energy reduction in comparison to previous ultra-low power PUF 
designs of 89.6% and 98%, respectively. Moreover, CNPUF allows a power-security 
tradeoff in an extended design, which can greatly increase the resilience against modeling 
attacks. 
Despite increasing focus on defenses against physical attacks, consistent security 
oriented design of embedded systems remains a challenge, as most formalizations and 
security models are concerned with isolated physical components or a high-level concept. 
Therefore, we build on existing work on hardware security and provide four contributions 
to system-oriented physical defense: (i) A system-level security model to overcome the 
chasm between secure components and requirements of high-level protocols; this enables 
synergy between component-oriented security formalizations and theoretically proven 
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protocols. (ii) An analysis of current practices in PUF protocols using the proposed system-
level security model; we identify significant issues and expose assumptions that require 
costly security techniques. (iii) A System-of-PUF (SoP) that utilizes the large PUF design-
space to achieve security requirements with minimal resource utilization; SoP requires 64% 
less gate-equivalent units than recently published schemes. (iv) A multilevel authentication 
protocol based on SoP which is validated using our system-level security model and which 
overcomes current vulnerabilities. Furthermore, this protocol offers breach recognition and 
recovery. 
Unpredictability and reliability are core requirements of PUFs: unpredictability implies 
that an adversary cannot sufficiently predict future responses from previous observations. 
Reliability is important as it increases the reproducibility of PUF responses and hence allows 
validation of expected responses. However, advanced machine-learning algorithms have 
been shown to be a significant threat to the practical validity of PUFs, as they can accurately 
model PUF behavior. The most effective technique was shown to be the XOR-based 
combination of multiple PUFs, but as this approach drastically reduces reliability, it does 
not scale well against software-based machine-learning attacks. We analyze threats to PUF 
security and propose PolyPUF, a scalable and secure architecture to introduce polymorphic 
PUF behavior. This architecture significantly increases model-building resistivity while 
maintaining reliability. An extensive experimental evaluation and comparison demonstrate 
that the PolyPUF architecture can secure various PUF configurations and is the only 
evaluated approach to withstand highly complex neural network machine-learning attacks. 
Furthermore, we show that PolyPUF consumes less energy and has less implementation 
overhead in comparison to lightweight reference architectures. 
Emerging technologies such as the Internet of Things (IoT) heavily rely on hardware 
security for data and privacy protection. The outsourcing of integrated circuit (IC) 
fabrication introduces diverse threat vectors with different characteristics, such that the 
security of each device has unique focal points. Hardware Trojan horses (HTH) are a 
significant threat for IoT devices as they process security critical information with limited 
resources. HTH for information leakage are particularly difficult to detect as they have 
minimal footprint. Moreover, constantly increasing integration complexity requires 
automatic synthesis to maintain the pace of innovation. We introduce the first high-level 
synthesis (HLS) flow that produces a threat-targeted and security enhanced hardware design 
to prevent HTH injection by a malicious foundry. Through analysis of entropy loss and 
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criticality decay, the presented algorithms implement highly resource-efficient targeted 
information dispersion. An obfuscation flow is introduced to camouflage the effects of 
dispersion and reduce the effectiveness of reverse engineering. A new metric for the 
combined security of the device is proposed, and dispersion and obfuscation are co-
optimized to target user-supplied threat parameters under resource constraints. The flow is 
evaluated on existing HLS benchmarks and a new IoT-specific benchmark, and shows 
significant resource savings as well as adaptability. 
The IoT and cloud computing rely on strong confidence in security of confidential or 
highly privacy sensitive data. As (differential) power attacks can take advantage of side-
channel leakage to expose device-internal secrets, side-channel leakage is a major concern 
with ongoing research focus. However, countermeasures typically require expert-level 
security knowledge for efficient application, which limits adaptation in the highly 
competitive and time-constrained IoT field. We address this need by presenting the first 
HLS flow with primary focus on side-channel leakage reduction. Minimal security 
annotation to the high-level C-code is sufficient to perform automatic analysis of security 
critical operations with corresponding insertion of countermeasures. Additionally, 
imbalanced branches are detected and corrected. For practicality, the flow can meet both 
resource and information leakage constraints. The presented flow is extensively evaluated 
on established HLS benchmarks and a general IoT benchmark. Under identical resource 
constraints, leakage is reduced between 32% and 72% compared to the baseline. Under 
leakage target, the constraints are achieved with 31% to 81% less resource overhead. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
Computer security is of utmost importance to our society due to the constantly increasing 
reliance on ubiquitous computing. With emerging devices in areas such as health care, 
wireless sensor networks, wearable devices, and the Internet of Things, privacy is no longer 
the primary concern, and the confidentiality and authenticity of data and devices has to be 
guaranteed to avoid physical damage.  
Secure hardware is of fundamental importance to computer security, as it provides the 
foundation on which algorithms and protocols are built. If the hardware components are 
insecure, any higher-level implementation is inherently vulnerable. For instance, a 
cryptographic module that implements the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), which is 
approved by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) for top-secret documents, was 
successfully attacked through analysis of side-channel information leakage.  
One promising building block for hardware security is the physically unclonable 
function (PUF). It implements a device-unique hardware fingerprint that has applications 
ranging from authentication to random number generation. As PUFs rely on physical 
variations to generate a device-specific fingerprint, most proposed PUF designs suffer from 
reliability concerns. The major weakness of PUFs is their vulnerability against machine-
learning attacks. 
In addition to the threat of invasive attacks, ongoing outsourcing efforts in integrated 
circuit manufacturing have increased the threat of information leakage due to hardware 
Trojan horses. It has been shown that minimal area footprint is required to introduce a 
hardware Trojan horse which has the capability of leaking internal bits in an AES 
implementation, which could lead to the full disclosure of the secret key employed in 
encryption. 
The amount of power consumption in a circuit depends primarily on the dynamic 
switching behavior. When the output of a gate is toggled, there are notable spikes in the 
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power trace. This correlation between device behavior and power consumption can be 
exploited in side-channel analysis attacks. Without any modifications to the circuit or 
insertion of hardware Trojan horses, successful side-channel analysis attacks have been 
launched against AES implementations. While mitigating defense techniques exist, for 
example by normalizing the power consumption, these techniques are very costly and 
require detailed security understanding for efficient application. 
1.2 Overview of this Dissertation 
In this dissertation, we study the three primary threats to hardware security: invasive 
physical attacks which can change device behavior after manufacturing; insertion of 
hardware Trojan horses by a malicious foundry which can leak secret information with 
minimal footprint; side-channel analysis of power traces to reveal device-internal secrets 
without any noticeable modification to the device. 
We propose the first carbon-nanotube (CNT) based PUF in Chapter 2. It exhibits strong 
cryptographic characteristics while reducing power consumption compared to conventional 
designs by taking advantage of the inherent uniqueness of the metal-to-semiconductor ratio 
of CNTs in a carbon-nanotube field-effect transistor (CNFET). 
We introduce a System-of-PUFs (SOP) in Chapter 3. The SoP utilizes the difference 
among multiple proposed PUF designs to improve the resistance against machine-learning 
attacks and introduces a new multi-level authentication scheme that allows recovery from 
attacks. 
We introduce the first polymorphous PUF (PolyPUF) in Chapter 4.  PolyPUF 
dynamically changes its runtime behavior to defend against machine-learning attacks while 
still allowing a trusted third party to perform authentication. Through this polymorphous 
behavior, it can achieve resistance against machine-learning attacks beyond any existing 
PUF design or architecture. We evaluate PolyPUF against neural network based machine-
learning attacks and demonstrate its strength. 
The defense against hardware Trojan horses (HTH) as part of high-level synthesis is 
presented in Chapter 5. HTH insertion by a malicious foundry is a significant threat due to 
ongoing outsourcing of integrated circuit manufacturing. Through an HTH, information can 
be leaked with minimal footprint in area and power consumption, which leads to a very low 
detection probably in post-manufacturing. The high-level synthesis flow mitigates this risk 
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by automatically detecting vulnerable circuit areas and increasing the difficulty of HTH 
insertion by dispersing security critical information.  
A high-level synthesis flow to protect against power analysis attacks is introduced in 
Chapter 6. It has been shown that hardware implementations can leak significant side-
channel information which can be extracted by analyzing power traces. For example, 
successful attacks against the advanced encryption standard were demonstrated. Defending 
against side-channel analysis is a difficult problem, as power consumption depends on 
several factors and is highly dependent on the underlying data being processed. Existing 
defense mechanisms are very resource intensive and require deep design and security 
understanding for efficient application. The proposed high-level synthesis flow identifies 
operations with high leakage potential and effectively applies countermeasures to achieve 
high resilience against side-channel leakage with strongly reduced resource requirements.  
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CHAPTER 2  
CARBON NANOTUBE PUF 
2.1 Introduction 
Modern life depends heavily on electronics. Not only are companies’ valuable and 
confidential assets stored and managed by technology but also our daily lives are connected 
with technology. Therefore, our privacy and confidential assets are vulnerable to attacks 
against the technologies we use. This trend leads to an increased interest in security. In 
addition to these common security concerns, wireless sensor networks and wearable 
technology have emerged as trends in new devices and can pose significant security risks 
for our society. Nodes in a sensor network are typically exposed to the public and can 
contain or handle sensitive data, e.g. power grid information or military defense mechanisms 
[1]. Wearable technology is emerging as part of ubiquitous computing and may accumulate 
as much information as the actual wearer, which represents a threat against privacy. Due to 
the nature of these new devices, they not only require higher security and privacy, but are 
also critically limited in circuit area, power, and energy budgets. This trend was already 
observed in current mobile devices, such as smartphones or tablets, but wearable technology 
tightens these constraints [2]. 
Software security typically assumes correctness and security of hardware and can only 
discover hardware based intrusions on a very limited scale [3]. Hardware security provides 
the building block for secure devices and aims to reduce hardware vulnerability to imaging, 
probing and intrusion. It is generally designed to take advantage of each chip’s unique 
physical aspects.  
Gassend et al. introduced the concept of silicon based physically unclonable functions 
(PUFs)[4], which has gained attention as an emerging hardware security technology. It maps 
a digital input, considered to be a challenge, to a digital output, defined as the response, 
based on intrinsic physical parameters of the circuit. Therefore, the mapping between the 
input and output of a PUF is called the challenge-response behavior.  
A major advantage of PUF is the fast and simple response generation, but extremely 
difficult challenge-response prediction and duplication. Although manufactured instances 
of PUF share an identical design, the manufacturing process introduces unpredictable 
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variations to the intrinsic physical parameters of the chip. Along with the large size of the 
challenge-response space, this leads to nearly impossible challenge-response behavior 
replication [5]. 
Various PUF designs were studied using different physical parameters of the device; 
silicon PUF [4], arbiter PUF [6], ring-oscillator PUF (RO-PUF) [7], butterfly PUF [8], clock 
PUF [9], and low-power current-based PUF [10] are examples of PUF designs taking 
advantage of very different circuit characteristics. The first silicon PUF, presented by 
Gassend et al., uses the delay of wires and digital logic devices within one circuit. RO-PUF 
is also designed to evaluate and compare inherent delay characteristics of wires and 
transistors, but compares distinct circuits. It is based on ring oscillators and uses the unique 
oscillation frequency for response generation. Butterfly PUF is based on FPGA-specific 
physical variations. ClockPUF is designed using the clock skew at the sink of the clock 
network. Ultra-low power current-based PUF converts analog current variations to unique 
digital quantities.  
Critical characteristics of PUF are reliability and uniqueness. The former is measured as 
the reverse of the average Hamming distance of a single chip under varying environment 
conditions and the same challenge. The latter is the average Hamming distance between 
multiple manufactured instances of the same design, and is desired to be 50%. 
Most of the existing PUFs focus on conventional silicon devices, and several of them are 
not geared towards low power operation. Furthermore, as technology moves forward, 
silicon devices for low-power, high-speed applications are facing a miniaturization 
bottleneck. Carbon-based structures, such as carbon nanotubes (CNT), are one of the 
promising emerging technologies that are considered as possible replacements for current 
silicon technology. Moreover, CNTs have great potential in flexible or wearable electronics 
[11]. 
In this chapter, we present a novel carbon-nanotube based PUF (CNPUF), which uses 
carbon nanotube field-effect transistors (CNFET). Our contributions and the advantages of 
CNPUF are as follows: 
 A PUF design that takes advantage of its unique CNFET characteristics and actively 
uses metallic CNTs, which are currently inevitable but typically considered a major 
issue for digital designs. 
 Considerable reduction in footprint by using CNFET-unique properties to reduce the 
transistor count. 
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 Extremely low power and energy consumption that is 89.6% and 98% lower than 
ultra-low power current based PUF [10] at 90 nm. 
 Very high reliability against environmental variations and SPICE-accurate 
experimental evaluation in two different settings.  
 An extended design that enables a power-security tradeoff, highly relevant for 
practical usage scenarios. 
 Evaluation of PUF behavior with regard to different CNT technology parameters 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In section 2.2, we provide background 
knowledge and explain CNT behavior and characteristics. In section 2.3, we propose 
CNPUF and theoretically evaluate it. An extension of CNPUF, which can be used for high 
security applications, is presented in section 2.4. A SPICE accurate experimental evaluation 
and comparison is provided in section 2.5. Finally, we summarize our findings and give an 
outlook in section 2.6. This chapter is based on [12]. 
2.2 Background 
Carbon nanotubes (CNTs) are cylindrical carbon molecules that have superior electrical, 
mechanical and thermal properties [13]. Thus, CNT technology is considered as one of the 
potential candidates for future electronics [13]. CNFETs, first introduced by S. Tans et al. 
[14], are transistors with channels consisting of CNTs instead of bulk silicon. Conventional 
methods in technology scaling will likely encounter physical limitations and these molecular 
electronics have attracted much interest as they can lead to further technology scaling. 
Regardless of the superior properties, there exist fundamental limitations and obstacles 
in fabrication of CNTs. Due to intense research studies, yield and performance of CNFETs 
are fast improving and they will be realized as digital circuits in the near future [15]. Most 
recently, a first fully CNT based subsystem was presented [16], and a first digital carbon 
nanotube computer was created [17]. Nevertheless, it is still impossible to guarantee perfect 
alignment, semiconducting property, and uniform distribution, which lead to performance 
variations [18]. The major CNT variations [19] are: (i) chirality, which defines the type to 
metallic or semiconducting; (ii) diameter; (iii) growth density; (iv) alignment; (v) doping 
concentration.  
Some of these variations correlate with one another and all of them result in electrical 
property variation and can lead to malfunction of digital circuits in the worst case. 
Particularly the lack of chirality (and thus type) control is a major issue for CNT usage in 
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digital circuits, as metallic CNTs in transistors lead to direct drain-to-source shorting. Due 
to the lack of precise chirality control, removal of metallic CNTs became necessary [20]. 
However, removal of undesired CNTs can lead to further circuit variations and even 
malfunctioning. For CNPUF design, we inherently consider this CNT specific property and 
take advantage of the type variation for extremely high efficiency digital secret generation. 
The CNT chirality is a pair of indices (𝑛, 𝑚) and represents the 2-dimensional wrapping 
of graphene and determines the type to either metallic or semiconducting [21]. Based on the 
chirality, CNTs are categorized into three categories. If 𝑛 = 𝑚, it is called an armchair 
nanotube. Another structure is zigzag nanotube with 𝑚 = 0 . Otherwise, it is a chiral 
nanotube. For a given chirality (𝑛, 𝑚), a CNT is metallic when it satisfies either of following 
two cases. 
1) 𝑛 = 𝑚 
2) 𝑛 − 𝑚 = 3𝑁  for any 𝑁 𝜖 ℕ 
Metallic and semiconducting CNTs have different impacts on different operating modes. 
When the CNFET is turned off, the metallic CNTs are still conducting, as they lead to a 
direct gate-source shorting. However, both metallic and semiconducting CNTs contribute 
when the transistor is on. Hence, the ratio of the semiconducting to metallic CNT is closely 
related to the on and off current (Ion, Ioff) ratio. By utilizing this CNT specific characteristic, 
our CNPUF design provides a simple, but unconventional and extremely energy efficient 
security solution.  
2.3 Carbon-Nanotube PUF 
In this section, we will explain the CNFET based PUF design. Subsection 2.3.1 gives an 
overview of the basic design and explains the challenge-response behavior. Then, the main 
internal block of the CNPUF design, the CNPUF Parallel-Element (CNPUF-PE), will be 
discussed in subsection 2.3.2. An analysis of area cost is provided in subsection 2.3.3. In 
subsection 2.3.4, we will elaborate on the design characteristics responsible for providing 
high reliability, which is experimentally shown in section 2.5. Subsection 2.3.5 shows the 
complexity of the PUF design and the dimensions that affect the challenge-response 
behavior, which leads to resistance against modeling attacks. 
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2.3.1 Basic Design 
The design of the CNPUF is shown in Figure 2.1. We define a CNPUF Parallel-Element 
(CNPUF-PE) as a pair of CNFETs that share the same gate voltage, which is an input to the 
CNPUF-PE. These inputs form the challenge. Each bit of the challenge is associated with a 
single CNPUF-PE, by directly providing the input challenge as the gate voltage. A high gate 
voltage corresponds to logic 1, and a low gate voltage corresponds to logic 0. 
Each CNPUF-PE has two distinct states, one for a high input gate voltage and one for a 
low voltage. These two states differ among all CNPUF-PEs because of the static variations 
caused by the manufacturing process. A detailed explanation of the variation sources is 
provided in subsection 2.3.5. The output bit of CNPUF is generated by comparing two 
currents through a series connection of CNPUF-PEs. In Figure 2.1, when I1 > I2, the output 
is 1; otherwise, it is 0. 
CNPUF can be used in different configurations to achieve multi-bit responses: The 
simplest approach is to replicate and parallelize a one-output-bit CNPUF to achieve multiple 
output bits. While this appears costly, each output bit is truly generated by different physical 
circuits and thus they are fully independent of each other. An area saving alternative to this 
approach can be achieved by reusing a one-bit CNPUF with a pseudo random number 
generator (PRNG) as a challenge translator. However, the output bits are no longer 
independent and the area saving can be very limited, as the CNPUF can be implemented 
with a small number of transistors, whereas a multi-bit PRNG can introduce high area 
overhead. 
 
Figure 2.1 Row of the CNPUF design. A series of CNPUF-PE are evaluated by a comparator 
(COMP) to generate the output bit. 
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2.3.2 CNPUF Parallel-Element 
The CNPUF mainly consists of a serial connection of CNPUF-PEs. Internally, the 
CNPUF-PE consists of two parallel CNFETs that share the same gate voltage. Each CNFET 
consists of a large number of semiconducting CNTs and a few metallic CNTs, typically with 
a metallic-to-semiconducting ratio between 10% and 33% [3]. Due to this difference, a 
CNPUF-PE has two distinct and nearly independent states for a high gate voltage and a low 
gate voltage. The current characteristics for a low gate voltage are dominated by the metallic 
CNTs, as the off-current for semiconducting CNTs is considerably lower than the current 
for metallic CNTs, even when the number of semiconducting CNTs is large. For a high gate 
voltage, the semiconducting CNTs dominate the current characteristics due to their much 
larger number. As CNT technology improves, we expect the ratio of semiconducting to 
metallic CNTs to increase, and thus the correlation between both states to further reduce. 
2.3.3 Area Comparison 
In practice, the number of challenge bits is larger than 128 bit. In this case, the area cost 
per bit of a one-output-bit CNPUF, 𝐴𝐶𝑁𝑃𝑈𝐹,𝑏𝑖𝑡, is approximately the area of a CNPUF-PE 
and thus two times the area of a transistor, 𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟: 
𝐴𝐶𝑁𝑃𝑈𝐹,𝑏𝑖𝑡 ≅ 2 ∗ 𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟 
This compares favorably to the basic implementation of the Arbiter PUF [1], which 
requires two multiplexers per input bit (assuming that the challenge bit length is large 
enough to neglect the Arbiter). Using a transmission gate implementation, the area cost per 
bit of a basic Arbiter PUF, 𝐴𝐴−𝑃𝑈𝐹,𝑏𝑖𝑡, is 
𝐴𝐴−𝑃𝑈𝐹,𝑏𝑖𝑡 ≅ 2 ∗ 𝐴𝑀𝑈𝑋 ≅ 8 ∗ 𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟 
Here, 𝐴𝑀𝑈𝑋 is the area of a 2:1 multiplexer (or MUX). 
The area advantage of CNPUF is even larger when compared with a ring oscillator PUF 
(RO-PUF) [2]: A RO-PUF requires at least 2𝑁 − 1 ring oscillators (ROs) for 𝑁 input bits. 
Considering the usage of very small ROs consisting of only three inverters, the cost of a 
RO-PUF per bit 𝐴𝑅𝑂−𝑃𝑈𝐹,𝑏𝑖𝑡 depends on the challenge length 𝑁 and is 
𝐴𝑅𝑂−𝑃𝑈𝐹,𝑏𝑖𝑡 ≅
(2𝑁 − 1)
𝑁
∗ 6 ∗ 𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟 
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2.3.4 High Reliability 
The reliability of PUF designs is typically evaluated with regard to variations in 
environmental parameters, such as the temperature, and variations in the operating 
conditions, e.g. the supply voltage. As explained in section 2.2, CNTs have exceptional 
electrical characteristics and are known to have high stability under environment variations. 
The reliability of our proposed CNPUF builds on the highly stable characteristics of CNTs, 
but has two additional features that support reliability: 
 Strong impact of physical variations 
 Regular design 
The physical variations are large and have a strong impact on the PUF challenge-
response behavior. Particularly the ratio variations between semiconducting and metallic 
CNTs have a very strong impact on the circuit behavior. Our design takes advantage of the 
difficulty of controlling CNT chirality to create a secret by comparing the current through a 
series connection of CNPUF-PE. Since metallic and semiconducting CNTs are randomly 
mixed during the fabrication process, the exact ratio of metallic and semiconducting CNTs 
for each FET is not predictable and can be treated as a random number.  
Except for the comparator, our design is very regular, and therefore the dynamic effects 
in the upper and lower path can average out. Only the comparator has to be specifically 
designed to be resilient to dynamic variations such as temperature changes or voltage peaks. 
In comparison, a ring oscillator PUF has MUXes, counters and also a comparator that have 
to be tuned, because they affect both paths and therefore have to treat these paths equally. 
This can be difficult in practice, as the variations on different metal layers and in different 
chip regions can be different, so that the number of circuit elements that require fine tuning 
has to be minimized. 
2.3.5 Resistance against Modeling Attacks 
The proposed CNPUF design takes advantage of inherent CNT properties and variations 
to represent a complex challenge-response behavior to modeling attacks. Some of this is due 
to the many varying physical factors as described in section 2.2. Even more important is that 
these varying physical properties can have a different level of impact on the challenge-
response behavior. Therefore, a model based attack has to accurately identify and mirror 
different physical characteristics. Due to an increase in this dimension, CNPUF has a high 
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resistance against such attacks. However, the basic implementation of CNPUF has 
independent output bits and thus does not take full advantage of the existing circuitry. 
Furthermore, some applications, such as secret key generation, require very high 
randomness and must have an even more complex challenge-response-behavior. Therefore, 
we also present an extended version of CNPUF that introduces a power vs. security tradeoff 
and has area overhead to create a feedback based design with even higher modeling 
complexity. 
2.4 Extended CNPUF 
2.4.1 Extended Design 
While the basic CNPUF has many desirable properties, such as low power consumption 
and minimal area requirements, its static nature does not allow fine-tuning by the designer 
to specific application needs. Therefore, we also present the extended CNPUF (ex-CNPUF), 
which is shown in Figure 2.2. As a basic element, the ex-CNPUF contains one basic CNPUF 
per output bit, shown in Figure 2.1. However, ex-CNPUF buffers each bit response and 
feeds it back into the CNPUF-PE elements through an XOR-element with the original 
challenge. This may be repeated a specific number of times for each challenge, depending 
on the application specific requirements. As a result of this response feedback, the 
complexity at the bit level increases, which further improves the resistance against modeling 
 
Figure 2.2 Design of the extended CNPUF (ex-CNPUF) to allow a power vs. security tradeoff 
and more complex challenge-response behavior. All shaded blocks contain the XOR-gate and 
CNPUF-PE structure shown to the top left. 
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attacks. Furthermore, the output bits will no longer be independent of each other, a feature 
that drastically increases the design complexity a modeling attack has to consider. 
The additional area overhead compared to the basic CNPUF is one XOR gate per 
CNPUF-PE element. Considering that the CNPUF-PE was designed for minimal area and 
consists of only two transistors, the area overhead of the extended design is approximately 
300%. The area of ex-CNPUF is: 
𝐴𝑒𝑥−𝐶𝑁𝑃𝑈𝐹 ≈ 8𝐴(𝑇) 
Although the area overhead over CNPUF is not negligible, ex-CNPUF still compares 
favorably to several PUF implementations. It has approximately the same area as a simple 
arbiter PUF and less area than an RO-PUF. However, the greatest advantage is the power-
security tradeoff, which is explained in subsection 2.4.2. 
2.4.2 Power-Security Tradeoff 
As shown in subsection 2.4.1, ex-CNPUF brings several advantages in flexibility and 
security, but introduces area overhead relative to the basic CNPUF design. The design of 
ex-CNPUF is very feasible for high-security applications that require more modeling 
resistance or higher randomness than what CNPUF can provide. By increasing the number 
of ex-CNPUF iterations, the complexity and randomness of the response increases. This 
comes at the cost of higher energy consumption and reduced reliability. The reduced 
reliability is a result of error propagation within the PUF and the fact that even a single bit-
error in the challenge can profoundly change the response, if no error correction schemes 
are used. Note that the area tradeoff is static and has to be made at design time, but the power 
tradeoff can be dynamically adjusted. Thus, ex-CNPUF can power a security interface that 
provides different degrees of resistance for different domains. 
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2.5 Experimental Evaluation 
2.5.1 Simulation Setup 
For the experimental evaluation of CNPUF, we simulated the design in HSPICE1 in a 
Linux environment. To simulate the CNFETs contained in CNPUF, we employed the 
Stanford CNFET HSPICE model [22], [23]. For standard logic and comparison purposes, 
we employed the Predictive Technology Model (PTM)[24]. Our CNT simulation is based 
on zigzag structure with a nominal chirality of metallic nanotubes of (𝑛, 𝑚) = (10, 0) and 
a nominal chirality of semiconducting nanotubes of (9, 0).  
As a solution to the lack of support for metallic CNTs in the HSPICE model, we simulate 
real CNFETs by splitting them into one ideal metallic and one ideal semiconducting 
CNFET, as shown in Figure 2.3. The metallic CNFET is modeled by assigning the 
appropriate chirality and setting the gate voltage to always-on, independent of the challenge. 
Note that this separation is solely for the purpose of experimental evaluation through 
simulations; one metallic CNFET and one semiconducting CNFET in the simulation model 
represent a single transistor. In this regard, our design does not require ideal or pure-
semiconducting CNFETs, but instead takes advantage of metallic CNTs. 
                                                          
 
1 HSPICE Version E-2010.12-SP2 32-BIT 
 
Figure 2.3 Simulation model for the metallic CNTs in the CNFETs contained in CNPUF. 
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For this experimental evaluation, we implemented an 8-Bit input/output CNPUF and 
analyzed reliability, inter-chip variability, and power consumption. A small design was 
chosen, such that a large number of SPICE-accurate simulations can be performed to 
provide detailed insight into the reliability under environment variations. As a proof of 
concept, we have also evaluated a larger design of 128-bits and observed in a smaller 
number of simulations that the behavior is very similar to the 8-bit implementation.  
2.5.2 Reliability 
Reliability is one of the main criteria for PUF quality and quantifies the capability to 
repeatedly and consistently produce the same challenge-response behavior. As explained in 
section 2.2, CNTs generally have a high reliability that is further improved by specific 
design measures described in section 2.3.4. To experimentally validate the reliability, 
CNPUF is evaluated under a standard simulation environment that is used in most literature, 
and a simulation environment with more dynamic variations to simulate real circuit 
performance.  
The standard simulation environment is similar to that employed in several publications 
[10], [25] and has the following characteristics: 
 Temperature variations: The temperature of the whole circuit is evaluated at 
specific temperature points or at random temperature values. 
 Supply voltage variations: The supply voltage of the whole circuit is varied. This is 
implemented by having a common random voltage variation with 𝜎𝑉,𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 at every 
voltage source (including challenges). 
To provide a stronger comparison with implemented PUF circuits, we also propose an 
extended simulation environment with the following parameters: 
 Dynamic temperature: In addition to the static temperature variation, we model 
dynamic temperature variation by adding a different random temperature 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 to 
the static temperature for each simulation. Therefore, we compare challenges that 
were acquired at different temperatures.  
 Local voltage variation: Simulation of dynamic local voltage variation by 
introducing a local variation 𝜎𝑉,𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙  at each voltage source and at each gate in 
addition to the common voltage variation. 
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This is particularly relevant to real physical devices, as there is additional circuitry on 
chip besides the PUF that can influence the power and temperature with different levels of 
activity. The experimental data for both simulation environments is shown in Figure 2.4. 
The detailed averages for each ratio are provided in Table 2.1. The range for these 
parameters is shown in Table 2.3. For the standard environment, we conducted over 3500 
HSPICE simulations and evaluated the intra-chip Hamming distance to: 
Table 2.1 Experimental results for reliability 
Nominal 
Metal Ratio 
Intra Chip Hamming Distance 𝑯𝑫𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒂 
Basic CNPUF Ex-CNPUF 
Std Env Ext Env Std Env Ext Env 
10% 0.025 0.040 - - 
20% 0.019 0.034 0.045 0.05 
30% 0.012 0.030 - - 
Total Average 0.019 0.035 0.045 0.05 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Robustness of CNPUF in a standard simulation environment (top) and in an 
extended simulation environment (bottom). 
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𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎,𝑠𝑡𝑑 = 1.9% 
In the extended simulation environment for accurate comparison against actual circuit 
implementations, the intra-chip Hamming distance was determined from more than 6000 
HSPICE simulations: 
𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎,𝑒𝑥𝑡 = 3.5% 
The reported data was gathered for three different ratios of metallic CNTs to 
semiconducting CNTs, as the ratio between metallic and semiconducting CNTs can have 
different nominal values. This ratio is typically between 10% and 33%; therefore, we 
provide evaluations with 10%, 20%, and 30% ratios and show that CNPUF is viable in the 
whole range. The graph further shows that a higher metallic ratio actually leads to a slightly 
higher reliability. This is an effect of increasing dominance of the metallic CNTs, as their 
share becomes larger. To achieve a well-balanced design, we therefore propose the usage 
of CNPUF with a nominal metallic ratio of around 20%, which can be achieved without any 
breakdown in current technology. 
Table 2.2 Power and energy comparison between CNPUF and ultra -low power current-based 
PUF [10] at 14nm and 90nm. 
Designs CNPUF Current based PUF [10] 
Technology 90nm, 1.2V 14nm, 0.8V 90nm 14nm, 0.8V 
Power 15.6μW/bit 1.26μW/bit 150μW/bit 24μW/bit 
Delay 43ps 26.5ps 250ps ~5ps 
Energy 0.67fJ/bit 0.0334fJ/bit 37.5fJ/bit 0.12fJ/bit 
 
Table 2.3 Simulation parameters for CNPUF. 
Parameter Range 
Temperature 𝑻 −20° 𝑡𝑜 80°𝐶 
Dyn. Temp. 𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒅 0° 𝑡𝑜 20°𝐶 
Voltage variation 
𝜇 = 0.8𝑉 
3𝜎𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 = 22.5% 
3𝜎𝑑𝑦𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐 = 7.5% 
CNT ratio variation 
𝜇𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = {0.1, 0.2, 0.3} 
3𝜎𝑝ℎ𝑦 = 22.5% 
Channel length variation 
𝜇𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙 = 14𝑛𝑚 
3𝜎𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙 = 22.5% 
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Due to simulation complexity, ex-CNPUF was only evaluated at a 20% metallic ratio. 
As expected, the reliability slightly decreases as the complexity of the design increases. 
However, the intra-chip Hamming distance is still well below the 10% typically considered 
a limit for error correction [9], and competitive with other PUF designs  
2.5.3 Inter-chip Variability 
For security applications, different PUF instantiations require sufficiently different 
challenge-response behavior, so that the behavior of one PUF instance may not be inferred 
through ownership of another. Ideally, all pairs of responses from different instances would 
share 50% of their output bits on average. As a metric for this variability between physical 
instances, the inter-chip Hamming distance, 𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟, is used.  
For the generation of 𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟, we created 10 groups of 10 PUF instances. To each group 
of PUF, we issued 100 randomly generated challenges. The average 𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 of CNPUF is 
49.67% and therefore very close to perfect (50%). 
2.5.4 Power Consumption 
 By using intrinsic CNFET-unique properties, such as the metallic-semiconducting ratio, 
CNPUF allows secret-key generation at a very low cost. An area comparison was provided 
in section 2.3.3 and showed that CNPUF requires less logic than other PUF designs. These 
advantages combine to greatly reduce the power and energy consumption, as shown in Table 
2.2. Based on SPICE-accurate simulations, we report that CNPUF achieves the highest 
power and energy efficiency to the best of our knowledge and reduces the power 
consumption per bit to 1.26μW and energy consumption to 0.0334fJ/bit. We compare 
CNPUF with ultra-low power current based PUF [10] at 90nm and at 14nm. According to 
data provided by the authors, CNPUF reduces power by 89.6% and energy by 98% when 
implemented in 90nm technology. For comparison purposes, we reimplemented [10] into 
14nm technology and conducted power and energy measurement under ideal conditions. At 
this technology node, CNPUF reduces the power by 94.75% and energy by 72.16%. 
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However, it is very likely that the quality of PUF designs that require sub-threshold 
operation, e.g. [10], will degrade at smaller technology nodes, as susceptibility to 
environment variations greatly increases. 
In Table 2.4, we compare the reliability of CNPUF against other PUF designs with 
simulated results and show that CNPUF can outperform them. In Table 2.5, the evaluation 
under extended environment conditions of CNPUF is compared against physical 
implementations of other PUF designs. Note that the authors only evaluated ScanPUF at a 
single temperature, which reduces the comparability, as all other designs were evaluated at 
a wide range of temperatures. The numbers show that in addition to a considerable reduction 
in area and power consumption that we previously showed, CNPUF can also achieve higher 
reliability. The inter-chip distance of all PUF designs, including ours, is very comparable 
and close to the desired 50%. 
2.6 Conclusion and Outlook 
We presented a PUF design based on intrinsic physical variations of CNTs. It takes 
advantage of the metallic to semiconducting CNT ratio in CNFETs to increase reliability, 
while strongly reducing the average power consumption and energy usage per bit. CNPUF 
was experimentally evaluated with SPICE-accurate simulations and showed strong results 
for security relevant properties such as reliability and inter-chip distance. Furthermore, we 
presented and evaluated an extension of CNPUF that allows a power vs. security tradeoff 
for dynamic usage in high security circuits. 
Table 2.4 Comparison of 𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎 in different simulated PUF designs. Lower percentages 
mean higher robustness. 
CNPUF ScanPUF[24] ROPUF[9] ClockPUF[9] Current PUF[10] 
1.9% 5% 9.51% 5.07% ~3% 
Table 2.5 Comparison of 𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎 between real PUF circuits and CNPUF under extended 
environment simulation. 
CNPUF Butterfly PUF [8] SRAM-PUF [25] ScanPUF [24] 
3.5% 6% ~8%-18% 3.2% (*) 
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CNPUF and ex-CNPUF provide the future basis for authentication and secret key 
generation by offering security at a very low area and power cost. This can open the field of 
PUF for a variety of new applications and is especially relevant for current research areas 
such as wireless sensor networks or ubiquitous computing. 
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CHAPTER 3  
SYSTEM-OF-PUFS: MULTILEVEL 
SECURITY FOR EMBEDDED SYSTEMS 
3.1 Introduction 
With the emergence of ubiquitous computing, the entire society increasingly relies on 
embedded computing devices in every aspect of life. They enable wireless communication 
and contactless payments, enhance automobile safety and reliability, and are at the core of 
the emerging smart-grid. The critical importance of embedded devices drives the growing 
need for computer security. The emergence of ubiquitous computing has brought new 
security threats and further increases the importance of security, particularly reliable 
authentication. Wearable technology and personal medical devices are employed to monitor 
and augment the functionality of human organs, but an adversary that circumvents 
authentication protocols can directly impact the physical well-being of users. Moreover, 
such authentication failures in wireless sensor networks for border control and defense 
purposes can have hazardous consequences at an international scale. Therefore, the need for 
continued advances in the domain of computer security is clear.  
Software and network security have gained increased attention and are widely perceived 
to provide the necessary means for secure communication, authentication, and data storage. 
However, researchers and security professionals have shown that algorithms and protocols 
that are theoretically proven to be secure are often physically attackable in their 
implementation. The primary cause for this vulnerability is that implicit high-level 
assumptions to the hardware, such as information containment and resistivity against 
physical modifications, are difficult or very costly to achieve. For example, Side-channel 
information leakage was used to successfully attack AES implementations [26], and secret 
keys can be extracted from volatile memory long after the device is disconnected from its 
power source [4]. Moreover, state-of-the-art security and authentication protocols are based 
on secure storage and usage of secret keys [27]. Therefore, non-volatile memory (NVM) 
and fuses were used to construct a hardware-based secret key [7]. However, NVM is prone 
to invasive physical attacks such as focused-ion beam based circuit-edits [28], [29] and non-
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invasive imaging attacks [30]. To worsen the security options of embedded systems such as 
smart-cards and wireless sensors, this new device generation is critically power and resource 
constrained, allowing only minimal resource allocation for security purposes. Classic 
cryptographic algorithms are of high complexity and are power intensive, rendering them 
undesirable for most embedded system applications [30].  
Due to the threat of invasive hardware attacks, physically unclonable functions (PUFs) 
[4] were introduced as a light-weight building block for hardware security. A PUF is a 
disordered physical system that reacts to an external stimulus or challenge 𝐶 with a response 
𝑅, which depends on nanometer-scale intrinsic fluctuations [31]. As this nanometer-scale 
disorder depends upon unique device-specific properties that originate from random 
variations during the manufacturing process, the PUF behavior is device-specific. 
Therefore, two PUF devices with identical (layout) design exhibit different behavior, which 
defines the unclonability of PUF. Moreover, as the behavior depends upon the exact internal 
properties of the disordered system, any physical modification or tampering results in 
modified behavior, which is utilized to achieve tamper resistance. Thus, PUFs do not exhibit 
the same weaknesses towards non-invasive imaging and invasive attacks. However, PUFs 
only provide the basic building block for security and have to be incorporated into a system 
that can participate in a security protocol for tasks such as authentication. Whereas PUFs by 
themselves have been intensively studied, analyzed, and formalized, there exists no 
consistent system-level security model that clearly defines and scrutinizes the security of an 
embedded system. This lack of system-level security model shows in current protocols, 
which introduce unsecure components into a PUF-based system that can lead to 
considerable security obstacles and reduced functionality. 
This chapter addresses the security demand of embedded systems and introduces a 
security model and PUF-based authentication protocol. Our unique contributions are: 
 A system-level security model for embedded systems with emphasis on invasive and 
modeling attacks. 
 Authentication protocol which operates in multiple levels and alleviates the resource 
constraints of embedded systems by moving resource intensive components off-chip.  
 A heterogeneous System-of-PUF (SoP) that utilizes the large PUF design-space to 
achieve tamper-resistance and resistivity against modeling attacks without costly active 
components. 
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 SoP is designed to achieve specific security requirements utilizing the system-level 
model. It reduces the gate-equivalent cost by 64% compared to an existing design. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In section 3.2, we review the 
background of PUF and PUF-based authentication. The main contributions of this chapter 
begin with section 3.3, where we introduce a system-level security model. In section 3.4, 
we analyze existing PUF-based protocols and design-techniques. In section 3.5, we propose 
a SoP with multilevel authentication protocol, followed by a detailed security analysis in 
section 3.6. An experimental evaluation that shows the feasibility of the protocol is provided 
in section 3.7. This chapter concludes with a summary in section 3.8. This chapter is based 
on [32]. 
3.2 Background 
PUFs are characterized by their challenge (input) and response (output) behavior. 
Typically, a PUF consists of a number of equally designed components that have marginally 
disparate physical properties due to manufacturing variations. The challenge to a PUF is 
used to select which PUF components are compared for their physical properties and the 
response is a bit or bit-string representing the outcome of pairwise comparison of the 
selected elements.  
3.2.1 PUF Quality Metrics and Designs 
In this chapter we use inter-chip and intra-chip distances [33] to establish design criteria 
for PUF. Inter-chip Hamming distance 𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟  is a metric for the difference between 
manufactured PUF instances and thus represents randomness, the usability of static 
Table 3.1 Comparison of PUF designs in reliability (lower 𝐹𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎 is better) and randomness 
(0.5 for 𝐹𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟  is ideal). 
PUF designs 
Quality metrics 
𝑭𝑯𝑫𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝑭𝑯𝑫𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒂 
ClockPUF [14] 0.503 0.057 
SRAM 0.4997 < 0.12 
Arbiter PUF 0.51 0.05 
4-XOR Arbiter PUF [13] 0.51 0.19 
Ring-Oscillator [4] 0.4614 0.0048 
 
23 
 
 
variations, e.g. process variations. Ideally, this randomness is 50%, as this would imply that 
different manufactured instances are uncorrelated. The strict avalanche criterion is another 
important property by which a single bit-flip in the input leads to a flip of half of the output 
bits. Intra-chip Hamming distance 𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎 represents the variability of the responses of a 
single PUF instance when issued with the same challenge. Unless 𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎 = 0, the PUF 
response contains bit-errors. 𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎 is a metric for the robustness of the PUF and lower 
values indicate higher reliability under environment variations. When averaged over the bit-
length, we refer to the fractional Hamming distances 𝐹𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎 and 𝐹𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟. 
A wide variety of PUF designs have been introduced. Figure 3.1 visualizes some of the 
components that can be employed as a PUF, and the properties of these designs are 
summarized in Table 3.1. 
SRAM-PUF [34], [35] leverages the device-specific start-up value of a SRAM-cell to 
provide a device-specific fingerprint. It is a low-cost PUF as it utilizes existing components, 
and it is suitable for ID or key generation. However, the reliability and uniqueness of 
SRAM-PUF are typically lower than those of dedicated PUF structures that have been 
engineered for these properties. 
In the Arbiter PUF [7], an output bit is generated from a delay comparison of two equally 
designed paths. The challenge is used to select a specific path by controlling multiplexers 
(MUXes) that select between equally designed, but physically different wire segments. 
Rührmair et al. presented model-building techniques that successfully predicted the 
behavior of an Arbiter PUF with a small training data-set [36]. N Arbiter PUFs can be 
combined by exclusive-or (XOR) gate connection of the individual response bits (N-XOR-
Arbiter PUF), for integer N. These XOR-Arbiter PUFs increase the difficulty of creating a 
 
Figure 3.1 Overview of various PUF designs. 
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model for the PUF, but the XOR combination also linearly reduces the reliability of the PUF 
[37]. Furthermore, it was shown that a 6-XOR Arbiter PUF is very expensive to model [36]. 
Ring-oscillator PUFs (RO-PUFs) [7] consist of a number of ring-oscillators that are 
designed to be identical. Based on the challenge, two MUXes select one ring-oscillator each 
and their frequency is compared using a counter for each of the oscillators. This comparison 
determines the output bit of the RO-PUF. RO-PUF has been shown to achieve high 
reliability, but is comparably power-intensive and slow as many cycles are needed to 
distinguish the respective oscillator frequencies. 
Yao et al. [9] introduced a PUF design based on the clock network of the chip that 
inherits the stability and inherent reliability of a clock network but introduces enough 
variations to show randomness. They choose specific sinks in the clock network and branch 
the clock signal from these sinks and generate a bit from comparison similar to the Arbiter 
PUF. It should be noted that this PUF design introduces an overhead of approximately 20% 
on the clock-tree, which is a considerable expense for current technologies due to the 
complexity of clock networks.  
3.2.2 PUF Security Models and Formalization 
The quality of PUF research is apparent from the number of security formalizations and 
models that exist for the PUF as a component. Rührmair et al. [31], [38] have introduced 
formal security proofs for Strong and Weak PUF designs. Strong PUF is defined to have a 
very large set of possible challenges with accessible but complex challenge-response 
interface. Corresponding responses of selected challenges will be paired to identify the 
correctness, and numerical prediction of a response is strongly prevented. On the other hand, 
Weak PUF has a small challenge-space. Thus, it does not exhibit the same resistance as 
Strong PUFs with regard to modeling attacks, but can be utilized to generate a secret key. It 
is preferred over NVM, as it is based on physical disorder and thus provides inherent tamper 
resistance. 
Based on practical attack scenarios, Rührmair and van Dijk [31] introduced three 
different PUF models: (1) stand-alone, good PUF model that assumes a single isolated 
protocol execution without malicious intervention such as manipulated hardware; (2) PUF 
re-use model which allows the adversary multiple access to the PUF, but does not consider 
hardware modifications; (3) bad PUF model, which is concerned with scenarios around 
physically modified PUFs which can be exploited by an adversary.  
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3.2.3 Helper Circuits 
As a basic building block, PUF relies on additional circuitry to enhance or complement 
its functionality. Although a wide variety of techniques exist, we will only discuss challenge 
expansion, error correction, and hash-based randomization, due to their importance for 
authentication protocols. 
Most PUF designs only generate one response bit, as the outcome of a random binary 
variable is evaluated. A resource-intensive approach of extracting multiple response bits 
such that the response has bit-length 𝑙𝑅 is to implement 𝑙𝑅 PUFs that are simultaneously 
stimulated by the identical challenge. For lightweight applications, a pseudo-random 
number generator (PRNG) can also be used as a challenge expander, e.g. a linear shift 
feedback register (LFSR) [30], [39]. Based on an initial challenge as the seed, the PRNG 
will generate a consistent challenge sequence, such that the PUF response with 𝑙𝑅 bits is 
generated by a single PUF structure in 𝑙𝑅 time-steps. Thus, this provides for a time-space 
trade-off, which can be utilized for low-resource embedded systems. It should however be 
noted that this approach is preferable with a long challenge, such that the probability of 
encountering the same actual challenges from the PRNG in a short time frame is small. 
Moreover, the challenge-expander technique is more susceptible to modeling attacks, as it 
provides less complexity and every bit is generated from the same PUF-structure. 
As PUF elements are designed to be equal, their response is volatile and dynamic 
variations such as temperature or supply voltage variations commonly lead to noise in PUF 
responses. This noise results in random bit-flips in the response. To maintain correct 
functionality in the presence of such bit-flips, PUFs can be complemented with error 
correcting codes (ECC) and fuzzy extractors [40]. Ring-oscillator PUF design employing 
index-based syndrome encoding (IBS) was shown to have very high reliability 
characteristics [40]. Further improvements over this exist, which allow a tradeoff between 
design complexity and error correction [41]. Despite continued research and advances in 
this domain, these error correcting techniques are very expensive in area and energy 
compared to the cost of the actual PUF, suggesting that they are less suitable for lightweight 
applications. This cost overhead is even more pronounced, as error correction leads to 
certain (predictable) loss of entropy, which in turn requires a larger PUF design.  
As described in subsection 3.2.1, randomness is an important property of PUF. When 
the PUF challenge-response behavior lacks randomness and is easily predictable, it can be 
complemented by a hash-function that randomizes the PUF responses. On-chip hash 
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functions are also used to enable authentication without exposing the direct PUF responses 
[42]. However, it should be noted that on-chip hash functions incur considerable cost in both 
area and run-time that typically exceed those of the PUF by more than an order of magnitude 
[30], [43]. Even hash functions that are designed for light-weight hardware implementations 
incur overhead that exceeds the cost of the PUF itself [44]. 
3.2.4 PUF-based Authentication Protocols 
We use the terminology of [30] and refer to the Prover as a device to be authenticated, 
and the Verifier as the trusted party authenticator that judged whether the Prover is authentic 
or not. The authentication protocol determines the interaction between Prover and Verifier.  
A simple authentication protocol based on issuing random challenges with known 
responses is presented in [7]. Initially, challenge and response pairs are gathered in an 
enrollment phase. The trusted party can validate the PUF responses against the known 
responses. To handle man-in-the-middle attacks, it is proposed to only use each challenge 
once. 
Reverse Fuzzy Extractor [39] is a lightweight authentication scheme that attempts to 
move computationally complex or resource intensive components off the PUF-circuit to the 
authentication granting authority. It is based on reversing error correction schemes 
employed to increase PUF reliability. 
Another recent approach is Public PUF (PPUF) [45], where detailed physical 
characteristics of each PUF instance are public, allowing anyone to simulate PUF behavior. 
A PUF is then verified by not only providing the correct response to a challenge, but doing 
so in a much shorter time than possible with simulations. As the true response can be 
simulated before issuing the challenge, no previous CRP storage is required. As PPUF has 
high latency and power consumption, extensions with the same principle were developed 
[46]. Due to the computational requirements and detailed device-specific measurements, 
PPUF is most suitable for small-scale applications. 
Slender PUF Protocol is another lightweight protocol [30] that can be used for 
identification and authentication. The protocol has two main ideas: (i) only substrings of 
responses are provided, and (ii) the challenges to the PUF are jointly created by both the 
Prover and the Verifier. The Verifier is assumed to have an ideal model of the PUF, so that 
a response for any possible challenge can be generated. The substring received from the 
Prover is then used to check whether it indeed is a substring of the real PUF response. The 
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second idea is that neither party is allowed to solely generate the challenge; thus the 
challenge comes from a pseudo random number generator (PRNG), and the seed to this 
PRNG is determined by randomly generated numbers (nonces) from both parties.  
Noisy PUF protocol [47], [48] is one of the few works that aim to use multiple PUFs to 
achieve increased security. They use the term noisy to characterize the inherent variation in 
PUF responses. This protocol aims to reduce the vulnerability against modeling attacks by 
modifying the challenge to the main PUF with the aggregated response 𝑋 from a non-noisy 
(error corrected) PUF. They assume that the trusted party can create correct models for both 
PUFs by observing 𝑋, and therefore authenticate the device. They assume that the trusted 
party can then permanently disable access to 𝑋, such that an attacker cannot observe 𝑋 and 
therefore cannot create models. This assumption does not hold under consideration of 
invasive attacks, and this is identified as a significant issue for PUF security in section 3.4.1. 
3.3 System-level Security Model 
In this section, we will discuss metrics and security requirements for embedded systems. 
Based on these requirements, we present mechanisms to achieve security with respect to 
particular vulnerabilities. We then introduce a practical system-level security model for 
embedded systems, which defines and classifies components, interactions, and 
vulnerabilities. With this model, we aim to breach the chasm between component-level 
formalized security models [31], [38], [49], [50] and their system-level implementations. 
This system-level security model is important to achieve improved consistency and resource 
effectiveness in systems and protocols; the current lack of a system-level security model has 
led to a disparity between systems and components that exposes the system to additional 
vulnerabilities, as shown in section 3.4. 
3.3.1 Threats and Metrics 
We discuss several system-level threats that will be considered in the proposed security 
model. For each of the threats, we define different degrees of security functionality with 
respect to the threat which is used to characterize specific components in subsection 3.3.3. 
Definition 1 (Security Functionality): The security features that are provided by a 
product or component [51]; A component 𝐶 has a set of security functionalities 𝐹(𝐶). The 
degree of a particular functionality 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹(𝐶) is denoted by 𝐹(𝐶)𝑓. 
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3.3.1.1 Invasive Attacks 
The threat of invasive attacks, e.g. through circuit edit with de-packaging [28], [29], [52], 
was one of the driving forces for research in PUF. With an increasing number of attack 
techniques and defense mechanisms, a system-level characterization is important to enable 
security based system design. We differentiate between the following three degrees of 
resistance against invasive attacks, which we refer to as tampering. 
Definition 2 (Tamper Evident): A component which is tamper evident (TE) shows 
physical signs of tampering that can be observed and utilized by a trusted party. 
Definition 3 (Tamper-Volatile Functionality): Tamper-volatile functionality (TVR) 
components change their functional behavior upon invasive modification, which can be 
exploited to detect and respond to such attacks. An example of this class is PUF, which 
exhibits highly volatile behavior that changes upon tampering. 
Definition 4 (Tamper Adverse): A component which is tamper adverse (TA) increases 
the difficulty of performing an invasive attack by posing an obstacle to the adversary. TA 
components do not take active measures of recognizing invasive attacks. An example of this 
class is passive metal mesh, which shields relevant parts of the datapath, and therefore 
increases the circuit-editing effort by an adversary who wants to monitor the datapath.  
Definition 5 (Tamper Susceptible): A component that does not contain any measures to 
detect or oppose invasive attacks and does not exhibit uncontrollable behavioral changes 
upon invasive attacks is tamper susceptible (TS).  
3.3.1.2 Modeling Attacks 
Modeling attacks aim to unveil internal behavioral patterns of a device for prediction and 
exploitation. A model can be generated from a vast number of input and output observations 
using machine learning (ML) algorithms. They have been shown to be successful against 
PUF when both input and output are directly accessible. 
Definition 6 (Modeling Resistant): A component is modeling resistant (MR) if it cannot 
be modeled, as it does not expose its behavior to the outside. 
Definition 7 (Modeling Resistant through Infeasibility): When a component exhibits 
highly complex behavior such that the computational cost of generating a model exceeds 
the capabilities of an expected adversary, it is modeling resistant through infeasibility 
(MRI). 
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Definition 8 (Modeling Susceptible): Exposed input-output (IO) behavior and 
reasonable computational cost define a modeling susceptible (MS) component. 
3.3.1.3 Side-Channel Attacks 
Side-channel attacks exploit side-products of confidential computation, memory-access, 
or other functionality, to indirectly infer secret information. This attack is of particular use 
when the component that operates on the secret information is not directly accessible. 
Examples of side-channel attacks include power analysis [26], thermal imaging [53], and 
photon emission analysis [54]. They have been shown to be particularly useful to extract the 
secret key from cryptographic processors running secure encryption. 
3.3.1.4 Attack Multiplicity 
A significant threat to conventional hardware systems is a break one, break all (BOBA) 
principle, in which the successful attack against a single system is applicable to many or all 
similar systems without major modification. An example of high attack multiplicity is a 
system that contains a hardware encoded secret key, such that all manufactured systems 
contain identical secret keys. When one of these systems is attacked and the secret key is 
extracted, all other systems are exposed as well. A PUF based implementation is an example 
of providing low attack multiplicity – even when an attacker extracts the challenge-response 
behavior of one PUF instance, it does not expose the behavior of other instances. 
3.3.1.5 Malicious Design and Untrusted Foundry  
Both design and manufacturing processes are increasingly collaborative but distributed, 
and therefore pose multiple threats: (i) modified RTL behavior or additional circuitry can 
lead to hardware Trojans horses (HTH), which can expose confidential data or disrupt other 
services; (ii) electronic counterfeiting, overproduction, and IP theft due to outsourced 
foundry. 
3.3.2 Classification 
Existing formalized security models as introduced in subsection 3.2.2 are primarily 
concerned with threat models, attack vectors, and vulnerabilities. Particularly for system-
level considerations and for applicability in embedded systems, a security model with 
component-wise functional characteristics is insufficient. Due to the limited pool of 
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resources in embedded systems, implementations have to carefully optimize security 
metrics while minimizing the resource overhead. By enabling characterization and 
classification of hardware security components, our system-level model allows resource-
driven security with intuitive component selection. 
Definition 9 (Core Component): A core component 𝐶𝐶  is one that provides the 
foundation of the security functionality; if a requirement 𝑟 in 𝑅(𝐶𝐶) of system 𝑆 is not met 
by a functionality 𝑓  in 𝐹(𝐶𝐶) , the requirements 𝑅(𝐶𝐶)  are infringed and therefore the 
security requirements of the entire system 𝑆 are not satisfied: 
f ≠ r → ¬𝑅(𝑆) for ∃𝑟 ∈ R(CC), 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹(𝐶𝐶) 
Definition 10 (Periphery): Components which do not directly interact with, affect, or 
enable security functionality are defined as security periphery. It is in the nature of 
computing systems to contain such periphery, and this category enables classification of all 
elements in this security model, even when they are not concerned with security itself.  
Definition 11 (Service Component): Unlike modifier components, a service component 
𝐶𝑆 contributes to usability, quality, reliability, or other security-unrelated functionality of a 
component 𝐶. Component 𝐶 can be a core component, modifier component, or other service 
component. When 𝐶𝑆 is applied to 𝐶, the security functionality of the resulting system is 
limited by the functionality 𝐹(𝐶𝑆): 
𝐹(𝐶)𝑓 = min(𝐹(𝐶)𝑓 , 𝐹(𝐶𝑆)𝑓) for ∀𝑓 ∈ 𝐹(𝐶𝑆) 
Definition 12 (Modifier Component): A modifier component 𝐶𝑀 applies to a compatible 
generalized component 𝐶 which can be a core component, periphery, service component, or 
other modifier component. The purpose of a modifier component is to change security 
characteristics. When 𝐶𝑀 and 𝐶 are compatible, [𝐶𝑀, 𝐶] evaluates to true. Similarly, when 
𝐶𝑀  is applied to 𝐶  and modifies it, 𝑚𝑜𝑑(𝐶𝑀, 𝐶)  evaluates to true. In this model, the 
modifier component directly transfers all of its security characteristics to 𝐶: 
[𝐶𝑀 , 𝐶] ∧ 𝑚𝑜𝑑(𝐶𝑀, 𝐶) → 𝐹(𝐶)𝑓 = 𝐹(𝐶𝑀)𝑓 for ∀𝑓 ∈ 𝐹(𝐶𝑀) 
3.3.3 Security Components 
According to the proposed model, the classification of components depends not only on 
the design, but also on the purpose of the component. Herein, we will demonstrate our 
classification on a subset of state-of-the-art hardware defense techniques. It will be applied 
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in section 3.5 to provide a resource optimized security solution for unilateral embedded 
system authentication. 
Core components are those that provide critical security functionality. This classification 
includes the PUF, which has applications that include secret key generation, unclonability, 
and Trojan detection. Security features of a PUF are: Tamper volatile functionality, as the 
physically volatile responses change upon invasive tampering; physical unclonability, as the 
security functionality is based on actual physical device parameters; low attack multiplicity, 
due to the device-specific security functionality, successful attack (modeling, side-channel) 
of a device only breaches the device itself, and not other instances; other core components 
can be random number generators (RNGs), which provide design and implementation 
dependent security functionality. Additional potential core components can be dedicated 
security registers [55], secure RAM implementations, such as oblivious RAM [56], and 
security processors [57]. 
Most embedded systems are not primarily concerned with security; therefore most 
components on such systems are categorized as periphery. This includes all components that 
do not affect security functionality or components in any way. Examples are arithmetic and 
signal processing units, (conventional) test circuitry, and memory in so far as it does not 
contain confidential data.  
Service components are those that positively affect usability. This classification applies 
to many components in PUF protocols, as PUF itself is a fundamental building block that 
in itself provides limited security functionality. Service components with the purpose of 
increasing PUF reliability are error correcting codes that employ helper data. As a downside, 
this component introduces additional resource utilization and information leakage, 
mandating a larger or more complex PUF implementation. Another, much simpler, service 
component for PUF is the input/output (PUF-IO) circuitry. Although PUF-IO is of low 
complexity, bundling it into the PUF itself would not accord with our security model and 
can generally provide adverse security implications. For protocols that directly expose the 
challenge and response of the PUF, PUF-IO introduces significant susceptibility to 
modeling attacks [58]. 
The purpose of modifier components is to transform the security functionality of other 
components, and they are applicable at the entire design stack, ranging from the signal 
routing to sensors. Examples of this classification are: signal routing at low metal layers to 
shield against semi-invasive and invasive hardware attacks [28]; passive metal meshes to 
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increase the difficulty of semi-invasive attacks and active metal meshes that carry a signal 
to prevent invasive attacks [28]; fuses that can be burnt to disable access to certain 
components after read / write access by the trusted party [30], [59], [60] and that, in the case 
of PUFs, are often applied to remove the vulnerability created by directly accessible PUF-
IO; circuitry that limits the interaction with a component or the number of protocol 
executions that involve the aforementioned component. 
3.4 PUF Security Issues 
In this section, we apply the security model introduced in section 3.3 to discuss the 
security of current protocols and expose vulnerabilities. The issues that we describe are 
impractical or impossible assumptions in subsection 3.4.1, inconsistent evaluation of 
tampering in subsection 3.4.2 and storage complexity in subsection 3.4.3. We propose a 
protocol to overcome these issues and specifically discuss the concerns mentioned here in 
section 3.6. 
3.4.1 Known Model Assumption 
Protocols for authentication based on PUFs typically require either a known model of 
the PUF [30], which is examined in this subsection, or a large set of CRPs [7], discussed in 
subsection 3.4.3. Protocols such as Slender PUF Protocol assume that the trusted party can 
compute a true model for the PUF challenge-response behavior, but an adversary cannot. 
This is justified by suggesting that the PUF circuitry initially exposes the challenges and 
responses of a PUF, such that machine learning algorithms can be used to learn a model. 
After model generation, the trusted party will externally disable the direct access and thus 
PUF
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Figure 3.2 Modeling susceptibility (MS) due to PUF-IO is removed using IO-Fuses, which are 
tamper susceptible (TS) and diminish the tamper volatile functionality (TVF) of PUF.  
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hinder the malicious party from creating a model, which is done using a fuse to disable 
access, as described in subsection 3.4.1. As model-building attacks might be possible when 
the full PUF response is accessible to the outside [30], [58], the ability to disable the sensing 
connection is key to this assumption. 
Using our embedded system security model introduced in section 3.3, we will show that 
this argument is difficult to uphold and has negative consequences for the security of the 
system. The analysis of this application is represented in Figure 3.2, in which rectangles 
represent core components, octagons depict modifier components, and ellipses represent 
service components. The security functionality introduced by a component is depicted using 
cursive typeface; functionality that is inherited by a system is in standard typeface. 
Independent of the particular implementation, PUF is considered a core component, and 
provides inherent tamper resistance due to its volatility. Additionally, PUFs by themselves 
are susceptible to side-channel attacks [61]. As a service component to directly interact with 
the PUF, which enables the trusted party to build a model, PUF-IO is inserted. The solid 
arrows in Figure 3.2 show how the components constitute a larger component. When PUF-
IO directly exposes the challenges and responses of a PUF, the PUF behavior can be 
modeled [58]. Thus, the resulting system is susceptible to modeling attacks. The 
conventional response to this is to use fuses that disable the direct PUF access, which can 
be modeled as a modifier component. While this initially defends against modeling attacks 
as intended, it also introduces a new vulnerability to the PUF system, namely the tamper 
susceptibility. This is the case, as invasive circuit editing [28], [29] can render the fuses 
useless and re-enable the direct PUF access. Thereby, tamper resistance as one of the main 
advantages of PUF is lost. At this point, additional costly techniques that have limited 
applicability for embedded systems, such as active metal meshes, can be employed to reduce 
the vulnerability against invasive attacks. However, tamper resistance cannot be restored to 
the point of inherent volatility that leads to immediate changes upon modification, as is the 
case for PUF. 
This reasoning was based on the assumption of physical fuses, which are burnt to remove 
access. However, it can be applied to similar other concepts that aim to change physical 
access to suit the needs of the trusted party. For example, logical disabling of the sensing 
capability cannot be considered to be secure, as an adversary could acquire the relevant 
knowledge to re-enable it. Maliciously forcing glitches, e.g. by altering the clock frequency, 
is also a common approach to overcome logical access restrictions. We identify this as a 
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major deficiency in existing PUF-based security protocols and propose to treat the trusted 
and malicious party equally. Thus, we require that modeling capabilities of the trusted party 
lead to the same for the adversary. 
3.4.2 Achieving Tamper Resistance 
In this subsection, we emphasize the importance of carefully analyzing, characterizing, 
and utilizing security features with regard to hardware invasive attacks. As outlined in 
subsection 3.3.1, functional tamper resistance as provided by a PUF has to be utilized by 
the protocol or usage scenario to achieve consistent resistance against invasive attacks. 
Components such as a true random number generator (TRNG) or a pseudo random 
number generator (PRNG) have to be treated with particular care and cannot be assumed to 
work as designed under invasive attacks. A security requirement of correct functionality is 
difficult to achieve for these components and requires cost-intensive tamper resistant 
techniques. Whereas a PRNG can be verified to work correctly by simulating or 
manufacturing a PRNG with same design and seed, this is not possible for a TRNG: by 
definition, the TRNG exhibits random and unpredictable behavior. Even an implementation 
based on PUF, which inherently provides TVF, is not tamper resistant, as TVF needs to be 
fulfilled (verified) by the protocol. The issue is that a PUF-based TRNG will exhibit 
changed behavior upon invasive attacks, but this change is not directly noticeable. Potential 
solutions to this are to: (i) model the distribution of the TRNG at enrollment and verify this 
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at runtime or protocol execution; (ii) periodically verify the randomness of responses at 
runtime. Thus, using TRNGs when invasive attacks are foreseen requires a more complex 
protocol with increased resource utilization. This fallacy is demonstrated on the basis of 
slender PUF protocol [30] in Figure 3.3. Here, a TRNG is employed to generate a random 
nonce on the PUF system, and another TRNG is applied to select a random substring of the 
PUF response. The slender PUF protocol applies these as modifier components, meaning 
that they change the security behavior of other components, namely concealing the input 
and output to the PUF to thwart modeling attacks. The issue is that the security functionality 
of these modifier components has to be carefully analyzed in conjunction with the protocol. 
When typical PUFs are invasively attacked, their challenge-response behavior changes and 
the protocol that utilizes the PUF, e.g. for authentication or key generation, is not functional 
anymore, thus enabling tamper resistance. In this protocol, the TRNGs are not core 
components but merely modifier components; even when implemented with PUF, they can 
be invasively attacked using e.g. circuit editing to change their behavior. This is possible, 
as the protocol does not take steps to ensure that these components provide correct 
functionality. Therefore, both of the TRNGs are susceptible to invasive attacks. As the 
authors themselves note, an attacker that is able to control both the Prover and Verifier 
circuitry would be able to generate a model, which is the case using invasive attacks as we 
have outlined here. Although this can be mitigated using additional, costly active tamper 
detecting circuits, this would not be in line with the motivation of slender PUF protocol. 
3.4.3 Exponential Storage Need 
When protocols do not rely on the known model assumption explained previously, they 
typically operate on a set of initially gathered challenges and responses as part of the PUF 
enrollment. As there is a finite number of gathered challenges, such protocols require that 
each gathered challenge is issued only once, as in [7]. The purpose of this is to thwart replay 
attacks in a scenario where the attacker has eavesdropped into legitimate authentication and 
thereby knows all valid responses to previously posed challenges. This approach provides 
an effective hindrance against this form of protocol, but it also exposes the protocol to 
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks: A malicious third party can query the Verifier until the 
stored CRP set is exhausted. This could be mitigated by storing a huge amount of CRPs at 
the Verifier side, which ultimately causes a data storage problem. To withstand a DoS attack, 
the Verifier would be required to store large numbers of long CRP strings and additional 
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synchronization bits. Whereas the known model assumption poses a security vulnerability 
that can lead to a compromised system, using a (limited) number of stored challenge-
response pairs only exposes the protocol to DoS attacks that reduce usability and 
applicability. In section 3.5, a system is introduced that does not assume a one-sided model, 
but is able to avoid the problems outlined here while operating in multiple levels.  
3.5 System of PUFs 
A major limitation that can be observed in current protocols is the usage of only one type 
of PUF design [7], [30]. However, there exist a wide range of competing PUF designs that 
provide complementary features, particularly with regard to reliability and resource 
overhead, as outlined in subsection 3.2.1. Only very few authentication protocols employ a 
combination of multiple PUFs [47], [48], [62], and these protocols do not take advantage of 
the trade-off enabled by the large PUF design-space. Whereas multiple research works 
compare and contrast existing PUF designs, we are not aware of any work that attempts to 
combine different designs to take advantage of unique characteristics.  
To deal with the various issues discussed in section 3.3, we propose a novel SoP that 
utilizes the design-space offered by continuous PUF research and uses multiple levels of 
challenge-response interrogation for authentication.  
3.5.1 Security Requirements 
Before introducing System-of-PUF (SoP) and the multilevel authentication protocol, we 
state the following security requirements that were considered in the design of SoP and the 
protocol. These requirements are typical for light-weight embedded system applications. To 
Hidden PUF Guard PUF
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Prover Verifier
Response Database
Cryptographic
Hash Function
CL1
RG
CL2
RS
RH
RH
CL1 Model ML1 RS
 
Figure 3.4 Components of the lightweight System of PUF. 
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achieve further requirements such as resistance against side-channel attacks, the protocol 
can be expanded with existing techniques [53]. 
Requirement 1: Unilateral authentication between a trusted party (Verifier) and a 
hardware device (Prover). This is a typical scenario for embedded system applications, such 
as smart-cards [63], sensor networks [64], and RFIDs [65]. 
Requirement 2: Resistive against invasive attacks, such as de-packaging and circuit-
edits. Invasive attacks should render the Prover device inoperative and at the least change 
its behavior such that it cannot successfully participate in the authentication protocol. 
Requirement 3: Resistive against modeling attacks; neither adversary nor trusted party 
should be unable to generate a model for the internal behavior of the Prover, particularly 
PUFs. 
3.5.2 Multilevel Authentication 
To provide secure unilateral authentication, the proposed protocol operates in multiple 
levels with a system that consists of three different PUFs, as shown in Figure 3.4: (i) Hidden 
PUF is a reliable PUF with challenge-length 𝑙𝐻 that does not expose its response 𝑅𝐻 to the 
outside and thus is hidden. It limits the exposure of Guard PUF and Secure PUF inputs to 
the outside, and thereby increases the difficulty of modeling attacks of both level-1 and 
level-2 responses. (ii) Together with the Hidden PUF, Guard PUF provides the first level of 
authentication with a challenge-length of 𝑙𝐺. The response of the Guard PUF 𝑅𝐺 is exposed, 
but the input is not. Although of reasonable complexity, we assume this PUF to be modeled 
Prover
Device to be authenticated
Verifier
Trusted party, authenticator
Generate challenge
CL1=random(DBC)
Hidden PUF response
RH=PUFH(CL1[0,lH])
Guard PUF response
RG=PUFG(RH,CL1[lH,lG])
Evaluate level-1 response
HD(RG,ML1(CL1)) < HDmax,L1
Compute Crypto Hash
CL2=Hash(CL1,ML1(CL1))
Secure PUF response
RS=PUFS(RH,CL2)
Evaluate level-2 response
HD(RS,DBL2(CL1)) < HDmax,L2
CL1
RG
RS
CL2
 
Figure 3.5 Proposed multilevel authentication protocol between the Prover and the Verifier. 
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by the trusted party and thus also any attacking party. It not only acts as a guarding stage 
before the Secure PUF, but also indirectly propagates errors of the Hidden PUF to the 
Verifier and thus reduces the critical level-2 false-negative rate. (iii) Secure PUF is the 
secure backbone of SoP and is impossible to model within reasonable time and 
computational complexity, which is denoted as modeling resistivity through infeasibility 
(MRI) as defined in subsection 3.3.1.2. This PUF has a challenge-length of 𝑙𝑆, and both the 
challenge- and response-space should be large such that MRI is achieved. The specifics of 
the authentication protocol are depicted in Figure 3.5. Initially, the Verifier chooses a 
challenge 𝐶𝐿1 of bit-length 𝑙𝐺 , equal to the challenge-length of the Guard PUF. This 
challenge is chosen randomly and can thus fulfill the role of a nonce to thwart replay attacks. 
As this challenge is randomly chosen, it is very unlikely that the same challenge will be 
issued twice, thereby eliminating replay attacks. Then, the challenge is issued to the Prover. 
Here, the Hidden PUF will generate the response 𝑅𝐻, which is internally connected to the 
Guard PUF and Secure PUF inputs. From 𝑅𝐻 and 𝐶𝐿1, the level-1 response 𝑅𝐺 is generated. 
The output of the Hidden PUF is directly connected to the Guard PUF and the Secure PUF; 
it is not available to the outside. After accepting the level-1 response through a Hamming 
distance check against the model 𝑀𝐿1, the Verifier will send the level-2 challenge 𝐶𝑙2. It is 
generated from a secure hash function from the initial challenge and 𝑅𝐺, and has a length of 
𝑙𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ = 𝑙𝑆 − 𝑙𝐻. The Prover then generates the level-2 response 𝑅𝑆 from the initial Hidden 
PUF response 𝑅ℎ  and 𝐶𝐿2 . Finally, the Verifier will verify the level-2 response 𝑅𝑆  by 
calculating the Hamming distance against the true response stored in the database 𝐷𝐵(𝐶𝐿1).  
At first glance, employing the Guard PUF and Hidden PUF as an outer layer to the 
Secure PUF can seem unnecessary, as the Secure PUF itself is already assumed to be of 
significant complexity to thwart modeling attacks. Additionally, it may seem counter-
productive to secure the Guard PUF through the Hidden PUF when the trusted party aims 
to generate a level-1 model. However, there are three reasons why this approach is taken in 
SoP: (i) increasing the difficulty of generating a level-1 model requires prolonged 
interrogation by an adversary, thereby eliminating many attack scenarios, e.g. ATM 
operation; (ii) as only serious and malicious attacks arrive at the second level, SoP supports 
breach recognition that cannot be triggered by accidental misuse or without prolonged 
interrogation of the Prover; (iii) although the Secure PUF by itself is resistant against 
modeling attacks, we increase this resistivity using the outer layer, and thereby either enable 
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long-term security (in presence of increasing compute capability) or the usage of a smaller 
PUF to achieve the same degree of security. 
A database of (previously gathered) responses is employed, as we do not make the known 
model assumption as discussed in subsection 3.4.1. However, SoP is also not vulnerable to 
the exponential storage issue outlined in section 3.4.3, as our multilevel approach allows 
storing very few of the lengthy level-2 responses without falling susceptible to DoS attacks. 
3.5.3 Breach Recognition and Recovery 
As explained in subsection 3.5.2, the Guard PUF may be modeled by an adversary. Note 
that although this is possible, it will come with a considerable computational cost and high 
runtime, as the PUF is not fully exposed to the outside. We define a security breach as a 
situation in which an adversary has gathered significant information on the challenge-
response behavior. In this multilevel scheme, a security breach can be recognized: When a 
false Prover 𝑃′ repeatedly replies with the correct level-1 response 𝑅𝐺
′ = 𝑃′(𝐶𝑙1) but with 
incorrect level-2 responses, the protocol can directly infer that the adversary has either 
generated a model, or gathered a large set of challenge-responses. If an adversary 
purposefully responds to a level-1 challenge with an incorrect response, he will not receive 
a correct level-2 challenge and therefore will be unable to infer the actual level-2 behavior. 
Due to the multilevel nature of SoP, it is still possible to recognize the true PUF: Until all 
stored level-2 challenges are exhausted, the true Prover may successfully authenticate, at 
which point the Breach recovery may be initiated. 
One of the major advantages of the SoP is that it may be used with different PUF designs. 
For higher cost applications with a larger resource budget, the Guard PUF can be designed 
to be reconfigurable. This can effectively reset the level-1 PUF behavior. As the correct 
Table 3.2 PUF design criteria and example implementation 
PUF Criteria Examples 
Low cost 
Hidden PUF 
High reliability 
RO PUF [4], 
Error corrected PUF [17] 
High cost 
Hidden PUF 
High reliability 
Reconfigurable 
Recyclable PUF [42] 
Guard PUF Low cost Arbiter PUF [4] 
Secure PUF High security 
XOR-Arbiter PUF [7], lightweight-PUF 
[20], interleaved Arbiter PUF [14] 
 
40 
 
 
Prover can be authenticated even after a level-1 breach, the advances of an adversary can 
thus be diminished. 
3.5.4 Design-space Utilization  
In combination with the wide range of existing PUF designs, our proposed SoP and 
multilevel authentication protocol enable a variety of design choices adequate for different 
application scenarios. In ultra-low cost applications such as RFID and wireless-sensor 
networks, secure authentication is an important requirement, but the on-chip resources are 
minimal. For such applications, a minimum implementation of SoP that does not implement 
breach recovery and thus only requires simple PUFs is possible. Instead of parallelizing 
PUFs, output bits can be created with challenge expanders through LFSRs. 
In addition to the degree of freedom previously described, each of the three PUFs has to 
be chosen with great care to their specific criteria, as shown in Table 3.2. The high reliability 
of the Hidden PUF is one of the main requirements, as any bit-error in 𝑅𝐻 will automatically 
falsify the Guard PUF and Secure PUF responses due to the avalanche criterion. The high 
resilience to modeling attacks of the Secure PUF is also a criterion that is fundamental to 
the security of the proposed authentication scheme. This clear distinction simplifies the 
design task and reduces the cost, as highly secure designs typically are unreliable and have 
to be correct with highly complex fuzzy extractors as described in subsection 3.2.3.  
3.6 Security Considerations 
In this section, we discuss the security of SoP under the proposed model and with regard 
to the previously identified prevalent PUF security issues. As described in section 3.5, the 
first level of SoP may be modeled by an adversary. Accordingly, we will show that security 
of the authentication protocol is not contingent upon secrecy of the first-level challenge-
response model. 
3.6.1 System-level Security Analysis 
Our analysis of SoP and the multilevel authentication protocol with regard to the system-
level security model we introduced in section 3.3 is shown in Figure 3.6. The most 
pronounced difference between our protocol and prior work is our approach to handling 
Requirement 3, resistivity against modeling attacks. The two techniques to thwart modeling 
attacks in SoP are: (i) conceal PUF I/O by separating input to the Prover from the output, 
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such that none of the PUFs expose both their input and their output; (ii) employ a secure 
PUF with large CRP-space to achieve modeling resistivity through infeasibility (MRI), as 
previous research has shown that PUF size can be increased to increase the cost of modeling 
to the point of infeasibility. 
Resistivity against invasive attacks as per Requirement 2 is achieved through exclusive 
use of PUF. Note that the protocol is designed such that the inherent TVF of PUF is fulfilled 
by comparing the level-1 and level-2 responses with respective database entries. Tampering 
of the Hidden PUF changes the response 𝑅𝐻 and therefore the input challenges to both the 
Guard and Secure PUF, thereby changing the level-1 and level-2 responses. Tampering with 
the Guard PUF or the Secure PUF changes their behavior, which changes the level-1 or 
level-2 responses, respectively.  
 
3.6.2 Attack Scenarios 
In the following, we will discuss several possible scenarios, which include those that 
would lead to successful masquerading of a malicious party. We will show that in practice, 
our proposed protocol is not vulnerable against replay attacks and is resilient against denial-
of-service attacks that would disable other protocols with limited stored CRP sets. We first 
consider a random guessing attack, and then the attacks of an eavesdropping attacker. 
Protocol
PUF–Input
Hidden PUF
Fulfilled TVF
PUF–Output
Modeling Susceptible
 Secure PUF
MRI
Fulfilled TVF
 Guard PUF
Modeling Susceptible
Fulfilled TVF
Verify with
L1 Model
Verify with
L2 DB
 Level-1 System
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Level-2 System
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PUF–Output
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Expansion
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Figure 3.6 System-level security model of SoP. Due to the size of the Secure PUF, the level-2 
behavior is modeling resistant through infeasibility (MRI). The system exhibits tamper-
volatile functionality (TVF). 
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3.6.2.1 Random Guessing Attack 
The attacker has to correctly guess the level-1 response with 𝑙𝐺  bits and the level-2 
response with 𝑙𝑆 bits. False-positive authentication is the case when an attacker successfully 
guesses both of these responses correctly. The probability for a randomly guessed false 
positive authentication 𝑃𝑅𝐺𝐹𝑃 is: 
𝑃𝑅𝐺𝐹𝑃 = ( ∑ (
𝑙𝐺
𝑖
) 0.5𝑙𝐺
𝐻𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑙1−1
𝑖=0
) ( ∑ (
𝑙𝑆
𝑖
) 0.5𝑙𝑆
𝐻𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑙2−1
𝑖=0
) 
For the lightweight system evaluated in section 3.7, this probability evaluates to 𝑃𝑅𝐺𝐹𝑃 =
1.8 ∗ 10−8 
3.6.2.2 Strong Knowledge Attack 
We consider the attack-scenario that the malicious party was in physical possession of 
the true Prover. Although difficult, it is possible that the malicious party generated a model 
for the level-1 behavior (from Hidden PUF input to Guard PUF output). When a malicious 
Prover tries to authenticate itself to a trusted Verifier, it will therefore correctly respond to 
the initial level-1 challenge 𝐶𝑙1, and will receive the corresponding level-2 challenge 𝐶𝑙2. 
However, it is numerically impossible that the attacker was able to generate a valid model 
for the level-2 behavior due to modeling resistivity through infeasibility (MRI) of the Secure 
PUF, as outlined in subsection 3.5.2. Nonetheless, it is possible that the attacker gathered a 
large amount of CRPs including 𝐶𝑙2 and level-2 responses 𝑅𝑆 by eavesdropping into valid 
protocol executions. Consider the attacker to have obtained 𝑘𝑎𝑡𝑡 CRPs. For each CRP, he 
has to store 𝐶𝑙1 of length 𝑙𝐺 , 𝐶𝑙2, and 𝑅𝑆  which both have length 𝑙𝑆 − 𝑙𝐻 , for each CRP. 
Considering only this data, this requires the attacker to store 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟 = (𝑙𝐺 + 2𝑙𝑆 −
𝑙𝐻)
𝑏𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑅𝑃
 . The trusted party stores only 𝐶𝑙1 and 𝑅𝑆 for each CRP, which results in storage 
requirement of only 𝐷𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 = (𝑙𝐺 + 𝑙𝑆)
𝑏𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑅𝑃
 . As 𝑙𝐺 ≪ 𝑙𝑆 − 𝑙𝐻, the trusted party uses only 
half as much memory as the malicious party. Furthermore, the malicious party has to store 
an exponential number of CRPs to achieve realistic authentication probabilities. The 
probability for a successful knowledge attack 𝑃𝐾𝐴 is: 
𝑃𝐾𝐴 =
𝑘𝑎𝑡𝑡
2𝑙𝑆
+ (1 −
𝑘𝑎𝑡𝑡
2𝑙𝑆
) 𝑃𝑅𝐺𝐹𝑃 
In our scenario, this means that an attacker with a model for the level-1 behavior will 
require 𝑘𝑎𝑡𝑡 = 2 ∗ 10
17 stored level-2 responses to achieve a false-positive rate of 1%. This 
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will require storage of 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟 = 2 ∗ 10
17 ∗ 144𝑏 ≈ 3.4 ∗ 109𝐺𝐵. Although the attacker 
and the trusted party have only a factor of 2 difference for a single CRP, the trusted party is 
not required to know a large subset of the challenge-space, as he chooses the challenge. 
This demonstrates the efficiency of our multilevel authentication and shows that SoP 
acts as a force-multiplier that supports the trusted party in authentication by drastically 
reducing off-chip memory requirements and on-chip resources. 
3.7 Experimental Evaluation 
3.7.1 Overview 
In the experimental evaluation, we simulated the lightweight SoP as described in section 
3.5. Our simulation environment was a C++ implementation of a synthetic PUF similar to 
that employed in previous research [58]. Our implementation considered the differences in 
reliability and randomness between different designs due to process variations and 
environmental variations. The specific configuration of our evaluated SoP consists of 
synthetic implementations for three selected PUF designs according to the criteria in Table 
3.2 and the characteristics in Table 3.1: 
 Hidden PUF: 16-Bit input RO-PUF 
 Guard PUF: 32-Bit Arbiter PUF  
 Secure PUF: 64-Bit 4-XOR Arbiter PUF  
3.7.2 Gate-level Cost Comparison 
To provide an estimate of the area overhead incurred by authentication protocols based 
on PUF, we performed a consistent gate-level evaluation. For this comparison, we evaluate 
the main security components, as the control logic introduces negligible overhead and 
should be comparable for all protocols. 
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In Table 3.3, the cost of our proposed lightweight SoP is given as 1767 gate equivalent 
units (GEs). Due to the entropy loss inflicted by the Syndrome generator, the Reverse Fuzzy 
Extractor requires longer responses and additionally employs a Hash function, leading to a 
total cost of 4946 GEs as shown in Table 3.4. Therefore, our lightweight SoP reduces the 
gate count by 64%. 
This emphasizes the low-cost characteristic of SoP. The proposed protocol implements 
unilateral authentication as part of the requirements introduced in subsection 3.5.1. Reverse 
fuzzy extractor additionally provides mutual authentication. We note that unilateral 
authentication is sufficient and often required for many light-weight embedded systems, 
such as NFC, RFID, and sensor networks. 
3.7.3 Reliability despite Error Propagation 
As explained in Section 3.5, we chose the Hidden PUF as an implementation of a RO-
PUF, as it is the most reliable design available from the comparison in Table 3.1. The 
Hamming distances of each PUF component are shown in Figure 3.7, and the propagated 
Table 3.3 Gate equivalent (GE) cost of proposed SoP. 
Component Explanation GE units 
Hidden PUF 16-Bit RO-PUF 145 
Guard PUF 32-Bit Arbiter PUF 130 
Secure PUF 64-Bit 4-XOR PUF 1032 
Challenge 
Expanders 
16-Bit + 32-Bit + 64-Bit LFSRs 460 
Total  1767 
 
Table 3.4 Gate equivalent (GE) cost of Reverse Fuzzy Extractor. 
Component Explanation GE units 
PUF 64-bit 4-XOR PUF 1032 
Challenge 
Expander 
255-Bit LFSR 1024 
Syndrome 
Generator 
234-Bit LFSR 940 
SPONGE Hash 256-Bit light-weight Hash 1950 
Total  4946 
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error from the Hidden PUF can be seen in the Guard PUF and Secure PUF around 𝐻𝐷𝐺 =
16 and 𝐻𝐷𝑆 = 32, respectively. This shows that even a minor error in the Hidden PUF leads 
to a large error with 𝐹𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎 = 0.5 for Guard PUF and Secure PUF. The reason for this 
is the strict avalanche criterion, which requires that even a single bit-flip on the input should, 
on average, lead to a bit-flip for half of the output bits. Figure 3.7 also shows why we 
selected 𝐻𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑙1 = 5  and 𝐻𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑙2 = 21  as parameters for the protocol: The real 
responses of the Guard PUF have a Hamming distance of 5 or less to the ideal response. 
Similarly, the correct responses of the Secure PUF have a Hamming distance of 21 or less.  
3.7.4 Authentication Error 
For authentication, the false-positive and false-negative rates are an important quality 
metric, as they represent the amount of authentication attempts that were falsely accepted 
or rejected, respectively. In our experiments, 𝑃𝐹𝑁,𝑙1 = 7.8% of the level-1 responses had an 
error that exceeded the tolerance of 𝐻𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑙1 and were thus falsely rejected. The cause of 
this lies in the strict avalanche criterion, and the series connection between the Hidden PUF 
and the Guard PUF. Thus, the protocol behaves as intended and rejects bit-errors in the 
Hidden PUF already at the first level. With an adequately chosen tolerance 𝐻𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑙2 at the 
second level and the Hidden PUF errors already filtered at the first level, only 𝑃𝐹𝑁,𝑙2 =
0.257% of the level-2 responses were incorrectly rejected.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.7 Intra-Chip Hamming distances of each of PUF component. We observe that an 
error in the Hidden PUF (left) will propagate and lead to a large error in the Guard PUF 
(center) and the Secure PUF (right) due to the strict avalanche criterion. 
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3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter contributes a new system-level security model that bridges the chasm 
between application-level security analysis and design of secure hardware, and models for 
isolated components. From this model, we analyzed and explained several hardware security 
requirements using existing protocols, and showed that they cannot be fulfilled without 
extensive cost. We presented a multilevel authentication protocol which is verified using 
the system-level security model and which takes advantage of a combination of different 
PUF-designs to minimize resource allocation. SoP does not require expensive error-
correction, as high reliability designs are employed where required. Furthermore, the need 
for latency and power intensive hash functions on the PUF circuit is replaced by a 
combination of strong PUFs and off-chip cryptographic hash. With breach recognition and 
recovery, new security features are introduced and shown to increase the attack-difficulty 
while enhancing reusability. A low-cost implementation of SoP was shown to reduce the 
area by 64% in a gate-level comparison. This low resource allocation and high flexibility 
allows SoP to provide a security solution tailored for ubiquitous computing devices. 
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CHAPTER 4  
POLYPUF: PHYSICALLY SECURE  
SELF-DIVERGENCE 
4.1 Introduction 
Hardware security is increasingly recognized as an important research area for current 
and future devices. Security features are required for all modern communication and 
computing devices, particularly for verification of authenticity and data confidentiality. 
Diverse hardware-based threats such as hardware Trojan horses (HTHs), reverse 
engineering, physical de-packaging and modification, machine-learning, and side-channel 
attacks not only lead to billion dollar losses in counterfeits [66], but also challenge the 
capabilities of existing security techniques.  
Hardware security is of particular value for emerging mobile applications such as 
wireless sensor networks, RFID chips, and smart cards. For these devices, conventional 
security techniques exceed power and footprint limitations. For instance, even widely used 
public-key cryptography techniques have high computational cost that can exceed the 
capabilities of such devices or can strain mobility by depleting their battery. Moreover, 
conventional defenses against physical attacks such as metal-meshes or tamper sensing 
through signal carrying wires require constant power supply and are therefore infeasible 
when low cost is a requirement.  
PUFs are promising security primitives as they are based on intrinsic nano-scale 
manufacturing variations, are lightweight, and provide resistivity against physical attacks. 
It is a binary mapping that represents the unique IC fingerprint by accumulating and 
reflecting the manufacturing process variations that went into each specific device. The 
input and output of this function are referred to as challenge and response respectively. This 
function is a {0,1}𝑚 → {0,1}𝑛 mapping with 𝑚 challenge bits and 𝑛 response bits, which 
we refer to as an 𝑚×𝑛 PUF in this chapter. A wide range of variation sources are used to 
generate this fingerprint, for example the unique constellation of carbon nanotubes [12] in 
carbon nanotube transistors. Due to the utilization of manufacturing variations, the exhibited 
challenge-response behavior is device unique and is not physically reproducible by 
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remanufacturing. Furthermore, the secret of the PUF is the internal physical structure and 
therefore adversaries cannot easily extract it. This dependence of the PUF behavior on the 
exact physical parameters provides the PUF with a volatility which implies destruction of 
the secret on invasive physical attacks.  
Although the PUF behavior is primarily determined by manufacturing variations, it is 
also influenced by environment variations including temperature, pressure, EM-waves, and 
quantum fluctuations [67] that can deteriorate PUF reliability. This lack of reliability 
manifests as noise in the challenge-response behavior and is characterized as the per-bit 
error rate in the responses when the same challenge is repeatedly issued. A common 
application is authentication, where a trusted party proves its authenticity by demonstrating 
ownership of the PUF.  
The two primary concerns for the widespread viability of PUF-based security are 
reliability and resistivity against machine-learning. As previously stated, the volatility of a 
PUF is a benefit against invasive attacks, but it also introduces bit-errors as a disadvantage. 
The volatile nature leads to small changes in the PUF response due to environment 
variations. With reduced reliability, the obstacles in other areas increase; for instance, costly 
error-correction may be required, which in turn requires increased PUF sizes due to entropy 
loss. The issue of machine-learning resistance is important to guarantee that adversaries 
cannot create a model for the PUF. If an adversary successfully creates a model, it would 
fatally defeat any security application of the PUF; for instance, in token-based 
authentication, an adversary with an accurate model can impersonate PUF ownership and 
thus achieve false acceptance. Reliability and resistance against machine-learning are 
particularly difficult to achieve, as the techniques to implement them have contradictory 
effects. On the one hand, a common approach to increase the machine-learning resistance 
is to combine the responses of multiple PUFs. However, this also has a multiplying effect 
on the volatility induced bit-error rate and thus reduces reliability. On the other hand, 
reliability can be increased by implementing error-correction, for instance through repetition 
codes. However, this introduces information leakage and thus decreases the resistance 
against model-building attacks. An additional major disadvantage of the reliability-reducing 
Strong PUFs is that the increased error rate forces longer responses, which in turn require 
transmission of longer bit strings and can have a significant impact on energy consumption 
[68]. As reliability and simultaneous model-building resistance are the primary concerns of 
PUF, they are the focus of this chapter.  
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The problem with resistance against machine-learning is fundamentally due to two 
issues: complexity and determinism. A highly complex behavioral pattern is very difficult 
to learn through machine-learning, as more training data and computational resources are 
needed. The difficulty with increasing complexity in a PUF is that it typically has a 
detrimental effect on reliability. For machine-learning algorithms, deterministic behavior is 
the ideal training target, as the pattern to be learned can be accurately specified. As 
determinism is reduced, for instance due to noise, learning algorithms require more 
computational resources and training data to identify the underlying pattern. As such, 
reducing determinism is a viable approach to counter machine-learning techniques. For 
PUF, however, high determinism is required so that the response to any given challenge can 
be compared to a known correct response. In this chapter, we present the first PUF 
architecture with intentional non-determinism and allow the PUF to change randomly 
between multiple behavioral patterns.  
The unique contributions made in this chapter are: 
 The first PUF architecture to achieve unpredictable non-deterministic polymorphic 
challenge-response behavior. 
 The first PUF architecture to demonstrate strong and scalable machine-learning 
resistance without detrimental effect on reliability and with wide applicability. 
 A consistent security solution by evaluating and eliminating other threat vectors such 
as an unprotected random number generator. 
 Quantitative evaluation of neural network attacks on our proposed PolyPUF 
architecture against reference architectures with various PUF configurations and 
training sets of up to one million examples. 
This chapter is structured as follows. In section 4.2, we introduce relevant background 
and discuss related work. In section 4.3, we introduce PolyPUF and describe the 
polymorphic behavior it exhibits. In section 4.4, the practicality and possible applications 
of PolyPUF are discussed. Section 4.5 discusses various security concerns with existing 
work and clarifies the security advantages of PolyPUF. We provide an analysis of possible 
attacks in section 4.6. In section 4.7, we present an extensive evaluation of PolyPUF and 
existing techniques. We conclude in section 4.8. This chapter is based on [69] 
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4.2 Background 
4.2.1 Notation 
We denote binary vectors in bold lowercase characters. As such, we refer to a PUF 
challenge as 𝒄 and to the response as 𝒓. Multiple binary vectors are differentiated through 
use of a subscript, e.g. challenges |𝒄1| and |𝒄𝟐|. We denote random binary vectors as 𝒙. The 
length of the vector is indicated through their absolute value, e.g. challenge length |𝒄|. The 
individual bits are referenced through round brackets, e.g. 𝒄(𝑖) where 𝑖 ∈ [0, |𝒄|]. Sets are 
denoted through uppercase letters, e.g. A. Due to their significance for this chapter, we 
denote bit-error rates with 𝜖. The Hamming distance between two bit-vectors 𝒂 and 𝒃 is 
denoted by Δ𝒂,𝒃. In larger equations where this subscript notation is not suitable, we also 
use Δ𝒂,𝒃 = 𝐻𝐷(𝒂, 𝒃) interchangeably. 
4.2.2 Statistical PUF Behavior 
In cryptography, confusion and diffusion are important properties of a security primitive. 
Confusion describes the complexity of the relation between the secret key and the cipher 
text, and diffusion describes the complexity between plain text and cipher text. In the context 
of evaluating a PUF, diffusion can be described as the complexity of the relation between 
the input (challenge) and output (response) of the PUF.  
With low diffusion, knowledge of the response to one challenge 𝒄𝑖 implicitly provides 
information on similar other challenges 𝒄𝑗  where the distance Δ𝒄𝑖,𝒄𝑗  is smaller than a 
threshold 𝑑𝑡ℎ . It follows that machine-learning algorithms can extract significant 
information on the challenge-response behavior from few CRPs. Moreover, weak diffusion 
also enables a modified form of repetition attacks, where an adversary re-uses a previously 
observed response 𝒓𝑖 = 𝑃𝑈𝐹(𝒄𝑖) for a new challenge 𝒄𝑗  where 𝒄𝑖 ≠ 𝒄𝑗  and Δ𝒄𝑖,𝒄𝑗 < 𝑑𝑡ℎ 
with hopes that it will be accepted instead of 𝒓𝑗 = 𝑃𝑈𝐹(𝒄𝑗). Here, ∆𝒓𝑖,𝒓𝑗 is small, as the 
originating challenges are close to each other. Due to bit-error mandated authentication 
thresholds, the response will be accepted when ∆𝒓𝑖,𝒓𝑗 is small. For the average response in a 
large set of CRPs, this generalizes to: 
 Δ𝒄𝑖,𝒄0 < Δ𝒄𝑗,𝒄0 → Δ𝒓𝑖,𝒓0 < Δ𝒓𝑗,𝒓0 
(4.1) 
In contrast, high diffusion implies internal complexity and provides high resistance 
against machine-learning attacks. 
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The avalanche criterion is another desirable property requiring that a small change in the 
input changes the output significantly. The strict avalanche criterion requires that any input 
bit flip leads to a flip in each output bit with a probability of 50%, which implies strong 
randomization and therefore difficult input prediction.  
4.2.3 Strong and Weak PUFs 
PUFs are divided into two main categories, Weak PUFs and Strong PUFs. Weak PUFs 
allow a small number of challenges; in some cases only a single challenge can be issued. 
Their most common application is the generation of secret keys that can be used for 
cryptography. An example of this category is the SRAM PUF, which employs the start-up 
state of SRAM cells to generate a response. Strong PUFs must have a large CRP space such 
that it is unreasonable that an adversary can obtain a large share of all possible CRPs. 
Furthermore, its behavior must be unpredictable for an adversary and must provide tamper 
resistance [70]. Whereas the requirement of a large challenge response space is easily 
accomplished, unpredictability is an ongoing concern as discussed before. 
Strong PUFs are subdivided into a variety of different designs that exploit physical 
variations through delay, frequency, temperature, and aging. The Arbiter PUF was one of 
the first proposed silicon-based PUFs and is shown in Figure 4.1. The challenge determines 
the signal path through a chain of multiplexers, and the response is set to logic 1 (0) when 
the signal through the upper path is faster (slower) than through the lower path. As the 
challenge determines the actual paths that the signals take, the response directly depends on 
the challenge and a large CRP-space is possible. The simplicity of the Arbiter PUF is one 
of its main weaknesses, and it is considered one of the weakest PUFs under model-building 
attacks as shown in section 4.2.5 and can easily be predicted [71]. 
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Figure 4.1. An Arbiter PUF with three input bits and one output bit, 3x1 Arbiter PUF. 
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To counter the predictability of the simple Arbiter PUF, the XOR Arbiter PUF was 
presented by Suh and Devadas [7]. It increases the internal complexity by combining the 
response of multiple Arbiter PUFs in an XOR operation. Despite its simplicity, this 
approach notably increases the difficulty of model-building attacks. However, two key 
factors limit the scalability of this approach: First, a 𝑘-XOR Arbiter PUF uses 𝑘 different 
PUFs, and hence requires a linearly increasing number of PUFs. Second, the error rate 𝜖 of 
a simple Arbiter PUF increases to 𝜖𝐾−𝑋𝑂𝑅 = 1 − (1 − 𝜖)
𝑘. Therefore, the error rate scales 
linearly for small 𝐾. In a 28 nm FPGA implementation, an error rate of up to 0.317 was 
demonstrated for a 4-XOR Arbiter PUF, drastically limiting its applicability [72]. 
A high error rate decreases the trusted party’s ability to differentiate a true PUF from a 
counterfeit because the authentication protocol has to allow a threshold so that the 
probability of false rejection of an authentic response is low. Previous research has shown 
that 𝑘-XOR Arbiter PUFs are effective against model-building attacks when 𝑘 ≥ 6 [36], 
[71]. However, this number of Arbiter PUFs degrades the error rate; therefore, the effective 
defense against model building remains an unsolved problem. 
4.2.4 Machine-Learning Techniques 
4.2.4.1 Artificial Neural Networks 
Artificial neural networks (ANNs) were initially designed after biological neural 
networks and are employed for tasks such as natural language processing and computer 
vision [73]. Each artificial neuron has inputs with corresponding weights and produces an 
output by applying a non-linear activation function to the sum of weighted inputs. The 
activation function affects the number of neurons that are needed for complex computations 
and the computational cost of simulating a neural network. Typically, a sigmoidal function 
is used as it can be normalized to produce stable outputs and is easily derivable which is 
useful for updating the input weights [73]. Supervised learning is the process of training the 
network with known training labels.  
A feed-forward network of neurons consists of an input layer, a problem-specific number 
of hidden layers, and an output layer without cycles. The number of layers in the neural 
network specifies the depth. The number of neurons in the input layer and output layer are 
constrained by the problem, in the case of PUFs to the challenge and response lengths, 
respectively. The number of hidden layers and the number of neurons in each hidden layer 
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are derived heuristically. Increasing the number of neurons in the hidden layer allows 
modeling of higher complexity patterns, but can lead to overfitting and increases the 
computation time.  
Backpropagation with gradient descent is a common learning algorithm for ANNs. For 
each weight 𝑤𝑖,𝑗, the corresponding impact on the error function 𝐸 is derived from the chain 
rule, where 𝑤𝑖,𝑗 is the weight between neuron 𝑖 and neuron 𝑗. With this derivative and a 
problem-dependent learning factor 𝜖 , the weight is updated from iteration t to t+1 to 
minimize the error function 𝑤𝑖,𝑗(𝑡 + 1) = 𝑤𝑖,𝑗(𝑡) − 𝜖
𝛿𝐸
𝛿𝑤𝑖,𝑗
(𝑡). 
The downside of backpropagation learning is that the weight update is dependent on the 
gradient, which has a small magnitude due to requirements on the activation function. 
Therefore, backpropagation can converge slowly. In resilient backpropagation (RPROP) 
[74] training, the change in weights does not directly depend on the gradient. Instead, the 
gradient only determines the direction of the weight update, and an individual update value 
Δ𝑖,𝑗 determines the magnitude of the weight update. This allows RPROP to converge much 
faster than backpropagation. In relevance to the evaluation in section 4.7, an epoch is a 
single pass through the entire training set including early evaluation with a verification set. 
Therefore, a limitation to epochs is a more sensible termination criterion than pure runtime 
for the context of learning under an ANN. 
In this chapter, a feed-forward artificial neural network is trained with a hyperbolic 
tangent sigmoid activation function. This function achieves the desired stabilizing behavior 
of the sigmoid function but is one of the most common activation functions because it ranges 
from [-1,1] and therefore allows negative valued outputs. 
4.2.4.2 Pattern Complexity and Model-Building Resistivity 
The complexity of the pattern to be learned mandates the difficulty that a machine-
learning algorithm faces in creating a model for it. A class of sets C is said to shatter a set 𝐴 
when the power set 𝑃(𝐴) = {𝑈 ∩ 𝐴|𝑈 ∈ 𝐶} , meaning that each subset of 𝐴  can be 
expressed as an intersection of 𝐴 and a subset of 𝐶 [75]. The Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC) 
dimension is a measure of the capacity of a classification algorithm: it is the cardinality of 
the largest subset that the algorithm can shatter. Therefore, the VC dimension provides 
insight into the complexity that the learning algorithm can represent. It also follows that a 
pattern that requires a learning algorithm with high VC dimension has a high pattern 
complexity. 
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For artificial neural networks with sigmoidal activation function and fixed depth, the VC 
dimension is contained between the lower bound Ω (𝜔𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝜔)) and upper bound 𝑂(𝜔4), 
where 𝜔 is the number of programmable parameters [75]. For a neural network with a single 
hidden network, the number of programmable parameters is the sum of input neurons and 
hidden neurons. It follows that a neural network with more hidden neurons can characterize 
patterns that are more complex. Furthermore, when a pattern requires a larger amount of 
hidden neurons to be learned, it follows that this pattern has higher internal complexity. This 
is an important consideration for the experimental characterization of model-building 
resistivity in section 4.7. 
4.2.5 Security Threats 
4.2.5.1 Model-Based Token Impersonation 
Highly successful modeling attacks on Arbiter PUFs, RO-PUFs, feed-forward Arbiter 
PUFs, simple PUFs, and XOR-Arbiter PUFs were demonstrated by Ruhrmair et al. [36] on 
synthetic PUFs. These attacks were based on logistic regression using RPROP gradient 
descent and evolutionary strategies. More recently, the authors expanded their results to 
include FPGA and ASIC implementations and showed results resembling those of their 
synthetic implementation [71]. In relevance to this contribution is that they broke a 128-bit 
and 64-bit Arbiter PUF in mere seconds, which leads to the assumption that this is indeed 
one of the weakest PUFs with regard to modeling attacks.  
4.2.5.2 Side-Channel Information Extraction 
It is in the nature of reasonably complex physical devices to leak information on the 
operation that is being performed, which is indirectly observable as a side-channel leakage 
through measurements of power, temperature, and other parameters. Side-channel attacks 
passively exploit this to extrapolate confidential information. This is true even for 
cryptographic modules such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), which is 
approved by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) for top-secret documents. 
Researchers have demonstrated that a side-channel unaware implementation of 128-bit AES 
can be attacked to reveal the entire secret key with only 8,000 measurements [76]. One 
technique against side-channel leakage is power randomization to reduce cross-correlation 
between power trace and performed operation [53]. Another approach is reducing leaked 
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information by normalizing the consumed power in logic gates and interconnects [76]. 
Additionally, obfuscation is a technique to increase the difficulty of understanding and 
reverse-engineering hardware [53], [77], which limits the applicability of side-channel 
attacks as design and internals are hidden. 
4.2.5.3 Physical Access and Tampering 
Physical security is one of the root causes for the invention of the PUF. Conventionally, 
confidential information such as a secret key for encryption/decryption is stored in on-chip 
non-volatile memory (NVM), as this information has to be preserved even when the device 
is powered down. However, this form of storage is vulnerable, as well-equipped adversaries 
can de-package the chip and physically access and read the contents of the NVM [29], [78]. 
Moreover, adversaries can physically tamper with circuitry, for example utilizing focused 
ion beams, to modify or disable components [28]. Conventional hardware security 
approaches such as tamper detection, metal meshes, and similar techniques are expensive in 
power and area and therefore are not applicable for lightweight devices [79]. Furthermore, 
semi-invasive attacks such as optical fault induction [80] allow adversaries to change 
individual bits in microcontroller memory by illumination. Therefore, the volatility that PUF 
provides is one of its strongest characteristics: when physically tampered with, the behavior 
changes and thus the internal secret is destroyed. In section 4.5 we further discuss that PUF 
by itself is not a safeguard against invasive attacks for the entire device. 
4.2.6 PUF Architectures and Protocols 
4.2.6.1 Reliance on Strong PUFs 
The promise of a Strong PUF is to provide a large challenge response space that is 
infeasible to model with state-of-the-art machine-learning techniques. A number of PUF-
based protocols expose both the challenge and response and hence rely on this intrinsic 
modeling resistivity. However, no PUF design for a Strong PUF achieves scalability and 
resistivity against model-building attacks without sacrificing reliability. This remains the 
most common issue among all protocols studied by Delvaux et al. [79]. For these reasons, 
an architecture that enables any PUF design to become a true Strong PUF has significant 
merit and benefits a wide range of existing protocols. In section 4.3, we propose PolyPUF 
that achieves these goals. 
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4.2.6.2 Reverse Fuzzy Extractor 
As previously described, most PUF-based authentication scenarios rely on a Strong PUF 
that can resist model-building attacks yet achieves high reliability. The Reverse Fuzzy 
Extractor (RFE) [81] attempts to avoid this requirement by hiding the actual PUF response: 
During authentication, the verifier issues a challenge 𝒄 with random nonce 𝑥𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒, which is 
an arbitrary random bit-string for one-time usage. The PUF device then generates the actual 
response 𝒓𝑝𝑢𝑓 , which contains perturbations due to environment variations, and the 
corresponding helper data 𝑑ℎ . To hide the actual response 𝒓𝑝𝑢𝑓 , the PUF device then 
releases a hash ℎ𝑃𝑈𝐹 that contains the response. Using helper data 𝑑ℎ and the true response 
𝒓, the verifier can construct 𝒓′ which should match 𝒓𝑝𝑢𝑓 if the PUF is authentic. The trusted 
party can then indirectly compare 𝒓′ and 𝒓𝑝𝑢𝑓 by evaluating ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝒓
′) = ℎ𝑃𝑈𝐹 . 
Releasing helper data always leads to a loss of entropy [79], [82], and despite the 
measures taken the RFE, Delvaux et al. [79] demonstrated that an adversary can selectively 
issue challenges to solve a system of linear equations that characterizes the helper data 
leakage. 
Furthermore, we emphasize that the entropy loss due to helper data leakage requires a 
significantly larger PUF challenge and response lengths. This in turn requires a larger 
challenge expander and a larger hash function [32]. 
4.2.6.3 Slender PUF Protocol 
The slender PUF protocol attempts to invalidate machine-learning-based attacks by 
exposing only a random substring of the response. The challenge to the PUF is determined 
by combining cryptographic nonces from the prover and verifier through a linear feedback 
shift register (LFSR). These nonces are generated from true random number generators 
(TRNGs). This challenge is available to both the prover and verifier, and cannot be fully 
controlled by one party. While it was the first protocol to efficiently introduce noise into the 
PUF response, it is limited by the requirement that it can only be applied on a true Strong 
PUF that meets the avalanche criterion. Such a Strong PUF can be approached with a k-
XOR Arbiter PUF, but this leads to a significant increase in the error rate. In [83], the authors 
demonstrate that the substring has to consist of 1250 bits to achieve an acceptable false 
rejection rate of 1% with a 4-XOR Arbiter PUF. Additionally, the usage of a random nonce 
on the prover side probabilistically enables an adversary to select the nonce such that the 
resulting challenge has a small Hamming distance to a known challenge.  
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4.2.6.4 Noise Bifurcation PUF Architecture 
Yu et al. [72] described a Noise Bifurcation PUF (NBPUF) architecture for PUFs that 
increases the noise for an adversary, reducing their ability to perform machine-learning 
attacks, without increasing the noise observed by the trusted party [72]. In their architecture, 
out of every 𝑑  bits in the response, 𝑑 − 1  bits are randomly discarded. Therefore, this 
architecture requires that the response be pre-expanded by a factor of 𝑑. In authentication, 
only those bits that have deterministic behavior are considered, meaning that all 𝑑 bits have 
the same value. Due to these discarded bits during authentication, the response has to be 
pre-expanded by a factor of 𝑑 ∙ 2𝑑−1 and therefore increases exponentially. The evaluation 
is performed on synthetic PUFs and demonstrates that machine-learning does not converge 
with a dataset of 1 million CRPs when this architecture is applied to a 5-XOR and 6-XOR 
Arbiter PUF.  
4.3 PolyPUF Architecture 
The PolyPUF challenge-response behavior can take many different shapes, and 
randomly changes between them. As the shape changes randomly, an adversary cannot learn 
it using model-building attacks. However, a trusted party can use secret knowledge to verify 
the authenticity of responses despite the random behavioral changes. The ultimate goal of 
PolyPUF is to decouple the observed response 𝒓 from the issued challenge 𝒄 so that model 
building becomes impossible, while maintaining reliable challenge-response behavior. For 
this purpose, the challenge-response mapping is truly random for each individual output bit, 
and therefore goes beyond the complexity achieved in the NBPUF. Therefore, PolyPUF 
enables true Strong PUFs that can withstand model-building attacks. The architecture is 
shown in Figure 4.2 and is described in detail in the following subsections. 
 
Figure 4.2 PolyPUF with challenge self-divergence (CSD), response self-divergence (RSD), and 
internal PUF structure. 
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4.3.1 Random Number Generation 
Many PUF architectures and protocols rely on TRNGs as a core component, but do not 
provide sufficient measures to safeguard them against physical attacks [30], [79]. Defending 
such components for large random numbers is difficult and expensive, as the complexity of 
defense measures to achieve physical security increases with the component’s footprint. 
The PolyPUF architecture overcomes these concerns by utilizing a very small TRNG 
that can be derived directly from the internal PUF and hence introduces minimal resource 
overhead and security concerns. During enrollment of the PUF, the trusted party programs 
a randomization challenge 𝒄𝑥 into the PUF, which was observed to have low reliability. One 
can derive the random bit-vector 𝒙 by XOR-reducing the PUF response 𝒓 = 𝑃𝑈𝐹(𝒄𝑥) such 
that 
 
𝒙(𝑖) =
⊕
𝑗 = 0 … |𝒙| − 1
𝒓𝑖(𝑖 mod |𝒙| + 𝑗 ∙ |𝒙|) 
 
(4.2) 
This approach is physically secure, as the TRNG cannot be modified without changing 
the actual behavior of the internal PUF, which would render it useless. Furthermore, the 
XOR gates required for the TRNG can be embedded into most existing PUF designs. 
The theoretical basis for this approach of generating small random numbers lies in the 
entropy maximizing nature of the 𝑋𝑂𝑅 operation used in equation (4.2). The bit-vector can 
be approximated as a series of independent random bits 𝒓(𝑖)  with a bias, such that 
𝐸[𝒓(𝑖)] = 𝜇. This is a conservative approach for entropy estimation, as the entropy of the 
XOR of two random variables is at least the entropy of the individual random variables. 
Under these considerations, the bias of each bit of the random seed vector is: 
 
𝐸[𝒙𝑖] =
1
2
+ (−2)
⌊
|𝒓|
|𝒙|
⌋−1
(𝜇 −
1
2
)
⌊
|𝒓|
|𝒙|
⌋
 
 
(4.3) 
If the randomization challenge 𝒄𝑥 is improperly selected to have an error rate of only 
10%, which is worse than an average challenge in the Arbiter PUF [83], the response bias 
would be 𝛽 = 1 − 𝜖 = 0.9. Even in this situation, a 64-bit response can generate a 3-bit 
random seed vector with an expected value of 𝐸[𝒙𝑖] = 0.505 according to equation (4.3), 
which is very close to the ideal 0.5. As discussed, it is critical that the random seed is short, 
and the expected value increases to 𝐸[𝒙𝑖] = 0.66 for a random 12-bit seed.  
When higher randomness is desired, e.g. because of small |𝒓| or large |𝒙|, this process 
can be repeated and the random numbers of each iteration can be XOR-combined. 
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4.3.2 Challenge Self-Divergence 
Challenge self-divergence achieves challenge-response diffusion by diverging the 
challenge, which is issued to the device from the true challenge, which is processed through 
the internal PUF. Therefore, the true challenge is concealed from any outside party and is 
only observed and known within the security device itself. 
First, the challenge divergence seed 𝒙𝑐 is generated as a short true random number by 
the PUF and its components as described in subsection 4.3.1. The apparent reasons for a 
short 𝒙𝑐  lie in reduced cost and facilitated PUF-based implementation, but it also has a 
profound effect on the verifiability and physical security of the PUF. We will show below 
that |𝒙𝑐| can be a very small value.  
Second, 𝒙𝑐 is maximally expanded into divergence vector 𝒙𝑐,𝑣 by repetition to match the 
challenge length of the PUF, such that |𝒙𝑐,𝑣| = |𝒄|. Finally, the true challenge is derived as 
𝒄𝑇 = 𝒄 ⊕ 𝒙𝑐,𝑣. This implies that each issued challenge is transformed into one of 2
|𝒙𝑐| 
possible true challenges. 
The XOR operation is critical, as it combines the original challenge divergence seed and 
the original challenge with maximum entropy, as every output bit depends on both input 
bits. Moreover, this form of self-divergence performs a uniform action across all original 
challenge bits and is based on uniform XOR operations for random number generation. 
Therefore, it provides a strong foundation for resistivity against side-channel attacks and 
can be optimized for side-channel leakage minimization at the layout level.  
For PolyPUF, |𝒙𝑐| = 2 is a viable selection to achieve the desired polymorphic behavior 
because it sufficiently diverges the challenge. Further increase of this would allow more 
possible challenges, but also requires a larger random seed and more computation on the 
server side, which are not desirable.  
4.3.3 Response Self-Divergence 
Challenge self-divergence only hides the challenge and therefore does not provide true 
polymorphic behavior – knowing the true response of the PUF can be a starting point for an 
advanced machine-learning exploit. Two problems remain. First, additional decoupling is 
needed to achieve sufficient challenge-response diffusion without further increase of |𝒙𝑐|, 
which would have the aforementioned detrimental effects. Second, it does not provide any 
improvement to the bias that is typically observed in PUF behavior.  
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To overcome both problems, we present a response self-divergence scheme that 
complements challenge self-divergence for truly polymorphic behavior. For this purpose, 
we have investigated response self-divergence through a shuffling approach as well as an 
XOR approach similar to the one described in section 4.3.2. In both cases, the true response 
𝒓𝑇 is divided into groups 𝒈𝑖. Based on the same mechanism employed in section 4.3.1, a 
small response divergence seed vector 𝒙𝑟 is generated. For the XOR approach, each group 
𝒈𝑖 is XORed with a response divergence seed 𝒙𝑟. In the shuffling approach, the bits in the 
divergence seed determine whether consecutive groups are exchanged. The investigation 
showed that XOR performed much better, and the evaluation can be simplified to the 
following example: Consider a case where shuffling is used with |𝒙𝑟| = 1, |𝒓𝑡| = 2, and 
|𝑔𝑖| = 1 . The bias of the response in this example is 𝐸[𝑟(𝑖)] = 𝑃(¬𝑥𝑟(𝑖))𝐸[𝑟𝑇(𝑖)] +
𝑃(𝑥𝑟(𝑖))𝐸[𝑟𝑇(𝑖 + 1)].  Therefore, bias is very possible and not drastically reduced. For the 
case of XOR, as we outlined in subsection 4.3.1, the entropy of the response is as good as 
the entropy of the divergence seed.  
Due to response self-divergence and as a side-effect of polymorphism, PolyPUF 
achieves the strict avalanche criterion, as an individual challenge bit-flip leads to a bit-flip 
in the output with an average probability that can arbitrarily approach 0.5 based on design 
requirements and length of the response self-divergence seed. 
4.3.4 Polymorphism 
Together, the challenge and response divergence grant polymorphic behavior, as the 
challenge-response behavior changes randomly. This behavior is illustrated in Figure 4.3 
for a very small PolyPUF with |𝒙𝑐| = 2 and |𝒙𝑟| = 1. In this example, a single challenge 
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Figure 4.3 Example of polymorphic behavior of PolyPUF with |𝑥𝑐| = 2 and |𝑥𝑟| = 1. The left 
side shows the overall processing steps in PolyPUF. A third party may observe any of the 
responses in R, as the actually observed response is non-deterministically generated through 
challenge and response self-divergence, which are shown in the center and right boxes, 
respectively.  
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has eight possible responses, and PolyPUF will unpredictably issue one of these. Given a 
response to challenge 𝒄, it is practically impossible to infer which true challenge 𝒄𝑇 was 
actually evaluated by the internal PUF, because a large number of equally probable 
combinations of true challenge and true response exist. Even when a large CRP set is 
gathered, the true challenges and responses cannot be derived. In fact, this polymorphism is 
not restricted to adversaries, and the trusted party faces the same non-determinism in PUF 
behavior. However, with the model of the internal PUF, the trusted party can explore the 
range of possible responses and thereby decide on the authenticity of the received response, 
as will be shown in section 4.4. 
We further explore the advantages of PolyPUF by discussing an alternative 
implementation where multiple actual PUFs are interchangeably used. The cost of 
implementing multiple PUFs is not negligible, but may be bearable in all but ultra-
lightweight applications. However, this alternative approach also has the following 
downsides: If multiple internal PUFs were used, either (i) all of them would compute the 
response and only one PUF would actually issue the response to the requestor, or (ii) only 
one PUF is selected to compute and issue the response while the others remain inactive. 
Approach (i) has a considerable power overhead, and potentially reduces reliability due to 
cross talk between PUF instances, which requires careful design work. Approach (ii) leaks 
significant side-channel information, as each PUF is unique and therefore exhibits a 
different power profile. Moreover, actually implementing multiple PUFs, independent of 
approaches (i) and (ii), introduces the problem that advanced machine-learning techniques 
such as ANN discussed in section 4.2.4 could perform space separation and hence cluster 
the PUFs and identify their individual challenge-response behaviors. PolyPUF does not 
suffer from any of these weaknesses, as all responses are issued by the identical internal 
PUF. Hence, the polymorphism originates in non-deterministic self-divergence instead of 
space expansion and provides stronger security. 
4.4 PolyPUF Application 
Conceptually, PolyPUF was designed to provide a strong foundation against all threat 
vectors identified in the introduction. The resistivity against modeling attacks arises from 
the polymorphic behavior described in section 4.3.4. The minimization of side-channel 
information leakage originates in the design optimizations to achieve said polymorphism. 
In the challenge self-divergence, the initially generated random number is small to have a 
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small range of possible challenges that the trusted party has to explore during authentication. 
Additionally, the proposed algorithm for performing challenge self-divergence takes 
information leakage into account. For instance, consider a scheme to derive the true 
challenge by a summation of the original challenge with a random bit-vector 𝒙, which 
provides a range of [𝒄, 𝒄 + |𝒙|] consecutive challenges. However, this approach (i) leaks 
more side-channel information as summation leaks far more side-channel information than 
a simple XOR operation, and (ii) as the possible challenges lie close to one another, 
knowledge of one CRP allows inference of other similar challenges due to the weak 
diffusion of the internal PUF, as reflected in equation (4.1).  
4.4.1 Wide Applicability 
As an architecture, PolyPUF has the unique advantage that it can be applied to almost 
every PUF design that allows a large challenge-response space and can turn it into a true 
Strong PUF with model-building resistivity. Due to challenge and response self-divergence, 
PolyPUF does not pose limiting requirements on bias, complexity, or reliability of the 
internal PUF. Even when the internal PUF exhibits biased behavior and does not achieve 
diffusion or meet the avalanche criterion, PolyPUF will exhibit high diffusion and meet the 
avalanche criterion.  
The source of this advantage lies in the polymorphic behavior specified in section 4.3.4; 
the model-building resistivity is grounded in this polymorphic behavior instead of 
characteristics of the internal PUF. We furthermore argue that PolyPUF is even applicable 
to the weakest known PUF designs where existing architectures such as the NBPUF do not 
provide sufficient improvement. We experimentally show that PolyPUF is indeed capable 
of this by evaluating it with a variety of Arbiter PUFs in section 4.7. 
4.4.2 Reliability 
Two of the major benefits of PolyPUF are the reliability and scalability this architecture 
achieves. Existing approaches to achieve a Strong PUF rely on combination of the responses 
of multiple PUFs to increase the challenge-response complexity. This, however, decreases 
the reliability of the resulting PUF, as an error in any of the individual PUFs leads to an 
error in the resulting PUF. For instance, the XOR-Arbiter PUF has an error rate that 
increases almost linearly with the number of contributing PUFs. A 4-XOR Arbiter PUF, 
which is not sufficient to achieve model-building resistivity, was shown to have an error 
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rate of more than 30% [72]. In contrast to this, PolyPUF does not negatively affect reliability 
at all, as no error-magnifying combination of multiple PUFs is implemented. This means 
that PolyPUF can achieve the reliability of any single PUF instance that it is applied on. 
4.4.3 Authentication Protocol 
We consider parametric authentication, the most common scenario for PUF [7], [30], 
[72]. Here, the trusted party generates a true model for the internal PUF in an enrollment 
phase with access to the internal PUF. Afterward, any outside access to the internal PUF is 
physically deleted, e.g. through fuses. 
Accurate authentication is possible despite the challenge and response self-divergence 
due to several considerations in the PolyPUF specification. The challenge and response self-
divergence seeds 𝒙𝑐 and 𝒙𝑟 were specified as small bit-vectors, which allows the trusted 
party to computationally explore all options. By exploring the previously described 
operations and querying the secret model, the trusted party can find all |𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑃| = 2
|𝒙𝑐|+⌊𝒙𝑟⌋  
possible responses. Although this equation is exponential, we emphasize that: (i) the 
experimental evaluation shows that |𝒙𝑐| = 2 is sufficient to thwart the strongest known 
machine-learning techniques; (ii) |𝒙𝑟|  can be specified by the trusted party to balance 
computational cost on the server side with machine-learning resistivity in the PUF; (iii) 
evaluating a known and established PUF model typically consumes a minimal amount of 
time; (iv) whereas size and energy cost of the PUF are critical, the computational 
requirements to the server are much more bearable. 
Finally, the response of the PUF is authenticated if it is part of the set of possible 
responses. When bit-errors are considered, a trusted party can iteratively compute the 
candidate response 𝒓𝑐 = arg min
𝒓𝑖𝜖𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑃
|𝒓𝑖 − 𝒓| . In the simplest form, 𝒓  can be accepted if 
|𝒓𝑐 − 𝒓| < 𝑡𝜖, where 𝑡𝜖 is a scenario-specific authentication threshold. We emphasize that 
a small threshold should be sufficient, as PolyPUF is the only known architecture to increase 
modeling resistance without negatively affecting reliability.  
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4.5 Security Considerations 
4.5.1 Pitfalls of Challenge Expansion 
Challenge expansion is a technique typically employed for lightweight PUFs. Challenge 
expansion implies that the application or protocol requires |𝒓| > 1 output bits from the 
PUF. For example, in an encryption scenario, a secret key of more than 128 bits is desired 
to increase the time consumption of brute-force attacks. Similarly, in authentication where 
the PUF response is used for authentication, a large output length is desirable to minimize 
the probability of a random guess achieving false acceptance.  
However, implementing a large number of PUFs can be expensive in the power and 
circuit area. Therefore, a small number of actual PUFs with |𝒓𝑝𝑢𝑓| < |𝒓| output bits is 
expanded to a length of |𝒓| by challenge expansion. In a typical implementation, only a 
single PUF with |𝒓𝑝𝑢𝑓| = 1  is implemented. The desired number of output bits |𝒓|  is 
sequentially generated through |𝒓|  challenges that are produced by a pseudo-random 
number generator (PRNG). As the original challenge can be used as a seed, the responses 
remain consistent across multiple queries. Whereas this is highly cost efficient and 
maximally reuses each PUF instance, several security and practicality concerns exist.  
First, challenge expansion itself is not physically secure. One of the main advantages of 
PUF is its volatility that limits the success of invasive physical attacks. However, the 
challenge expansion circuitry remains physically attackable and thus requires extensive 
conventional defenses. This diminishes some of the cost savings introduced by PUF and 
reduces the range of viable applications. Second, implementing a large pseudo-random 
number generator or cryptographically secure hash function to perform challenge expansion 
is expensive in itself [32]. As some PUFs are very lightweight, the difference between a 
challenge-expanded PUF and a PUF that actually consists of multiple parallel elements may 
be insignificant compared to the security advantages. Additionally, challenge expansion 
decreases the diffusion described in section 4.2, as all response bits originate in the identical 
PUF. Furthermore, it is common that a single PUF exhibits only weak diffusion and strong 
bias, as the nano-scale intrinsic variations cannot be controlled. Therefore, relying on a 
single PUF increases the likelihood of a device that is unusable from a security perspective. 
Besides, designs that employ a single PUF with a challenge expander expose 𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡 responses 
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of the PUF in a single CRP, hence allowing any adversary to gather large per-PUF CRP 
sets. 
For these reasons, the internal PUF is proposed to be implemented with multiple 
individual PUF elements. In the experimental evaluation, the internal PUF is comprised of 
individual PUF elements for each configuration without any challenge expansion. 
4.5.2 Reliance on True Random Numbers 
Multiple PUF designs and architectures involve the utilization of TRNGs without 
providing guidelines for a secure design for this element. Particularly in this scenario 
involving PUFs, all relevant components have to achieve a certain degree of resistivity 
against invasive attacks described in section 4.2.5. Without this consideration, an adversary 
may tamper, disable, or guide the generation of random numbers and hence compromise 
security.  
To illustrate this shortcoming, the adversary could modify the nonce generator in the 
NBPUF architecture to a fixed bit-vector if insufficient countermeasures are implemented. 
Then, the adversary has full control of the challenge generation and can exploit this by 
repeatedly issuing the same challenges.  
To utilize true random numbers without exposing a vulnerability or requiring extensive 
conventional security measures, PolyPUF requires a very small TRNG. Furthermore, an 
implementation that re-uses the internal PUF for inherent security against invasive attacks 
was outlined in section 4.3.1. 
4.5.3 Entropy Oblivious Design 
We challenge the reliance on error-correction or high-acceptance thresholds for PUF-
based authentication. Koeberl et al. have recently performed an extensive entropy and error-
correction analysis and shown that min-entropy is often over-estimated [82]. Additionally, 
they demonstrated that correcting an error of 15% and PUF min-entropy of 15% requires a 
PUF response length that is more than 15 times the size of the desired entropy. This 
enormously increases the cost of PUF and diminishes the lightweight characteristic that is 
one of PUF’s strongest features. 
Similarly, relying on a higher authentication threshold instead of error correction also 
introduces new problems. For one, the length of the PUF has to be increased so that the 
probability of random guessing remains small. Furthermore, due to noise in the PUF 
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response, it is very difficult to discern the noisy PUF from an emulated PUF that takes 
advantage of PUF bias. Delvaux et al. [79] have made similar conclusions and have shown 
that existing PUF authentication protocols have insufficient security and practicality. These 
results imply that employing XOR, feedback, and feed-forward-based architectures to 
increase modeling resistivity provides insufficient improvements and introduces other 
difficulties. 
4.6 Attack Analysis 
4.6.1 Random Guessing 
The simplest and least effective approach to impersonate a PUF is to respond to a 
challenge with a random response. In the following, the threshold 𝑡𝜖 refers to the maximum 
Hamming distance to the correct response for which the received response can be accepted 
as authentic. 
For PolyPUF, the probability of a random guessing attack is slightly increased, as 
multiple responses are possible for any given challenge. In the following, we consider the 
64x64 PolyPUF with |𝒙𝑐| = 2  and |𝒙𝑟| = 3 . Therefore, the probability of a false 
acceptance in this ideal scenario without consideration of bit-errors due to environment 
variations equals: 
𝑃𝐹𝐴,𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑙 = 2
|𝒙𝑐|+|𝒙𝑟|−|𝒓| = 1.73 ∙ 10−18 
Under consideration of bit-errors that are typical due to PUF volatility, the probability 
for false acceptance increases. The trusted party can compute all possible responses, identify 
the most likely correct response 𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑙, and accept the provided response if Δ𝒓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑙,𝒓 ≤ 𝑡𝜖  . 
Recall that PolyPUF can be assumed to be unbiased due to the response self-divergence, 
therefore the bias is 𝛽 = 0.5. The false acceptance probability under consideration of bit-
errors equals: 
𝑃𝐹𝐴,𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 = 2
|𝐱c|+|𝐱r| ∑ (
|𝒙𝒓|
𝑖
) 𝛽𝑖(1 − 𝛽)|𝒙𝑟|−𝑖
𝑡𝜖
𝑖=0
 
Assuming a 10%-bit error rate in the internal Arbiter PUF, one may set the threshold to 
𝑡𝜖 = 12 and achieve a false acceptance probability of 𝑃𝐹𝐴,𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 = 7.3 ∙ 10
−6. 
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Note that this is only a factor of 32 larger than the false acceptance probability when a 
simple Arbiter PUF is used, without PolyPUF. Especially given larger PUF sizes as used in 
practice, e.g. |𝒙𝑟| = 256, this increase in false acceptance probability is diminishing. 
The probability of false rejection for the proposed protocol is almost negligibly larger 
than the probability for the case that a simple Arbiter PUF is authenticated. The bit-error 
rate is denoted by 𝜖 and is not increased by PolyPUF. The probability for correct acceptance 
of the Arbiter PUF is: 
𝑃𝐶𝐴,𝐴𝑟𝑏 = ∑ (
|𝒙𝑟|
𝑖
) 𝜖𝑖(1 − 𝜖)|𝒙𝑟|−𝑖
𝑡𝜖
𝑖=0
 
Similarly, the probability of correct acceptance for PolyPUF can be derived by 
considering that a larger number of responses are acceptable: 
𝑃𝐶𝐴 = 𝑃𝐶𝐴,𝐴𝑟𝑏 + (2
|𝒙𝑐|+|𝒙𝑟| − 1) ∑ (
|𝒙𝒓|
𝑖
) 𝛽𝑖(1 − 𝛽)|𝒙𝑟|−𝑖
𝑡𝜖
𝑖=0
 
Finally, the probability of false rejection is 𝑃𝐹𝑅 = 1 − 𝑃𝐶𝐴  and can be quantified as 
𝑃𝐹𝑅 = 0.01 for this example implementation. 
4.6.2 Direct Machine Learning 
The direct approach of machine-learning on a large CRP set is bound to fail against 
PolyPUF, as these CRPs are virtually guaranteed to be derived from multiple different 
PolyPUF instantiations. As the exact nature of the instantiation is unknown, it is impossible 
to derive the relation between responses of different challenges across different 
instantiations. The experimental results for this are shown in section 4.7.2. 
4.6.3 Brute-force Machine Learning 
In this subsection, we discuss the cost of performing a brute-force attack on PolyPUF by 
gathering all possible responses for a given number of challenges, and then training a model 
for each possible combination of responses. Let us assume that the internal PUF is 
considered to be accurately learned if the number of known CRP pairs reaches 𝑘𝐶𝑅𝑃. Thus, 
the attacker aims to gather 𝑘𝐶𝑅𝑃  challenge response pairs of a single instantiation of 
PolyPUF. Given challenge seed vector length |𝒙𝑐| and response seed vector length |𝒙𝑅|, the 
number of PolyPUF instantiations is 𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 2
|𝒙𝑐|+|𝒙𝑟| . For a given challenge 𝒄𝑖 , the 
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probability that the attacker has observed all 𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 instantiations after issuing this challenge 
𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 times is: 
𝑃𝑖 = ∑ (−1)
𝑘 (
𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝑘
) (
𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 − 𝑘
𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡
)
𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙
𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡−1
𝑘=0
 
For the example implementation with |𝒙𝑐| = 2 and |𝒙𝑟| = 3 it follows that 𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 32. 
To achieve a probability 𝑃𝑖 = 99%  of having observed all possible instantiations, the 
adversary has to issue the same challenge 𝑁𝐶 = 260 times. Thus, the adversary is required 
to perform 260 ∙ 𝐾𝐶𝑅𝑃 authentications with the PUF device to gather a sufficiently large 
dataset. 
 Once this dataset is established, the adversary has to train one model for each 
permutation of CRPs in the dataset. Thus, the number of models to be trained is 𝑛𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑠 =
𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝑘𝑐𝑟𝑝
. This brute-force approach guarantees that one of the models was trained on a pure 
CRP set that corresponds to a single instantiation. However, the number of models that need 
to be learned increases exponentially, and therefore this is not a feasible attack. Even when 
a simple Arbiter PUF is used, 𝐾𝐶𝑅𝑃 = 5000  and 𝑁𝐶𝑅 = 32  require training of 
approximately 5.6 ∙ 107525 models. 
4.6.4 Cross Inference Attack 
There are two possible attack vectors for the adversary: Attempt to learn the internal PUF 
by gathering true challenge and true response pairs, or attack one shape of PolyPUF by 
gathering a CRP set that corresponds to a single shape.  
The adversary cannot identify the actual values for the divergence seeds, but he or she 
can characterize several of them relative to an assumed initial value of 𝑥𝑐0 and 𝑥𝑟0 from the 
initial CRP, which we denote by 𝐶𝑅𝑃0 = {𝑐0, 𝑥𝑐0, 𝑥𝑟0}. The adversary can enumerate all 
𝑆𝑐 = 2
|𝑥𝑐| possible true challenges and trivially characterize one response with regard to the 
initial seeds: 𝐶𝑅𝑃𝑖 = {𝑐0 ⊕ 𝑘𝑐,𝑖, 𝑥𝑐0 ⊕ 𝑘𝑐,𝑖, 𝑥𝑟0}. This can then be expanded so that all 
possible responses for these challenges are well characterized with regard to 𝑥𝑐0 and 𝑥𝑟0 by 
enumerating the possible response self-divergence operations: 𝐶𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑗 = {𝑐0  ⊕ 𝑘𝑐,𝑖, 𝑥𝑐0 ⊕
 𝑘𝑐,𝑖, 𝑥𝑟0 ⊕ 𝑘𝑟,𝑗}. Then, the set of understood CRPs is 𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑃 = 2
|𝑥𝑐|+|𝑥𝑟|. However, it is 
impossible to learn and explicitly characterize a CRP that corresponds to a challenge not 
found in 𝑆𝑐. Therefore, the number of CRPs that can deterministically be clustered is limited 
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to |𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑃|. While infinitely many of these clusters can be created, they are all characterized 
with regard to a cluster-specific assumed 𝑥𝑐0  and 𝑥𝑟0  as reference point and therefore 
cannot contribute to a coherent model. This can be proven by considering the set of possible 
challenge self-divergence seeds 𝑆𝑥,𝑐. It is notable that every possible bit-vector with length 
|𝑥𝑐| is contained in this set, thus |𝑆𝑥,𝑐| = 2
|𝑥𝑐|. If challenge 𝑐𝑖 was derived through seed 
𝑥𝑐𝑖 = 𝑥𝑐0𝑋𝑂𝑅 𝑘𝑖 , then any seed of derivable challenge 𝑐𝑖+1  can be reduced to 𝑥𝑐𝑖+1 =
𝑥𝑐𝑖 ⊕ 𝑘𝑖+1 = 𝑥𝑐0 ⊕ (𝑘𝑖 ⊕ 𝑘𝑖+1). As all possible divergence seeds with length |𝑥𝑐| were 
explored, it must be that (𝑘𝑖 ⊕ 𝑘𝑖+1) ∈ 𝑆𝑥,𝑐. 
Algorithm 4.1 Targeted Machine-Learning Attack 
Input:  
𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡– limit for number of total challenges to issue 
𝑡𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 – limit for repetitions of a single challenge 
𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡  – number of possible PolyPUF instantiations 
Output: 
𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑃- set of selected challenge-response pairs 
Current challenge c=GENERATERANDOMCHALLENGE() 
Selected Challenge-Response Pairs 𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑃 = { } 
Number of issued challenges 𝑛𝑐 = 0 
While(𝑛𝑐 < 𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡) 
 Previous challenge 𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣 = 𝑐 
     RANDOMIZE(𝑐) 
    Observed Responses 𝑂𝑟 = { } 
    Trial number 𝑛𝑡 = 0 
    While(𝑛𝑡 < 𝑡𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡  And |𝑂𝑟| < 𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡)  
        𝑟=PPUF(𝑐)         
        𝑂𝑟 = 𝑂𝑟 ∪ 𝑟 
        𝑛𝑡 = 𝑛𝑡 + 1,  𝑛𝑐 = 𝑛𝑐 + 1 
    𝑟𝑆 = SELECTRESPONSE(𝑂𝑟 , 𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑃 , 𝑐, 𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣) 
    𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑃 = 𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑃 ∪ (𝑐, 𝑟𝑠) 
Simplified Method:  SELECTRESPONSE (𝑅𝑂, 𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑃 , 𝑐, 𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣) 
Selected response 𝑟 = argmin
𝑟𝑖∈𝑂𝑟
|𝑟𝑖 − 𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑃[𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣]| 
Expensive Method:  SELECTRESPONSE (𝑅𝑂, 𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑃 , 𝑐, 𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣) 
Cost[𝑟𝑖] = 0 for 𝑟𝑖 ∈ 𝑂𝑟  
For 𝑐𝑖  where 𝐻𝐷(𝑐𝑖 − 𝑐) ≤ 1, 𝑐𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑃,𝑘𝑒𝑦𝑠  
    For 𝑟𝑖 ∈ 𝑂𝑟 
        Cost[𝑟𝑖] = Cost[𝑟𝑖] + 𝐻𝐷(𝑟𝑖 − 𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑃[𝑐𝑖]) 
Selected response 𝑟 = argmin
𝑟𝑖∈𝑂𝑟
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡[𝑟𝑖] 
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4.6.5 Targeted Model-Building 
Considering that the intended application of PolyPUF is to strengthen an internal PUF 
with weak machine-learning resistance, an attack may exploit the weak statistical properties 
of this internal PUF. These weak statistical properties imply that the avalanche criterion is 
not met, and that one CRP reveals information on arithmetically close other challenges as 
shown in equation (4.1). An adversary may attempt to exploit this behavior to identify those 
CRPs that are of the same PolyPUF instantiation. If the adversary can gather a large set of 
CRPs that correspond to the same PolyPUF instantiation, then he or she can perform simple 
machine-learning on it and should achieve results similar to those of directly attacking the 
internal PUF. 
In Algorithm 4.1, we outline an approach to gather a set 𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑃 of challenge-response pairs 
that have a better than average probability of belonging to the same PolyPUF instantiation. 
The attacker first issues a random challenge and remembers the response it receives. It then 
repeatedly selects new challenges that have a Hamming distance of one to the previous 
challenge. For this purpose, the function RANDOMIZE performs a random bit-flip and 
ensures that the resulting challenge has not been processed yet. For each of these challenges, 
the algorithms attempt to perform a full response-space exploration by re-issuing the same 
challenge until either (i) the maximum amount of distinct responses 𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 2
|𝑥𝑐|+|𝑥𝑟| have 
been observed, or (ii) a desired limit of PUF transaction 𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 has been reached. At that 
point, it chooses the most probably response.  
The algorithm repeatedly selects new challenges with Hamming distance of one to each 
other, so that a larger section of the challenge space can get explored while maintaining a 
short distance between consecutive challenges, so that the statistical weakness of the internal 
PUF is maximally exploited. 
Although this approach appears to be a promising attack as it exploits the weak statistical 
nature of the internal PUF, two disadvantages have to be specified: (i) It has to be 
emphasized that equation (4.1) only applies to the average of a large set of CRPs, and 
certainly does not apply to every CRP. With this attack approach, there will be incorrect 
selections, which will lead to propagation errors. (ii) Any PUF without error correction will 
experience a certain number of bit errors, which will also propagate through the response 
selection and lead to a larger count of incorrect selections. 
Even though it is not successful, it should be noted that this attack requires multiple 
orders of magnitude more challenge-response interactions with PolyPUF compared to a 
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direct attack against the internal PUF. The experimental results of this attack are presented 
in subsection 4.7.4.  
4.7 Experimental Evaluation 
We evaluated a synthetic implementation of PolyPUF under machine-learning attacks 
and compare results to our implementation of the NBPUF architecture, described in section 
4.2.6.4. Both architectures are designed to increase the modeling resistivity, hence we 
evaluate with the weakest known internal PUF from section 4.2, the simple Arbiter PUF. 
For PolyPUF, |𝒙𝑐| = 2 and |𝒙𝑟| = 3. For the NBPUF, we select 𝑑 = 2 as proposed by the 
authors. We note that for the evaluation of it, we allow four times the number of output bits 
compared to PolyPUF, as the architecture requires omitting three-fourths of output bits. 
Table 4.1 Model-building error rates for multiple PUF configurations with varying number of 
hidden neurons and one million CRPs training set size. The most effective number of neurons 
is bolded and used for the following evaluation steps. 
Configuration Size Neurons Error Rate 
Simple Arbiter 
32x32 
10 0.042% 
20 0.041% 
30 0.042% 
64x64 
10 0.049% 
20 0.049% 
30 0.052% 
2-XOR Arbiter 
32x32 
30 0.82% 
40 0.78% 
50 0.82% 
64x64 
40 0.78% 
50 0.78% 
60 0.79% 
4-XOR Arbiter 
32x32 
50 8.99% 
60 8.97% 
70 8.84% 
64x64 
60 9.14% 
70 8.98% 
80 9.02% 
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4.7.1 Machine-Learning Setup and Preparation 
The ANN was trained with RPROP as specified in section 4.2.4 using Matlab. The 
termination criteria were set to be 1000 epochs, a performance gradient of less than 10−5, 
or six iterations with decreasing validation performance.  
We challenge the practice of performing machine-learning attacks on a single PUF 
output bit and emphasize that the following are based on training of all output bits. This has 
two reasons: First, PUF is based on intrinsic physical variations and when observing a single 
PUF output bit, the results can be skewed and may not be representative. Second, most 
machine-learning algorithms use a random initialization vector; therefore, a single response 
bit evaluation increases the evaluation dependence on this initialization.  
The capability of ANNs can be controlled through the number of neurons in the hidden 
layer. Although there are heuristics, there is no analytical solution to derive the optimal size 
of the hidden layer for a practical problem such as building a PUF model. Therefore, we 
experimentally evaluated each of the internal PUFs with varying number of neurons in the 
hidden layer to find the least error rate configuration. These experiments simultaneously 
provided the baseline for the following experiments, and also provided insight into the 
current weakness of PUF scalability. The results of this evaluation are shown in Table 4.1. 
The optimal number of neurons was experimentally derived for each configuration and size 
of the Arbiter PUF, and is highlighted in bold font in the table.  
As discussed in section 4.2.4.1, the number of neurons together with the error rate 
provides insight into the pattern complexity. These experiments emphasize a key problem 
with PUF: the CRP space is easily expanded, but the pattern complexity and resistivity 
against model-building attacks do not scale accordingly. Moving from a PUF size of 32x32 
to 64x64 has almost negligible impact on the complexity of all three PUF configurations, 
which can be observed in the number of neurons in the hidden layer and the error rate. 
After deriving the optimal number of neurons for each internal PUF, we performed 
experiments on PolyPUF and NBPUF with this optimal ANN configuration. 
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4.7.2 Resistance Against Malicious Model-Building 
A comparison of ANN-based model-building against various configurations of a basic 
PUF architecture, the NBPUF, and PolyPUF is shown in Table 4.2. For each architecture, 
this table evaluates the model-building error against three internal PUFs: An Arbiter PUF 
which is expected to have the least model-building resistivity, a 2-XOR Arbiter PUF, and a 
4-XOR Arbiter PUF with the highest model-building resistivity. To illustrate the increasing 
modeling accuracy with a larger training size, this table provides the error rates for training 
set sizes between 5k and 1M CRPs. The table shows that PolyPUF is the only architecture 
that can withstand model-building attacks even when 1 million CRPs are trained. Error rates 
in italic font are less than 5% and denote attack scenarios under which the PUF is considered 
to have been broken. 
Table 4.2 Comparison of a basic PUF architecture, NBPUF, and PolyPUF architecture, each 
with multiple different internal Arbiter PUFs. For model-building error rate, closer to 50% is 
better, as it characterizes modeling resistivity. For random guessing probability 𝑃𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 , lower is 
better.  
Architecture 
32x32 Internal PUF 
Model-Building Error Rate 
𝑷𝑭𝑨,𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒂𝒍 5k CRPs 50k CRPs 500k CRPs 1M CRPs 
Basic 
0.66% 0.15% 0.053% 0.041% 
2−32 6.81% 1.05% 0.77% 0.78% 
38.81% 12.68% 8.94% 8.84% 
NBPUF 
2.44% 0.048% 0.001% 0% 
2−8 15.67% 0.92% 0.16% 0.13% 
40.78% 14.05% 5.07% 4.57% 
PolyPUF 
50.1% 49.97% 50% 50% 
2−27 50.01% 49.97% 49.99% 50.01% 
50.1% 49.96% 49.99% 49.95% 
 
Architecture 
64x64 Internal PUF 
Model-Building Error Rate 𝑷𝑭𝑨,𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒂𝒍 
5k CRPs 50k CRPs 500k CRPs 1M CRPs 
Basic 
1.08% 0.2% 0.062% 0.049% 
2−64 19.35% 1.43% 0.88% 0.78% 
45.4% 18.51% 9.54% 8.98% 
NBPUF 
7.28% 0.2% 0.003% 0% 
2−16 27.05% 3.31% 0.23% 0.17% 
45.74% 26.92% 5.84% 4.89% 
PolyPUF 
49.99% 49.98% 50% 50.01% 
2−59 50.16% 49.98% 50% 49.97% 
51.97% 50% 49.99% 50.01% 
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As the results are consistent and for brevity, we only discuss the results for 5k and 1M 
CRPs. For the same reasons, we only discuss the simple Arbiter and 4-XOR Arbiter PUFs. 
The probabilities for successful guessing attacks for various PUF configurations are 
shown in the last column of Table 4.2. As previously described, the polymorphic nature of 
PolyPUF leads to a small increase in the success probability of such an attack, but it remains 
clearly lower than that of the NBPUF.  
Three clear patterns can be observed from this table: (i) the model-building error rate 
and hence resistance increases with a more complex internal PUF; (ii) increasing the training 
set size reduces the prediction error rate; (iii) scaling the PUF by increasing the challenge-
length from 32 bits to 64 bits has minimal impact. These results support the motivation that 
a new approach to model-building resistance is needed. 
For a 32x32 Arbiter PUF as internal PUF, the basic architecture and NBPUF architecture 
are learned to error rates of only 0.66% and 2.44% respectively with only 5k CRPs in the 
training set. This implies that both of these architectures are considered to have been broken. 
As the training set size is increased, the error rate only decreases. In contrast, even with a 
significantly larger training set of 1M CRPs, the error rate against PolyPUF is 50%; 
therefore, the model-building resistance of PolyPUF exceeds that of the reference 
architectures by multiple orders of magnitude. 
For the very complex 4-XOR Arbiter PUF as internal PUF, the baseline architectures 
perform much better. For the case of 5k CRPs, the 32x32 basic architecture and NBPUF 
achieve an error rate of 38.81% and 40.78%. The model-building attack against PolyPUF 
had an error rate of 50.1%, which is clearly higher, but all of these architectures are 
considered to have resisted this model-building attack. As the intensity of the attack is 
increased by increasing the training set size to 1M CRPs, PolyPUF shows its advantages. 
Whereas the basic architecture and the NBPUF have error rates of 8.84% and 4.57% 
respectively and thus were sufficiently modeled, PolyPUF has an error rate of 49.95% and 
thus remained resistant against this attack. 
Another observation from Table 4.2 is the weakness of the NBPUF compared to the 
basic architecture. Although the error rate is larger for the NBPUF for smaller training sets, 
it is half of the error rate of the basic architecture under a training set of one million CRPs. 
This suggests that a large training set allows an ANN to train the NBPUF very efficiently. 
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We propose that such a large training set is sufficient to identify the patterns in the PUF 
challenge-response behavior to identify those bits that randomly flip, and those that are 
consistent. Whereas random bits are impossible to learn, the consistent bits are learned with 
a much higher accuracy, as they remain consistent across multiple challenges. As the 
NBPUF only utilizes the consistent bits and discards the random bits in the evaluation, a 
well-trained ANN can model it to high accuracy. 
Overall, the results in this table support our claim that PolyPUF is able to drastically 
increase the model-building resistivity of PUFs and that the polymorphic behavior is able 
to confuse machine-learning algorithms even when very large training data is employed. 
4.7.3 Model-Building Authentication Attack 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the per-bit error rate of the learned models for the basic architecture, 
NBPUF, and PolyPUF. For each of these architectures, the model for the 64x64 PUF which 
was trained with 1M CRPs from Table 4.2 was evaluated for 5k malicious authentication 
attempts. For authentication, the Hamming distance between malicious authentication 
attempts and noisy responses of a true PUF is significant to determine a viable acceptance 
 
Figure 4.4 Comparison of five thousand malicious ANN authentication attempts. Depicted is 
the error rate of malicious authentication attempts, where higher is better. From left to right, 
the internal PUF is a simple Arbiter PUF, 2-XOR Arbiter PUF, and 4-XOR Arbiter PUF. Only 
PolyPUF has a consistent threshold to the illustrated typical PUF error rate. 
 
 
Table 4.3 Results of the simple and improved targeted model-building attacks that attempt to 
exploit the statistical weakness of the internal PUF. 
Metric Simple Improved 
ANN error rate 49.44% 51.5% 
Mean 𝑯𝑫(𝒙𝒄) 1.04 0.94 
Mean 𝑯𝑫(𝒙𝒓) 1.56 1.35 
Mean total HD 2.6 2.29 
Correct selection 1.68% 5.81% 
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threshold. These figures emphasize that PolyPUF is the only architecture that maintains a 
consistent distance to a typical PUF bit-error rate, which is approximated to 10%. 
4.7.4 Targeted Model-Building Experiment 
The outcome of the targeted model-building attack is summarized in Table 4.3. The 
result of the simplified method of targeted model-building is an error rate of 49.44% and 
50.1% for 1M and 100M total issued challenges. These total challenges correspond to 
10,289 and 1,029,167 gathered challenges, respectively. These results demonstrate that this 
targeted model-building attack does not increase the success probability of an adversary, as 
PolyPUF behavior remains a virtual blackbox. The underlying reason for this successful 
defense is shown in Figure 4.5. The Hamming distances between the seed value for the 
initially selected response and subsequently selected responses are shown. Clearly, the 
fundamental idea behind the attack holds, and multiple consecutive challenges that 
correspond to the same divergence seed values are found. However, these results also 
demonstrate that the overall Hamming distance behaves almost like white noise, and 
therefore the attacker is learning multiple different instances of PolyPUF and cannot infer a 
clear model. Since it is impossible for the adversary to consider only those responses that 
have same seed values, the attack is bound to fail. The visualization of the Hamming 
distances in the more expensive selection approach is very similar and thus omitted for 
brevity. 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Hamming distances between the original seed value and the seed values in the 
selected responses in the simplified targeted model-building attack. 
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4.7.5 Implementation Cost 
PolyPUF offers multiple hardware implementation cost improvements. First, PolyPUF 
solves the requirement of error correction or cryptographic hashing for authentication and 
thereby removes two heavyweight but common components in existing PUF protocols [32], 
[79]. Second, due to the self-divergent approach, PolyPUF does not need a dedicated 
random number generator and can instead take advantage of the internal PUF itself. This 
reduces the number of hardware units as well as requiring less usage of conventional 
security techniques to prevent invasive attacks. 
With the drastically increased strength against machine-learning, the internal PUF does 
not need to be duplicated multiple times. In contrast, existing protocols such as the Slender 
PUF protocol [30], [83] and the NBPUF [72] require a Strong PUF that meets the avalanche 
criterion. In the following evaluation, we approximate a Strong PUF with a 4-XOR Arbiter 
PUF. 
The following is a quantitative analysis of the implementation overhead of PolyPUF 
compared to other PUF architectures for a Xilinx Virtex XC5VJX58T, which was chosen 
for comparability with existing literature [30].  
To achieve comparability among multiple architectures, the implementations are driven 
by the requirements that (i) the internal PUF generates longer responses through challenge 
expansion and that (ii) a full response is generated as part of the PUF structure, rather than 
streaming individual bits of the PUF response. Each of these architectures is applied on a 
PUF with 64 input bits. As with the previous evaluation, we consider PolyPUF with 64 
output bits and a simple Arbiter PUF as the internal PUF. As both the Slender PUF and the 
NBPUF require a Strong PUF, they are implemented with 4-XOR Arbiter PUFs, which have 
a higher error rate. The results of Rostami et al. [83] suggest an error rate of 13.2% for a 
simple Arbiter PUF and 43.2% for a 4-XOR Arbiter PUF. 
 The high error rate of the required internal PUF requires that the NBPUF transmits a 
very long response. According to the formulas provided by Yu et al. [72], even selecting a 
response length of 400 bits and a threshold of 133 bits leads to a false rejection rate and false 
acceptance rate of 11.9% and 7.3% respectively, both of which are far inferior to the 
statistical properties that PolyPUF achieves. For conservative comparison, we evaluate 
against this configuration, although it provides less security than PolyPUF. 
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The false acceptance and false rejection rates for the Slender PUF [30] can be reduced 
to the same equations as the NBPUF architecture for the case that 𝐿𝑠𝑢𝑏 = 𝐿 , which is 
beneficial for evaluation of these statistical properties. 
 Our implementations of Slender PUF and NBPUF use the same approach for combining 
the prover and verifier nonce through an XOR operation. As a further energy optimization 
in the NBPUF, we assume that the PUF response is not generated for the bit that is discarded. 
Similarly, we assume that PUF responses that are skipped during substring selection in the 
Slender PUF are not generated to save energy. 
The energy cost comparison in Table 4.4 shows the number of operations that each PUF 
architecture requires generating a full response. We do not further quantify the energy cost 
as it is highly dependent on implementation, platform (e.g. FPGA, ASIC), and means of 
data transmission. However, we would like to emphasize the clear trend that PolyPUF 
requires the least energy for both generation and transmission of a response. A single PUF 
operation is significantly more expensive than an XOR operation, as the signal has to travel 
Table 4.4 Energy cost comparison of lightweight PUF architectures based on a comparison of 
individual operations. These operations reflect a generation and transmission of one full response. 
Operation Slender NBPUF PolyPUF 
PUF 4 * 400 4 * 800 3 * 64 
LFSR 400 to 800 800 64 
TRNG 64 + 5 64 + 800 N/A 
2-XOR 64 64 3 * 64 
4-XOR 400 800 N/A 
Transmit 64b + 400b 128b + 800b 64b 
Table 4.5 Implementation cost comparison of the primary security components of lightweight 
PUF architectures measured in look-up tables (LUT). 
Component Slender NBPUF PolyPUF 
PUF 4*128 4*128 128 
LFSR 10 10 10 
TRNG 128 128 N/A 
𝒙𝒄/𝒙𝒓 N/A N/A 14 
CSD/RSD N/A N/A 61 
Total 650 650 213 
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through 64 stages. Furthermore, we note that most protocols do not consider the cost of data 
transmission, although it may require most of the available energy budget. Particularly for 
wireless sensor networks and similar mobile applications, data transmission can be the 
primary source of energy consumption [68]. In contrast to PolyPUF, both reference 
architectures transmit longer responses and exchange nonces. PolyPUF requires 93.1% less 
transmission than NBPUF and 82.6% less than the Slender PUF. As Wander et al. [68] 
found that transmission of a single bit is equivalent to roughly 2090 clock cycles of 
execution on the microcontroller under test, it is clear that the reduction in response length 
leads to significant energy savings. 
The hardware implementation cost of PolyPUF in comparison to the reference 
architectures is shown in Table 4.5. To achieve a conservative comparison, we evaluated 
only the security relevant components and disregarded control logic. Similar to PolyPUF, 
both reference architectures are highly efficient and do not require error-correction or 
cryptographic hash functions. Therefore, the primary cost reduction is achieved because 
these reference architectures require usage of a Strong PUF, which is here implemented as 
a 4-XOR Arbiter PUF. This PUF is roughly four times as expensive as the simple Arbiter 
PUF that PolyPUF employs. Additionally, PolyPUF employs the internal PUF for random 
number generation and has a small overhead for generation of 𝑥𝑐 and 𝑥𝑟 in contrast to the 
TRNG that the reference architectures require. As they operate in sequence and can 
therefore re-use the same hardware, challenge and response self-divergence are lightweight 
as well. Note that response generation in PolyPUF will be much faster, as this comparison 
assumed sequential generation of response-bits. To achieve a similar throughput to 
PolyPUF, the reference architectures would require more parallel PUF components. 
4.8 Conclusion 
The primary challenges for PUF are their reliability under environmental variations, and 
their resistivity against advanced machine-learning-based model-building attacks. Existing 
techniques to increase PUF model-building resistivity are not scalable due to their 
detrimental effect on PUF reliability.  
We proposed PolyPUF, a widely applicable PUF architecture that employs challenge 
and response self-divergence to provide polymorphous PUF behavior. This changes the 
challenge-response behavior to be non-deterministic and unpredictable, while still being 
verifiable in an authentication scenario. In an extensive evaluation, this polymorphic 
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behavior was shown to provide strong resistivity against model-building attacks and was 
the only architecture to withstand an ANN model trained with one million CRPs by 
increasing the model-building resistance by more than an order of magnitude. Moreover, 
PolyPUF achieves model-building resistance without negatively affecting the reliability of 
the PUF device, which uniquely qualifies it for practical scenarios. 
As part of our experimental evaluation, it was shown that neural networks with large 
training size overcome deterministic noise such as that induced by the NBPUF architecture. 
Therefore, truly random behavior such as that exhibited by PolyPUF is a necessity. 
We have further demonstrated that PolyPUF introduces less hardware overhead than 
reference architectures, and reduces the energy cost of generating a PUF response. 
Additionally, PolyPUF requires transmission of much smaller responses, which can provide 
significant energy savings. 
Although existing work has shown that synthetic PUFs behave very closely to silicon or 
FPGA implementations, the strength of PolyPUF should be evaluated in a silicon or FPGA 
implementation in future work. This will also enable exploration of side-channel leakage 
and optimized designs to counter this. 
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CHAPTER 5  
HIGH-LEVEL SYNTHESIS FOR 
HARDWARE TROJAN HORSE DEFENSE 
5.1 Introduction 
The Internet of Things (IoT) is the next step towards pervasive and ubiquitous computing 
and has the potential to drastically change the society through constant recording, 
processing, and communication of data. Due to the need for light-weight, secure, and 
reliable communication, new protocols and use cases for the IoT are explored [84]. With 
the lightweight requirements of IoT, it is important to provide the flexibility of establishing 
where security enhancements are required, and to what extent these enhancements should 
be performed. For instance, an encrypted video stream that is transmitted by a smart video 
recording system is already protected in its transmission through the encryption. At the 
hardware level, the security enhancements can be focused on protecting the cipher key for 
encryption and decryption against any form of information leakage, rather than guaranteeing 
that the encoding of the video stream is leakage-free. Although the video footage may be 
considered confidential, it is easier to detect its leakage due to the size of the corresponding 
transmissions. 
Security and trust in integrated circuits (ICs) remain an ongoing concern, as a security 
breach at the hardware-level exposes even provably secure algorithms and protocols to 
vulnerabilities. Among the threats that hardware security faces, hardware Trojans have 
emerged as one of the major security concerns due to the economically incentivized 
increased outsourcing of IC fabrication to third parties that cannot be fully trusted [85], [86]. 
Such Trojans are not only found in consumer grade electronics, but can exist in mission-
critical military equipment as well. Recently, a backdoor was discovered in a military grade 
FPGA that was implemented in the silicon of the chip itself and could be used to extract 
secrets and even reprogram the device [87].  
Hardware Trojans can be inserted in different stages of the design and fabrication 
process, and are characterized by the trigger, which activates the Trojan operation, and by 
the payload, which is the malicious deviation from the intended system behavior. Trojans 
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are triggered by one or more rarely switching nets or a sequential combination of them, 
which makes activation during testing highly difficult, especially due to the increasing 
density of integration. The payload can have a destructive impact, e.g. modifying signals or 
deteriorating the circuit, or can have the purpose of leaking confidential information. 
Hardware Trojans which leak confidential information as their sole payload have been 
characterized as especially dangerous, as they minimally change the overall system behavior 
[88]. For instance, a hardware Trojan was shown to be capable of inferring and leaking the 
secret key in an advanced encryption standard (AES) circuit implementation without 
directly probing it [89]. Even secure storage of the cipher key, e.g. in a physically unclonable 
function (PUF) which is highly volatile against physical modification or probing, would not 
prevent this indirect information leakage. An example Trojan which indirectly leaks the 
cipher key by tapping into the net containing the round key in the ‘Add Round Key’ phase 
of AES is shown in Figure 5.1.a). Ideally, the confidential information, in this case the cipher 
key, is dispersed over multiple operations as shown in Figure 5.1.b). As the information 
contained in the cipher key and all dependent instructions and values such as the round key 
is dispersed through multiple paths, the device does not expose a single point of 
vulnerability anymore and, therefore, is much less likely to be successfully infiltrated by a 
hardware Trojan.  Although Trojans inserted in the design or manufacturing stage should 
ideally be detectable in pre- or post-silicon verification and testing respectively, the 
 
Figure 5.1. a) Simplified example of a hardware Trojan for indirect leakage of the cipher key 
in AES, b) dispersed cipher key to prevent hardware Trojan insertion. 
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complexity of state-of-the-art ICs make such exhaustive tests infeasible, leaving the need 
for alternative detection and prevention solutions.  
As hardware Trojans that are inserted by a malicious manufacturer and indirectly leak 
security critical information are extremely difficult to detect after insertion, this chapter 
focuses on an HLS flow to prevent Trojan insertion and strongly increase detection 
probability where full prevention is not possible. This problem is especially significant for 
emerging devices in the IoT space, as they have to meet the highest security standards to 
gain consumer confidence and defense approval, but have to rely on external foundries due 
to their size and economic reasons. 
An earlier version of this chapter appeared in [90], where we introduced a high-level 
synthesis flow for prevention of hardware Trojan insertion by an untrusted manufacturer. In 
this chapter, we extend the contributions of [90] through the following unique contributions: 
 A threat-targeted high-level synthesis flow against Trojan insertion that can be 
adapted for a range of threat scenarios. 
 A flexible metric to model the security against Trojan insertion attacks with the 
goal of information extraction. 
 A targeted obfuscation scheme to camouflage the effect of information 
dispersion and mislead reverse engineering attempts. 
 New experimental results that emphasize the proposed synthesis flow’s ability 
to target specific threat parameters by achieve security metrics that exceed the 
baseline by a factor of at least 8.37 under constant resource constraints.  
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 describes relevant background and 
related work. The threat model and goals of the adversary are described in section 5.3. 
Section 5.4 describes threat-targeted high-level synthesis, and introduces information 
dispersion and obfuscation as inherent parts of the synthesis flow. In section 5.5, we present 
an experimental evaluation. The chapter is concluded in section 5.6. This chapter was 
partially published in [90]. 
5.2 Background 
5.2.1 Related Work 
Design techniques for hardware Trojan defense can be categorized into three areas – 
mitigating against destructive Trojans through redundancy [91], improving detection 
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probability of Trojans [92], and increasing the insertion difficulty [93], e.g. by reducing 
rarely switching nets that are ideal candidates to trigger a Trojan payload.  Synthesis flows 
to increase system reliability and avoid destructive Trojans by utilizing multiple different 
third party IPs (3PIPs) with the same functionality to detect deviation are studied in [91], 
[94]. Ben Hammouda et al. [95] have developed a technique to use ANSI-C assertions in 
HLS to automatically generate on-chip monitors (OCM) for verification of hardware 
accelerators, which has the primary application of increasing reliability. Trojans inserted in 
the manufacturing stage can be detected by analyzing the path-delay fingerprints [96], 
issuing targeted test patterns based on likely Trojan insertion points [97], or analyzing the 
side-channel emissions of a device-under-test [85], to name several recently proposed 
techniques. Although the contribution of detection is significant as it can deter Trojan 
insertion, it is not capable of actually preventing it. Multiple works have approached the 
problem of filling unused circuit area that could otherwise be exploited for Trojan insertion 
by a malicious manufacturer to increase insertion difficulty [98]. Xiao and Tehranipoor [92] 
have proposed built-in self-authentication (BISA), which employs functional filler cells that 
contribute to a digital signature. A secondary technique to prevent Trojan insertion is the 
minimization of the adversary’s ability to identify nets that can be used to trigger the Trojan. 
In [99], the authors describe efficient obfuscation through insertion of small obfuscation 
cells in conjunction with a PUF generated response to derive chip-dependent licenses. 
Chakraborty and Bhunia [100] describe the application of obfuscation against the insertion 
of Trojans by forcing the device to operate in a normal and an obfuscated mode, thereby 
expanding the reachable state space and hiding signal probabilities. 
In contrast to existing work, we propose the first security optimized HLS flow that 
increases the difficulty of hardware Trojan insertion by a malicious foundry and therefore 
helps to prevent it. The proposed synthesis flow hides security critical information by 
dispersing it on the circuit, such that the malicious foundry would be required to insert a 
large number of Trojans in different circuit locations. As actual circuits are very large and 
contain an ever increasing number of nets, hiding the security critical information is a more 
feasible approach than attempting to minimize the adversary’s ability to find suitable trigger 
signals by targeting rare switching nets. The proposed work can be combined with existing 
research in side-channel resistance and OCMs to achieve complete security through 
synthesis. 
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5.2.2 Need for Obfuscation 
As described in the previous subsection, there exist a range of sophisticated and diverse 
defense mechanisms. However, the potential threat vectors to ICs are similarly diverse, as 
further described in section 5.3.3. Thus, it is very possible that the   adversary gains precise 
understanding of the underlying circuit before attempting to insert Trojans. Moreover, a 
malicious party generally requires detailed understanding of the design as well as a detailed 
analysis of the control flow graph and state transition function prior to Trojan infiltration. 
The adversary needs to understand (i) which nets contain the desired secret information, and 
(ii) what the switching probabilities of local nets are, to identify a suitable rarely switching 
trigger for the Trojan. Therefore, obfuscation is an important technique to increase the 
difficulty of Trojan insertion by hiding the actual circuit behavior and switching 
probabilities. Additionally, the information dispersion flow that was previously introduced 
in [90] cannot achieve its full strength if the adversary can easily derive the full control-flow 
graph, as further described in section 5.4.4. However, conventional obfuscation flows do 
not integrate well with the proposed high-level synthesis flow, as the proposed information 
dispersion attempts to maximally utilize available resources. Moreover, such flows do not 
inherently consider the effects of information dispersion and thus will introduce obfuscation 
where it is ineffective and has no practical benefits. To mitigate this risk and further increase 
the security of the synthesized design, this chapter introduces obfuscation in co-optimization 
with information dispersion and is embedded in the synthesis. 
5.2.3 Vulnerability Characteristics 
The vulnerability of a circuit-level design to hardware Trojan insertion for information 
leakage by a malicious foundry can be characterized with three metrics: (i) the amount of 
available circuit area that can be used to insert Trojan payload, which includes area that is 
only artificially filled with dummy cells; (ii) the availability of rare-switching nets that can 
be used for Trojan activation; (iii) the availability of nets carrying the desired security 
critical signal. Whereas (ii) has been studied in the past, we present a fully automated flow 
in this chapter to simultaneously minimize (i) and (iii) such that the risk of Trojan insertion 
is drastically reduced. 
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5.3 Adversary Objective and Threat Model 
The objective of the proposed flow is to defend the synthesized design against Trojans 
inserted by a malicious manufacturer. This defense is primarily concerned with Trojan 
resistance, i.e. increasing the required effort and resources that an adversary has to invest to 
inject a Trojan into the design. A secondary objective is the facilitation of Trojan detection 
if prevention was not successful. Therefore, the threat model targeted in this chapter is 
different from those commonly studied for hardware security [101]. The majority of 
proposed Trojan defenses are geared towards detecting them after insertion, for instance 
through comparison with a golden design, performing side-channel analysis, or targeted 
functional testing [102]. The prevention of manufacturer inserted Trojans that leak 
confidential information is a particularly difficult problem, as such Trojans do not 
noticeably change circuit signals. Due to the need to account for manufacturer and 
environment variations, runtime detection of such leakage Trojans is rarely possible.  
5.3.1 Attack Goal 
The adversary intends to insert Trojans into the device with the objectives of: (i) 
revealing confidential information which is not externally observable; (ii) revealing this 
information based on a deterministic (though not necessarily external) trigger signal; (iii) 
hiding this information leakage from detection by the trusted party. The leakage channel for 
this intentional information leakage is not further specified, though modulation of a wireless 
transmission as demonstrated in [103] is representative of the threat. 
5.3.2 Adversary Capabilities 
The malicious foundry is capable of inserting a Trojan into the layout provided by the 
trusted party, which includes tapping into existing signal routing for both the trigger and the 
payload of the Trojan. Due to the engineering difficulty and cost, as well as the increased 
probability of detection in testing, the adversary is assumed to be incapable of performing 
significant modifications to existing placement and routing in the layout, with the exception 
of the removal of transistors that are clearly detected as redundant (e.g. dummy cells). In 
line with the attack goal of avoiding detection, the adversary further has only limited routing 
capability. 
Moreover, in addition to knowledge of the layout, the motivated adversary is assumed 
to have gained full access to the high-level design description of the fabricated hardware. 
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As motivated earlier, this is possible through knowledge transfer, IP theft, or reverse 
engineering. For high-security applications in the military or for the widely connected IoT, 
security may not depend on the secrecy of the design. Thus, further scrambling of the circuit 
behavior is necessary to reduce the adversary’s ability to gain deep insight into the device’s 
actual functional behavior and control flow. 
5.3.3 Diverse Threat Spectrum 
Obfuscation solves the problem that all locations for Trojan insertion are apparent if the 
control flow can be fully analyzed and understood. Therefore, there are diverse threat 
situations. In one case, the primary threat is that an adversary could potentially perform a 
deep analysis of the available layout data in the manufacturing process, which leads to 
detailed understanding of control flow and security critical nets. In this situation, a high 
degree of obfuscation is very desirable to mitigate the adversary’s ability to fully understand 
the underlying logic. This threat is referred to as the Analytical Threat in the following. A 
different threat situation exists if the secrecy of the exact control flow is less critical, for 
example when the manufacturing adversary is also expected to perform a significant share 
of the post-manufacturing validation and thus requires intimate understanding of the 
underlying device behavior. Similarly, it is also possible that the control flow is already 
highly complex or is protected with other countermeasures, such that reverse engineering 
and analysis are not primary concerns. Split-manufacturing is another technique where the 
analytical threat is reduced as the adversary has limited understanding of the full design. In 
such situations, the trusted party would emphasize the physical threat and therefore 
information dispersion over the analytical threat or increased obfuscation. To achieve a 
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Figure 5.2 The threat-targeted high-level synthesis flow extends typical high-level synthesis steps 
with a dispersion analysis, resource analysis with optimization of security parameters, and 
obfuscation as well as dispersion flows. 
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synthesis flow that is widely applicable, the flow must seamlessly support defenses against 
the entire threat spectrum, ranging from an analytical threat to a primarily physical threat. 
5.4 Threat-Targeted Synthesis 
The proposed security-centric HLS flow is implemented in the LLVM compiler 
infrastructure [104]. At the core of LLVM is the intermediate representation (IR), which is 
a low-level programming language that can be considered to be a machine-independent 
assembly language. The overall flow is presented in Figure 5.2. The typical HLS flow 
consists of allocation for determination of available hardware units under consideration of 
constraints, scheduling to assign operations into clock cycles and to generate a finite state 
machine (FSM), and binding, which assigns operations to hardware units. These HLS steps 
are further described in sections 5.4.8 and 5.4.9. The flow extends these common steps by 
further steps for security optimization. First, a dispersion analysis derives key characteristics 
that allow highly resource efficient defense measures. Then, a resource analysis with co-
optimization of security target parameters for dispersion and obfuscation is performed. 
Information dispersion is the key technique to ensure that the difficulty of Trojan insertion 
is greatly increased by dispersing security critical values across multiple operands, so that 
the adversary’s ability to leak such information is greatly reduced. Information dispersion 
is complemented with obfuscation to hide the internal results of the dispersion flow and 
scramble the control flow to further reduce the adversary’s ability to understand the design 
and derive adequate leakage payload or trigger signals.  
First, the security critical instructions are derived by analyzing security annotations 
provided by design engineers. Then, the initial Trojan insertion points (TIPs) and instruction 
entropy are determined for each critical instruction. From these results, resource driven 
information dispersion is performed to introduce artificial dispersion for operators and 
registers to increase both the difficulty of Trojan insertion and the probability of Trojan 
detection. Through resource-targeted security optimization, the proposed flow inherently 
minimizes the available unused circuit area and removes the need for abundant dummy cell 
insertion. 
5.4.1 Definitions and Notation 
The term entropy, in general, is used to refer to the expected amount of information. For 
instance, in the case of error correction in PUF [82], this term refers to the amount of security 
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critical information specifically. Entropy of instruction 𝑖  is denoted as 𝑆𝑖 ∈ [0,1] . We 
define information decay 𝜅 as the degree to which a value loses entropy when combined 
with non-critical values. We denote the initial number of TIPs for instruction 𝑖 to expose the 
original secret value (OSV) by 𝜏𝑖. The degree of information dispersion 𝑑 is defined as the 
minimum number of circuit signals to be simultaneously observed to guarantee full 
observation of the OSVs under consideration of entropy loss. The degree of obfuscation is 
denoted by 𝜎. Vectors and mathematical sets are denoted by an uppercase character, e.g. the 
set of processed instructions 𝑉. Tables are denoted by an uppercase 𝑇, e.g. the entropy table 
for operand types 𝑇𝑆. 
5.4.2 Dispersion Analysis 
Through dispersion of critical information, the secret information is distributed among 
different physical paths and only one of the alternate paths processes the actual value. 
Therefore, the adversary is required to insert a Trojan into all locations to guarantee 
successful leakage of the critical information. As part of the automated synthesis flow, the 
individual critical paths are clock gated such that the overhead in power consumption is 
negligible and only the active path operates normally. 
5.4.2.1 Identification of Critical Instructions 
The starting point of the proposed flow is the high-level description of the functionality 
in C-code with (minimal) additional security annotation: (i) those functions or variables 𝑖𝑐 
that contain OSVs have to be annotated. (ii) the functions or variables that are explicitly not 
security critical 𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒, despite possibly having critical inputs. These annotations allow the 
synthesis to perform highly targeted operations. Note that the algorithm automatically 
determines all dependent instructions, and hence it is sufficient to specify only the initial 
occurrence of a critical value, which introduces minimal engineering overhead. To continue 
the example in Figure 5.1, specification of the cipher key as critical is sufficient, and the 
flow will automatically derive the XOR operations and the round keys are security critical 
as well. In addition to this, the designers may optionally specify that the cipher, which is the 
result of the encryption, should not be treated as critical and would therefore mark the 
outcome of the encryption method as safe. This helps to reduce the cost, but is largely 
already contained in the automatic entropy estimation. The proposed security flow iterates 
through the IR and resolves direct and indirect dependencies of the critical instructions 
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while terminating the exploration at the safe instructions. The outcome of this exploration 
is a complete list of every instruction that directly or indirectly depends on the OSVs, which 
includes memory accesses and registers.  
5.4.2.2 Determination of Artificial Dispersion 
To achieve the target dispersion 𝑑𝑡 , which is derived as part of the dispersion and 
optimization co-optimization in section 5.4.5, the security optimization flow determines the 
required degree of artificial information dispersion 𝑑𝐴,𝑖  for each critical instruction. It 
describes the required information dispersion such that the OSVs achieve an overall target 
dispersion 𝑑𝑇 . It specifically describes the number of locations into which the original 
information content of instruction 𝑖 has to be dispersed, and is derived from the entropy 
content 𝑆𝑖 and the initial TIP count 𝜏𝑖, which are further specified in the following sections. 
The artificial dispersion is derived as 𝑑𝐴,𝑖 = ⌈𝑑𝑇𝑆𝑖 − 𝜏𝑖⌉. Consider an example similar to 
Figure 5.1 of a highly secure IoT device where the cipher key has to be fully protected 
against information leakage, and where sufficient unused circuit area is available. The target 
dispersion could be selected to 𝑑𝑡 = 10 such that an adversary would be required to insert 
Trojans into at least 10 circuit locations to extract the cipher key. For the XOR operation, 
the initial number of TIPs could be 𝜏𝑖 = 1.6 due to exchange with non-critical operands, 
and the entropy could be reduced to 𝑆𝑖 = 0.3 due to an upstream logical operator. In this 
case, 𝑑𝐴,𝑖 = 2, and the information contained in the XOR instructions has to be dispersed 
across two circuit locations. After determination of all artificial dispersion factors, the flow 
iterates through all critical instructions to disperse the value contained in each instruction 
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by duplicating it by the 𝑑𝐴,𝑖. In a second sweep, the operands in the instructions are updated 
to reference duplicated instructions of the corresponding path. 
5.4.2.3 Derivation of Initial Trojan Insertion Points 
As stated in section 5.2.3, the minimum number of Trojan insertion points (TIPs) for 
critical information leakage is a key characteristic for the prevention of Trojan insertion by 
the manufacturer. From the set of critical instructions, the TIPs are computed for each 
instruction per method DERIVETIPS in Algorithm 5.1. By default, an instruction has a TIP 
count 𝜏 of one, as an adversary can directly leak its output net or register to extract its secret 
Algorithm 5.1 Derivation of the initial Trojan insertion points (TIPs) and of the entropy for critical 
instructions. 
Constants: 
𝜅 Criticality decay 
𝑇S Entropy channel 
capacity for all 
operand types 
𝑤𝑚 Weight of the 
maximum parent 
entropy 
 Input: 
𝑉 Instruction call chain 
𝑖 Critical instruction to 
be processed 
Output: 
𝑆𝑖 Entropy of instruction 
𝑖 
𝜏𝑖 Initial TIPs of 
instruction 𝑖 
 
DeriveTIPs 
𝑉 = 𝑉 ∪ 𝑖 
If SAFE(𝑖) 
    𝜏𝑖 = ∞ 
Else If ISALLOCATION(𝑖) 
    𝑉𝑐 = GetStoresInto(𝑖) ∪ GetPointersInto(𝑖) 
    𝜏𝑖 = min DERIVETIPS(𝑖𝑐 , 𝑉), 𝑖𝑐 ∈ 𝑉𝑐 
Else If NoCriticalParents(𝑖) 
    𝜏𝑖 = 1 
Else 
    𝑉𝑝 = GETPARENTS(𝑖) 
    𝜅𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 𝜅 ∙ |𝑖𝑛𝑐 ∈ NOTCRITICAL(𝑉𝑝)| 
    𝜏𝑚𝑖𝑛 = min DERIVETIPS(𝑖𝑐 , 𝑉), 𝑖𝑐 ∈
CRITICAL(𝑉𝑝) 
    𝜏𝑖 = 𝜅𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝜏𝑚𝑖𝑛 
𝑉 = 𝑉\𝑖 
DeriveEntropy 
𝑉 = 𝑉 ∪ 𝑖 
If SAFE(𝑖) 
    𝑆𝑖 = 0 
Else If 
     NoCriticalParents(𝑖) 
    𝑆𝑖 = 1 
Else 
    𝑉𝑝 = GETPARENTS(𝑖)     
    If IsAllocation(𝑖) 
        𝑉𝑝 = 𝑉𝑝 ∪ GETPOINTERSINTO(𝑖) 
    𝑉𝑆,𝑃 = DERIVEENTROPY(𝑖𝑐)𝑇S[OPTYPE(𝑖𝑐)], 𝑖𝑐 ∈
CRITICAL(𝑉𝑝) 
    𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 = max  𝑉𝑆,𝑃 
    𝑆𝑖 =
𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑤𝑚+(1−𝑤𝑚) ∑(𝑉𝑆,𝑃\𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥)
(|𝑉𝑆,𝑃|−1)(1−𝑤𝑚)+𝑤𝑚
 
𝑉 = 𝑉\𝑖 
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information. We introduce a variable criticality decay 𝜅  to characterize the loss of 
reproducibility when security critical values are combined with non-critical values. 
Consider the division operation in Figure 5.3, which depends on the values from the security 
critical modulo operator, and the (non-critical) constant value 𝑁2. The output of the modulo 
operation cannot directly be inferred from the output of the divider, unless certain 
knowledge about N2 exists, which is captured in the criticality decay 𝜅 . For the 
experimental evaluation, we use a constant criticality decay that was empirically set to 𝜅 =
0.3. The algorithm recursively visits instructions and derives their TIPs as the minimum of 
the TIP of the instructions’ predecessors and subtracts the total criticality decay. We briefly 
discuss the edge cases in this approach. Circular dependencies, e.g. through loops, are 
broken by terminating the exploration before completing the circle by maintaining a chain 
of instructions that had already been visited. 
 
Figure 5.3 Example of targeted insertion of information dispersion. Due to modulo entropy 
loss, only upstream critical instructions are dispersed. 
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5.4.2.4 Consideration of Entropy Loss 
For resource-efficient secret information dispersion, we consider not only the decay of 
criticality through exchange with non-critical operands, but also the information capacity of 
instructions. The high-level implementation is described in method DERIVEENTROPY of 
Algorithm 5.1. The underlying principle is the fact that each type of operator transmits 
different degrees of information, and therefore a variable amount of entropy is lost. The 
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Figure 5.4. a) Dispersion leads to clear separation of critical paths that can be exploited by 
adversaries. b) Obfuscation introduces links among critical paths (operators (1) and (2)), 
and between critical and non-critical paths (operator (3)). 
Table 5.1 Information Capacity of operators for entropy estimation. 
Operator Information Capacity 𝑻𝑺 
Equality Comparator (‘==’) 0.1 
Comparator (e.g. ‘<’) 0.15 
Modulo (‘%’) 0.3 
Logical exc. XOR (‘&’, ‘|’) 0.3 
Other (e.g. ‘+’, ‘^’) 1 
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entropy library used in our experiments is in Table 5.1 and shows the information capacity 
C of different operators that were empirically determined and can be adjusted in a trade-off 
between resource effectiveness and worst-case information loss upon successful Trojan 
insertion. To illustrate the need for empirical entropy estimation, consider the modulo 
operation: 𝑥 = 𝑐 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁, where 𝑐 is a security critical value. When only the values 𝑥 and 
𝑁 are considered, it is not possible to directly determine the original value of 𝑐, though it is 
possible to derive an equation that describes all possible values of 𝑐. The outcome of this 
modulo operation does not contain as much security critical information as input 𝑐, and this 
entropy loss is conservatively modeled as 0.3 for this operand type. 
5.4.3 Obfuscation to Defeat Reverse-Engineering Vulnerability 
After information dispersion, security critical operations are performed in multiple, 
parallel paths such that an adversary is forced to introduce multiple Trojans to guarantee 
successful information leakage. However, due to the nature of the critical paths and to ensure 
a minimum number of TIPs, functional units are not shared across critical paths. This has 
the effect that simple information dispersion is reflected in clearly separated logical and 
physical operators for critical instructions. Thus, a motivated adversary can exploit this 
understanding to facilitate the identification of security critical instructions. 
Therefore, we introduce an obfuscation scheme to (i) hide the actual transition 
probabilities, (ii) remove the clear separation of security critical paths, and (iii) more 
concisely quantify the threat and corresponding security solution. 
An overview of the obfuscating operations is provided in Figure 5.4. It shows that the 
initial control flow graph exhibits a clear separation between individual critical paths, as 
well as between critical and non-critical paths. This can be exploited to identify security 
critical nets and can facilitate the infiltration of all security critical paths. The figure shows 
two types of obfuscating operations. We refer to links among critical paths as critical-to-
critical (C2C) links; obfuscating operators (1) and (2) in the figure are such links. A link 
between a critical and non-critical (CNC) path is keyed operator (3). These links are inserted 
based on a keyed operator. The control flow after obfuscation will only follow the original 
flow if the device is operated with the correct key. Otherwise, a large number of random 
links between the critical paths is activated, which will lead to non-deterministic functional 
behavior as well as incorrect switching profiles. Moreover, adversaries would no longer be 
able to exploit clear separation of paths to insert Trojans into all critical paths. 
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5.4.4 Threat-Targeted Security Metric 
Information dispersion limits the available free area and requires the adversary to 
simultaneously insert multiple Trojans to successfully leak security critical information. In 
previous work, the number of Trojan insertion points (TIPs) was the primary metric for the 
security of the synthesized design. With the introduction of obfuscation, it is apparent that 
TIPs can be complemented with the degree of obfuscation for a resource efficient security 
solution. 
The metric for obfuscation has to adhere to several principles: 
 Different designs should be comparable, such that similar values in the metric 
of different designs provide a similar level of obfuscation. This should include 
designs of considerable size and resource variations. 
 Increasing the count of artificial links increases the difficulty of reverse 
engineering the information dispersion and should accordingly increase the 
value in the metric. 
 Links among critical paths, and between security critical and non-critical paths 
have different purposes. Thus, application and threat dependent weighting must 
be possible. 
From the aforementioned description, the metric for obfuscation is determined to 𝜎 =
2∗(𝛼1𝐿𝐶𝑁𝐶+𝛼2𝐿𝐶𝐶)
𝑁𝑐
, where 𝑁𝑐 is the number of security critical instructions, and 𝐿𝐶𝑁𝐶 and 𝐿𝐶𝐶 
are the number of links between critical and non-critical paths and between critical and 
critical paths, respectively.  
To describe the overall resilience against Trojan insertion by a malicious adversary in 
the manufacturing stage, the number of TIPs has to be considered in conjunction with the 
degree of obfuscation. This metric has to abide by the following constraints: 
 Whereas increasing dispersion will linearly increase the security of the device, 
increasing obfuscation should yield diminishing returns based on the cost and 
security characteristics of the device. 
 The offset of the weighting of obfuscation as well as the velocity of the 
diminishing return for obfuscation should be user-specified threat-parameters to 
control the targeting of the synthesis. 
From these requirements, the combined security metric is quantified as 
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𝜓 =
𝑑𝑡  (𝑘2 + 𝜎)
1 + 𝑘1 𝜎
 (5.1) 
 
where 𝑘1 and 𝑘2 describe constant offsets that allow tuning the security optimization for 
specific threat scenarios. The former determines the velocity of diminishing return for 
obfuscation, and the latter determines the offset with regard to dispersion. 
5.4.5 Resource Analysis and Optimization 
The resource oriented co-optimization of information dispersion and obfuscation is 
initiated after an automated cost analysis of dispersion. In this cost analysis, the resource 
cost is divided among critical instructions and non-critical instructions. Then, the cost of 
increasing information dispersion is computed by considering the cost of adding new 
multiplexing units for shareable instructions, as well as the cost for new functional units 
where sharing is not a possibility. The resource cost of increasing dispersion is denoted with 
Δ𝐶𝑑𝑡. 
The cost of increasing the obfuscation metric is similarly computed by first deriving the 
cost for inserting the links from a library of known keyed links. The increase in resource 
cost due to increase of obfuscation can then be quantified as ΔCσ =
𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑔,𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘∗𝑁𝐶
2
, where 
𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑔,𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘 is the average cost of inserting a link weighted by the relative insertion probability 
of the link, and 𝑁𝐶  is the number of critical instructions. In combination with the metric for 
resiliency against Trojan defense in equation (5.1), this results in the equations: 
Maximize  
𝜓 =
𝑑𝑡  (𝑘2 + 𝜎)
1 + 𝑘1 𝜎
, 
𝑑𝑡 ∗ Δ𝐶𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎 ∗ ΔCσ + 𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 ≤ 𝑅max 
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This constraint optimization problem in two variables (𝑑𝑡 and 𝜎) can be solved to derive 
the following optimal values for the degree of information dispersion and obfuscation, 
respectively: 
𝑅 = 𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 
Ω1 = Δ𝐶𝜏
2Δ𝐶𝜎
2 
Ω2 = √−Ω1𝑘1𝑘2 + Ω1 − Δ𝐶𝜏2Δ𝐶𝜎𝑘1
2𝑘2𝑅 + Δ𝐶𝜏2Δ𝐶𝜎𝑘1𝑅 
𝑑𝑡 =
±Ω2 + Δ𝐶𝜏Δ𝐶σ + Δ𝐶𝜏𝑘1𝑅
Δ𝐶𝜏2𝑘1
 (5.2) 
𝜎 =
𝑅 − Δ𝐶𝜏 𝜏
Δ𝐶𝜎
 (5.3) 
 
Algorithm 5.2. Obfuscation flow through manipulation of the LLVM IR 
after resource analysis and optimization. 
 Input: 
𝐵𝐵. 𝑉𝑐  Critical instructions for a given basic 
block 
𝐵𝐵. 𝑉𝑎 All instructions for a given basic 
block 
𝑣𝑜𝑏𝑓  Critical instruction to be processed 
𝑙𝜎  The link target to achieve the desired 
𝜎 value 
Obfuscate 
Repeatedly until 𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 = 𝑙𝜎  
    For Each BasicBlock 𝐵𝐵 
        𝑀𝐶 = DEPENDENCYSORT(𝐵𝐵. 𝑉𝑐) 
        𝑀𝑎 = DEPENDENCYSORT(𝐵𝐵. 𝑉𝑎) 
        𝑖𝑡 = 𝑀𝑐[RAND()]     
        𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 =  RAND() >
𝛼1
𝛼1+𝛼2
  
        If 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 = 1 
            M𝐶,𝑆 = {𝑐𝑖 ∈ 𝑀𝐶 , Path(𝑐𝑖) ≠ Path(𝑖𝑡)} 
            𝑖𝑠 = 𝑀𝑐,𝑆[Rand(0, 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥(𝑀𝑐 , 𝑖𝑡))] 
        Else 
            𝑖𝑠 = 𝑀𝑎[RAND(0, 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥(𝑀𝑐 , 𝑖𝑡))] 
        If COMPATIBLE(𝑖𝑡 , 𝑖𝑠) 
            INSERTLINK(𝑖𝑡 , 𝑖𝑠) 
            𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡+= 1 
InsertLink - Select 
i𝑠 = 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡(𝑣𝑜𝑏𝑓 , 𝑣𝑡 , 𝑣𝑠) 
𝐵𝐵. 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡(𝑖𝑠) 
For Each Parent(𝑖𝑡) 𝑖𝑝 
    ReplaceOperand(𝑖𝑝 , 𝑖𝑡 , 𝑖𝑠) 
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These values of 𝑑𝑡 and 𝜎 are dynamically computed as part of the automated synthesis, 
and yield in a security-optimized threat-targeted solution. 
5.4.6 Obfuscation Flow 
The obfuscation flow is shown in Algorithm 5.2. When performing obfuscation in the 
control flow, an initialization step has to catalog non-critical and critical instructions to 
establish clear dependencies. These dependencies are critical for adequate insertion of links, 
as values cannot be arbitrarily consumed before they are initialized to achieve successful 
RTL synthesis. To achieve efficient obfuscation, the algorithm makes heavy use of 
randomization and therefore does not expose any patterns that could be exploited in a 
reverse engineering process. 
Based on the weighting of C2C and CNC links that is established as a result of threat 
targeting, the respective count of links is statistically determined by employing a random 
number generator with corresponding thresholds. Then, the links are introduced into the 
LLVM intermediate representation by iterating over the basic blocks and randomly 
choosing a critical instruction that serves as a target, 𝑖𝑡. For C2C links, a corresponding 
source instruction 𝑖𝑆 is randomly selected in a subset of critical instructions on a different 
critical path that appear earlier in the dependency order. For CNC links, the source 
instruction 𝑖𝑠  is selected among all instructions in earlier dependency order that are not 
critical. The actual insertion of the link depends on the type of link chosen; for this chapter 
a keyed-select is employed. The obfuscation flow takes a list of obfuscation operations as 
its input, such that these operators match the existing device and so that the obfuscation flow 
achieves a high degree of flexibility to be applicable in varying scenarios. For the results 
presented in section 5.5, the obfuscation flow only utilized ‘select’ operations as shown in 
Algorithm 5.2. Similar to [100], an applied value is compared against a known key which 
can be device specific, as in [99]. If the supplied value matches the key, the original operand 
is passed through the select instruction – otherwise, an entirely different value is forwarded, 
thus scrambling the actual control-flow graph. 
5.4.7 Dispersion Flow 
Once the dispersion analysis as well as dispersion and obfuscation co-optimization are 
completed, the desired target dispersion 𝑑𝑡  is known. From this target dispersion, the 
required amount of artificial dispersion is determined for each instruction as specified in 
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section 5.4.2.2. Then, the flow iterates through all critical instructions to disperse the value 
contained in each instruction by replicating it 𝑑𝐴,𝑖 times. In a second sweep, the operands in 
the instructions are updated to reference duplicated instructions of the corresponding path. 
As a result of this action, instructions that previously had a low number of TIPs were 
artificially strengthened and achieve a higher number of TIPs to match the target dispersion. 
The security optimized flow contains additional modifications. In scheduling, replicated 
critical instructions are forced into the same cycle so that the overall system performance is 
not degraded. As further described in section 5.4.9, this is inherently required to achieve 
security guarantees across critical paths. 
We propose two alternate approaches to determine the active path and outline the 
differences. The first case is dynamic and truly random path activation; the second case is 
static path activation. In dynamic path activation, a true random number generator (TRNG) 
is used to determine at runtime which of the possible circuit paths should be taken. As the 
path is dynamic and selected at runtime, the adversary is not able to predetermine the net 
that will contain the critical information and hence has to tap into multiple nets. The 
disadvantage of this approach is that the adversary can statistically leak critical information 
in a subset of the operations when Trojans are inserted in only a subset of the required paths. 
The preferred approach is static path activation through a keyed physically unclonable 
function (PUF) after the device is received from the foundry. The benefits of this approach 
are: (i) testing and side-channel analysis can focus on a single path, allowing higher 
coverage; (ii) the adversary may not expect statistical information leakage if Trojans are 
introduced only into partial paths; (iii) a backdoor or Trojan is detected in one path after 
deployment, and recovery by removing the information leakage is possible by 
reprogramming the device to use a different path when a PUF type supporting this is 
employed [105]. This allows immediate mitigation if leakage is detected after deployment 
in critical scenarios. We emphasize that, independent of the method for path activation, only 
one security critical path is active for any given operation. Combined with clock-gating, this 
ensures that the power overhead of the proposed security optimization is negligible. 
5.4.8 Security-Driven Allocation 
To achieve security driven synthesis, we have modified the allocation to either target a 
given degree of dispersion 𝑑𝑇, or to achieve the highest degree of dispersion possible given 
a resource constraint. Both approaches are evaluated in the experimental evaluation, and the 
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latter technique to target a given resource limitation is of particular benefit as it 
simultaneously reduces the available unused area which could otherwise be used for Trojan 
insertion by a malicious manufacturer. The available unused area after this synthesis flow 
is minimal and can be complemented with limited dummy cell insertion. To model resource 
consumption, a technology library that maps operators and their bit-width to a normalized 
resource cost is loaded during synthesis. In our experiments, this table was derived as the 
gate equivalent cost of each module, using optimized modules where available. The 
resource computation further considers whether operator types are shareable or not, which 
is heavily architecture dependent [106] and is therefore also loaded from a configuration 
table. In allocation, the available hardware units are determined based on sharing within a 
security critical path and between critical and non-critical instructions. Different critical 
paths do not share instructions for security reasons. After deriving the set of critical 
instructions, resource constraints are modeled for the entire design by determining the cost 
of the non-critical instructions 𝐶𝑁𝐶  and the cost of critical instructions 𝐶𝐶  that 
approximately linearly increases with the degree of dispersion.  
5.4.9 Security-driven Binding 
Binding is concerned with assigning instructions and variables to functional units and 
registers. Typically, it is driven by a cost-function to reduce hardware implementation cost 
or achieve better timing. To truly achieve dispersion of secure information, operations have 
to be bound to functional units with great care, such that the ability of an adversary to leak 
information by inserting Trojans that tap into fewer than 𝑑𝑇 signals is not increased. In the 
weighted bipartite matching algorithm that is used for binding in the HLS implementation, 
the highest positive weight is given to instructions of the same critical path, and negative 
weights are given to instructions of different critical paths. Shareable output registers or 
operands are secondary characteristics considered in binding. Avoiding mismatches in 
functional unit assignment is critical, as the adversary may otherwise extract the secret 
values of multiple critical paths by inserting a Trojan that taps into a single signal. The result 
is shown in Figure 5.3. From an initial intermediate representation (IR), the critical 
instructions are determined, and after derivation of the target dispersion, information is 
dispersed among two paths. As the And operations have significant loss of entropy, the 
modulo operations and other downstream operations do not undergo any dispersion 
optimization. In binding, functional units are shared as much as possible, and a single Adder 
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is used for both critical and non-critical instructions. However, the And operators are not 
shared, as they correspond to different critical paths. Sharing between critical instructions 
of different critical paths would allow the adversary to simply tap into the output net of the 
shared operator and would therefore diminish the security benefits, and is hence forbidden. 
5.5 Experimental Evaluation 
The security flow presented in this work was implemented as an extension of the LegUp 
HLS tool [107], which builds on the modular design of the LLVM compiler framework. 
The implementation primarily consists of two passes – security preparation, and security 
optimization. In security preparation, the security annotation is understood and applied to 
the LLVM IR to identify critical instructions and their downstream users. In security 
optimization, the bulk of the security-relevant work is performed, which includes estimating 
the initial cost and deriving an achievable target dispersion, deriving the initially required 
tap counts and entropies, and introducing the artificial dispersion into the design. 
Additionally, existing LegUp code was modified in allocation, binding, and scheduling to 
adjust for the needs by the security-driven flow, as described in the last parts of section 5.4. 
5.5.1 Benchmarks 
We present the evaluation of the proposed flow against a subset of the CHStone 
benchmarks [108]. In addition to the common benchmarks that show the HLS characteristics 
for specialized modules, we introduce an IoT-specific benchmark. It computes the running 
average temperature and determines whether a person is present based on a door sensor. 
Additionally, the benchmark performs voice command recognition by cross correlating a 
received time series signal with a secret stored signal by performing a fast Fourier transform 
(FFT) and the inverse of it. 
5.5.2 Analysis of Information Dispersion 
For each benchmark, we specify the critical value as shown in Table 5.2. We 
quantitatively compare the proposed entropy-based security optimization against two 
different baseline approaches. As this is the first work that targets this problem, there is no 
previous solution that can serve as a comparison. However, we employ a modular defense 
approach that is the natural extension of synthesis efforts against destructive Trojans in [91], 
[94] as the first baseline. Here, security information dispersion is achieved by introducing 
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multiple IP modules and distributing the secret information across these modules. The 
targeted defense baseline is based on intermediate results of the proposed HLS flow and 
utilizes the fine-grained critical instructions to achieve security dispersion without taking 
full advantage of the entropy and TIP count analysis.  
Table 5.2 shows that the proposed security optimization consumes on average 54.4% 
fewer resources compared to the modular baseline when the same degree of security is 
targeted. This resource consumption is in gate equivalent units from the technology library. 
Table 5.2 Resource utilization in established benchmarks when a given security level is to be 
achieved. The proposed security optimized defense reduces the hardware implementation cost on 
average by 54.4% (𝛥1) and 26.3% (𝛥2) compared to the modular defense and targeted defense, 
respectively. Resource costs are reported in thousands. 
Benchmark Critical Values 
Disp.  
𝒅𝑻 
Modular 
Defense 
Targeted 
Defense 
Proposed Security 
Optimization 
Cost Cost 𝚫𝟏 Cost 𝚫𝟏 𝚫𝟐 
AES key 5 247.2 182.2 26.3% 104.5 57.7% 42.7% 
SHA sha_info_digest 5 76.8 48.0 37.5% 30.4 60.4% 36.7% 
Blowfish indata 5 109.2 79.8 27.0% 63.9 41.5% 19.9% 
GSM LARc 5 667.2 292.2 56.2% 236.2 64.6% 19.1% 
Entropy 
Chain 
key 5 68.3 68.3 0.0% 43.6 36.1% 36.1% 
Smart- 
Sensor IoT 
secret_voice, 
key 
5 412.4 144.6 64.9% 139.1 66.3% 3.7% 
Table 5.3 Evaluation of the ability to maximize the target security information dispersion 𝑑𝑡  under 
resource constraints. The proposed flow achieves on average three times higher information 
dispersion than the modular defense baseline (𝛥1) and 41% higher dispersion than the targeted 
defense (𝛥2).  
Benchmark 
Resource 
Target 
Modular 
Defense 
Targeted 
Defense 
Proposed Security 
Optimization 
Cost 𝒅𝒕 Cost 𝒅𝒕 𝚫𝟏 Cost 𝒅𝒕 𝚫𝟏 𝚫𝟐 
AES 125 98.9 2 115.8 3 50.00% 104.5 5 150% 66.67% 
SHA 75 61.4 4 72.5 8 100.00% 72.8 14 250% 75.00% 
Blowfish 100 87.4 4 94.2 6 50.00% 89.5 7 75% 16.67% 
GSM 350 266.9 2 331.8 6 200.00% 346.3 8 300% 33.33% 
Entropy 
Chain 
100 95.6 7 95.6 7 0.00% 96.5 11 57% 57.14% 
Smart-
Sensor IoT 
200 165 2 191.1 8 300.00% 185.5 8 300% 0.00% 
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Table 5.3 compares the three techniques under identical resource constraints, and the 
proposed flow achieved on average 188.69% higher security than the modular baseline. The 
effectiveness of the targeted defense, which is a subset of the proposed security 
optimization, is most pronounced when a module contains a significant share of instructions 
that do not have data dependencies to critical instructions. Here, the targeted approach 
allows dispersion of the information in only critical operations and therefore achieves 
significant gains, whereas the multiplication of the module, as done in e.g. [94] for higher 
reliability, would include multiplying such non-critical instructions. The true benefits of the 
fully optimized security flow show when numerous complex operations are performed on 
the critical information. The AES benchmark clearly demonstrates that the security 
optimized approach reduces the resource utilization by 66.67% compared to the targeted 
defense and by 150% compared to the modular defense. The cause for this significant 
improvement is in the complex and costly cryptographic operations performed within AES. 
Multiple modulo and divider operations are chained such that significant entropy loss is 
incurred, which is exploited by the proposed flow. 
The ratio of security improvement to area overhead is four on average. We emphasize 
that the area overhead does not have a corresponding power overhead, as (i) a single critical 
path performs the critical operations and (ii) the other operations can be clock-gated. 
Furthermore, the area overhead is reported respective to a very small security component 
that is almost entirely security critical. Compared to a full chip, the overhead is minimal. 
Our experiments have shown that dedicating at most 10% of the circuit area of a Xilinx 
XC2V4000 FPGA to a security improved AES implementation [24] would allow increasing 
the dispersion target to 15. The real increase in Trojan defense is significantly higher, as the 
security enhancements make it very difficult for the adversary to find unused circuit area to 
insert this number of Trojans. Even if the adversary manages to insert and route the trigger 
signal to all of them despite these countermeasures, this would significantly increase the 
detection probability. The primary threat of hardware Trojans, their small footprint, is 
defeated. 
5.5.3 Analysis of Threat-Targeted Synthesis 
The ability to target a range of threats is very important in the diverse landscape of circuit 
design and manufacturing, as further explained in section 5.3.3. A comparison among three 
configurations is performed: information dispersion by itself, obfuscation with a primarily 
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physical threat, and obfuscation with a primarily analytical reverse-engineering threat. For 
the physical threat, the available levers use default values of 𝑘1 = 1  and 𝑘2 = 0.1  to 
construct 𝜓1 . In contrast to this metric configuration, the analytical threat emphasizes 
obfuscation stronger with 𝑘1 = 0.01  and 𝑘2 = 0.01  to form 𝜓2 . The first value 𝑘1  is 
proportional to the negative effect of increasing obfuscation; reducing this value allows 
obfuscation to be applied in larger amounts to increase the overall security metric. Similarly, 
𝑘2  controls the offset in obfuscation and determines the importance of obfuscation – a 
smaller value of 𝑘2 implies higher importance of obfuscation. 
The results for threat-targeted synthesis are shown in Table 5.4 for two different 
configurations. The physical threat configuration (𝑘1 = 1,𝑘2 = 0.1) favors both dispersion 
and obfuscation, whereas the analytical threat configuration prefers obfuscation (𝑘1 = 0.01, 
Table 5.4 Comparison of the threat-targeted synthesis under resource constraints for two 
different configurations. Resource costs are reported in thousands. 
Benchmark Resource 
Target 
Information 
Dispersion 
Obfuscated – 
Physical Threat 
Obfuscated – 
Analytical Threat 
Cost 𝒅𝒕 Cost 𝒅𝒕 𝝈 Cost 𝒅𝒕 𝝈 
AES 125 104.4 5 123.1 5 9 123.2 3 30 
SHA 75 72.8 14 74.2 11 14 74.6 6 41 
Blowfish 100 89.4 7 99.7 7 16 99 5 55 
GSM 350 346.3 8 344.7 7 3 343.4 4 12 
Entropy Chain 100 96.5 11 99.1 10 71 99.8 8 185 
Smart Sensor 
IoT 
200 185.5 8 198.3 8 5 198 5 23 
Table 5.5 Continued evaluation of the security metric from data presented in Table 5.4. Δ1 and 
Δ2 are the respective factors of improvement over pure information dispersion. 
Benchmark Information 
Dispersion 
Obfuscated – Physical 
Threat 
Obfuscated – Analytical 
Threat 
𝝍𝟏 𝝍𝟐 𝝍𝟏 𝝍𝟐 𝚫𝟏 𝝍𝟏 𝝍𝟐 𝚫𝟐 
AES 0.5 0.05 4.55 41.33 9.10 2.91 69.25 1385.08 
SHA 1.40 0.14 10.34 135.18 7.39 5.87 174.51 1246.50 
Blowfish 0.70 0.07 6.63 96.61 9.47 4.92 177.45 2535.02 
GSM 0.80 0.08 5.43 20.46 6.78 3.72 42.89 536.16 
Entropy Chain 1.10 0.11 9.88 415.26 8.98 7.96 519.33 4721.15 
Smart Sensor 
IoT 
0.8 0.08 6.80 38.17 8.50 4.81 93.54 1169.21 
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𝑘2 = 0.01). The degree of obfuscation 𝜎 is notably higher in the latter configuration, in 
exchange for a lower degree of information dispersion 𝑑𝑡. This evaluation is continued in 
Table 5.5, where the security metrics for each of the configurations are provided. It is 
notable that the two metrics are not exchangeable and only values of the same metric are 
comparable. For the physical threat configuration, it is notable that obfuscation increases 
the metric score in comparison to information dispersion by a factor 8.37 on average. This 
improvement comes at no resource cost, as the same resource limitations were applied for 
all configurations. In the analytical threat configuration, the improvement is even more 
pronounced, and the average improvement factor is 1932. As the primary target of the 
defenses in this configuration is to eliminate the adversary’s ability to reverse engineer the 
control flow and determine the dispersed security critical operators, the introduction of 
obfuscation carries significant weight. 
This improvement also shows when comparing the two obfuscated configurations. For 
the first metric, the physical threat configuration achieves an improvement of 46%. 
Similarly, the analytical threat configuration achieves a 77% higher value in the second 
metric.  
5.6 Conclusion 
Hardware Trojans are a significant threat for emerging devices that rely on the highest 
levels of security, due to the increasingly outsourced manufacturing. This chapter presented 
a security optimization flow that utilizes resources with high efficiency to identify and 
disperse security critical information through multiple operators and registers. Moreover, 
this work introduced an obfuscation flow that is embedded in the high-level synthesis flow 
and allows threat-targeted security optimization under resource constraints. Engineers 
merely need to define the initial security critical variable, and the downstream 
vulnerabilities are automatically detected and defended. The evaluation showed security 
enhancements with up to 5-times higher information dispersion and significantly higher 
Trojan insertion difficulty under the same resource constraints as a baseline technique. A 
threat-targeted evaluation showed that the co-optimization of obfuscation and dispersion 
can improve security by a factor between 8.37 and 1932, emphasizing the strength and 
flexibility of threat-targeted synthesis. 
Due to the strong capabilities of the manufacturer, defending against Trojan insertion at 
this stage is very difficult. Circuitry that is inserted with defensive purposes may be removed 
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or manipulated by a well-educated and capable adversary. In addition, the problem of 
limiting intentional secret information leakage is of particular difficulty, as information can 
be leaked with minimal modifications to a circuit, which may not exhibit notable differences 
in power traces to be detectable. Therefore, we propose an entirely different approach to 
defend against this type of HTH. Our proposed approach simultaneously increases the 
difficulty of HTH insertion and probability of detection by dispersing secret values across a 
device such that it can be processed in one of multiple different locations. As the actual 
processing occurs in a dynamically and randomly selected path, the adversary is forced to 
insert an HTH into each of the possible locations. Thereby, the likelihood of detection is 
increased, as the Trojan payload is necessarily larger. Additionally, the link between the 
Trojan payload (the leakage) and the trigger will require more engineering work for 
customized locations on the device, or will have to travel a longer distance on the device.  
Finally, we propose to combine this methodology with resource utilization maximization, 
such that this defense security dispersion is employed to minimize the available empty 
circuit area. This increases the difficulty of inserting one HTH, let alone many, even further. 
To make this attack feasible, we propose to implement it as part of a high-level synthesis 
(HLS) framework, such that security critical information can automatically be detected and 
dispersed to meet resource utilization targets. 
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CHAPTER 6  
HIGH-LEVEL SYNTHESIS FOR  
SIDE-CHANNEL DEFENSE 
6.1 Introduction 
Embedded devices are prevalent in every aspect of human life, a recent development that 
is only exasperated by the emergence of the Internet of Things (IoT) and cloud computing. 
In IoT, a large number of devices, buildings, vehicles, and sensors are interconnected to 
form a network that can gather and process data and respond to it. As part of emerging 
cyber-physical systems, these devices cover a wide range of applications from home 
automation in residential buildings to the coherent operation and control of the smart-grid. 
An array of military applications has also been proposed and tested, for example wireless 
sensor-network monitoring of borders and demilitarized zones [109], [110]. The public and 
private cloud are employed to control billions of IoT devices and analyze a massive and 
perpetual stream of sensor data. However, cloud computing is not limited to its IoT 
applications – there is rapid development and adaptation in industrial, marketing, and 
financial segments. 
Today, security is considered to be one of the most significant obstacles to both IoT and 
cloud computing [109]. The security threats to IoT and cyber-physical systems are as 
numerous as their applications: There are concerns about privacy in home automation, 
resiliency in smart-grids, and confidentiality in defense applications. One of the concerns 
for IoT is the need for low cost, rapid development, and the lack of standardization or 
control, which dramatically increases the likelihood of security flaws. The security concerns 
for cloud computing are different but equally important: while secure data transfer between 
the data source and the cloud provider is a largely solved problem, extracting insight through 
analytical queries over encrypted data is very limited. This means that data has to be 
available in plaintext for meaningful analysis. Although many enterprise customers would 
prefer to outsource processing of confidential and sensitive data, this limitation on plaintext 
is an important blocker, since they cannot allow cloud providers to operate on plaintext. 
FPGAs with customer-supplied programming can be a solution to this. 
108 
 
 
For both cloud and IoT, FPGAs provide excellent solutions with scalability, 
maintainability, cost, and efficiency. Various proposals for FPGA-friendly protocols and 
security architectures have been made for these emerging fields [111], [112]. High-level 
synthesis (HLS) enables developers and designers to synthesize a low-level hardware 
description from a high-level system specification in widely known programming languages 
such as C.  As such, HLS is a primary contributor to wider enablement of FPGA devices. 
Although basic security practices such as encryption of network traffic or proper 
selection of encryption algorithms are well-known and incorporated in many designs, 
hardware security concerns are commonly overlooked. Moreover, countermeasures 
typically require low-level understanding and fine-grained cost balancing [113]. The 
hardware implementation is a significant source of information leakage which is often not 
considered when selecting higher-level algorithms or security techniques. This information 
leakage can be exploited through side-channel attacks, which perform statistical analysis to 
extract confidential values through the side-channel leakage. For example, when the 
execution of operations depends on any confidential value, the presence or absence of 
operations in a captured power trace can reveal information about the confidential values 
through a simple power analysis (SPA). Moreover, the hardware implementation of even 
the simplest logic operations is typically very susceptible to information leakage, as 
dynamic power consumption is dependent on the number of switching bits, capacitances, 
and a number of other identifying characteristics. Therefore, input and output values can be 
retrieved through differential power analysis (DPA). Numerous countermeasures against 
side-channel attacks have been proposed at the algorithmic and at the gate- or layout-level. 
Most of the lower-level techniques against side-channel attacks are highly resource and 
power intensive, as they attempt to achieve a constant, input-independent power drain. 
Moreover, these countermeasures cannot be applied efficiently without expert-level 
understanding of hardware security as well as deep familiarity with the circuit and 
potentially vulnerable operations. 
In this chapter, we propose the first fully automated high-level synthesis flow with the 
primary target of minimizing side-channel information leakage in defense of DPA. This 
contribution enables developers and design engineers to efficiently address side-channel 
leakage concerns in a practical manner: specifying confidential variables in addition to the 
high-level specification to be synthesized is sufficient for automatic analysis of leakage and 
scalable injection of countermeasures. The unique contributions of this chapter are: 
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 High-level side-channel leakage characterization through derivation of per-
operation confidentiality and cycle-accurate simulations. 
 First side-channel leakage resistant high-level synthesis flow. Minimal 
annotations in addition to high-level C-code are sufficient for automated leakage 
analysis and insertion of countermeasures. This flow can target resource-
constraints as well as an allowable leakage threshold. 
 Automated detection and mitigation against branch imbalances that otherwise 
enable simple power attacks. 
 Experimental evaluation with established CHStone benchmarks and a custom 
IoT benchmark. The proposed flow achieves up to 81% better leakage reduction 
than the baseline under identical resource constraints. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In section 6.2 we introduce 
relevant background. The high-level synthesis flow is presented in 6.3 and experimentally 
evaluated in section 6.4. A conclusion with outlook is provided in section 6.5. 
6.2 Background 
6.2.1 Related Work 
Recent research found that HLS can provide unique benefits to the design of secure 
systems. Reliability can be increased through automatically generated on-chip monitors 
(OCMs) [95]. Reliability in the face of destructive hardware Trojans can be achieved 
through selective module selection as part of synthesis [91], [94]. HLS can also be applied 
to detect vulnerable operations with granular insertion of hardware Trojan defenses through 
information dispersion [90]. However, this is the first work to explore the benefits of HLS 
in securing designs against side-channel leakage. 
The threat of side-channel leakage has received significant attention with the 
introduction of DPA by Kocher et al. [114]. DPA is a side-channel attack that enables the 
extraction of secret keys through signal processing over a large number of power traces. It 
can reveal the internal secrets of cryptographically secure algorithms such as the advanced 
encryption standard (AES) [115].  While introduction of random noise effectively reduces 
the signal-to-noise ratio, it has been shown that arbitrary noise does not provide significant 
security benefits and cannot efficiently hinder exploitation of side-channel leakage [116]. 
Masking was proposed to reduce the correlation between captured power traces and the 
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actual underlying data. Masked-AND was an early proposal for generally applicable logic 
design to secure AES [117]. Several techniques have been proposed to equalize the dynamic 
power consumption of digital circuits to reduce side-channel leakage. In dynamic 
differential logic (DDL), the correlation between the power consumption of the circuit and 
processed input signals is reduced by adding the complement of a circuit. Wave dynamic 
differential logic (WDDL) uses standard building blocks to form secure compound gates 
which can be applied in a regular ASIC or FPGA design flow in place of standard cells 
[118]. WDDL aims to consistently consume power by combining standard cell gates such 
that both the positive and negative outputs are computed. In precharge, all inputs are set to 
0 such that outputs evaluate to 0. Therefore, as a result of the evaluation phase, there is one 
transition per output bit – either in the positive or in the negative output. This provides for 
consistent dynamic power consumption. Leakage may still occur due to timing and load 
capacitance variations. Simple dynamic differential logic (SDDL) [118], [119] operates 
similar to WDDL and is derived by applying De Morgan’s law and AND-ing the differential 
output with the precharge signal. SDDL cannot guarantee only one switching signal per 
clock cycle, and therefore is inferior to WDDL. Even though such logic styles reduced 
leakage, they did not eliminate it due to routing and load imbalances. To address this 
concern, duplication of fully routed circuits with switched positive and negative input 
signals was proposed for WDDL as Double WDDL (DWWDL) [120] and other logic styles 
[121]. 
Manual application of DDL on a subset of the circuit has been proposed to achieve 
reduced overhead in Partial DDL [122] while maintaining leakage resistance. Resource cost 
reductions of 24% were reported for AES. 
The previously described techniques and architectures require a specific security-centric 
skillset for efficient and effective application. While full application of an advanced logic 
style provides meaningful security enhancements, it is extremely costly in terms of resource 
consumption. Hence, an automated HLS flow can be very resource effective by introducing 
specific countermeasures where they provide the most benefit while also reducing the need 
for constant security-engineering guidance. 
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6.2.2 FPGAs in Emerging Applications 
6.2.2.1 Cloud Computing 
Due to their unique customizability, FPGAs expose a much more defined surface area 
for attacks and are therefore a valuable building block in establishing trust in the emerging 
cloud computing environment. It is generally undesirable to fully trust the cloud provider 
both from a security standpoint from the customer’s perspective, and from a liability 
perspective from the cloud provider’s standpoint [111]. However, complex analysis and 
computation tasks often require direct processing of plaintext data, hindering full adoption 
of the cloud. It was proposed to offload data analysis and processing tasks for highly 
sensitive data to dedicated FPGA units which perform custom operations specified by the 
cloud customer. Specific applications include operating on personally identifiable 
information (PII) in healthcare data [111] and privacy preserving map reduce [123]. These 
FPGAs externally consume and produce encrypted data, such that the cloud provider is not 
directly exposed to the highly sensitive plaintext data. For this operation, the FPGA is 
programmed with encrypted bitstreams containing secret keys, which allow decryption as 
well as encryption of data, thereby removing the requirement for full trust of the cloud 
provider. 
In this application of FPGAs in the cloud, it is important to note that network-level 
information assurance regarding confidentiality is achieved. However, the cloud provider 
maintains physical access, particularly for maintenance and operation of the FPGA devices. 
Therefore, extraction of the secret keys for decryption of the available data, as well as direct 
extraction of the plaintext from the physical device, must be considered. 
6.2.2.2 Internet of Things 
In IoT, many physical devices, sensors, buildings, and vehicles are interconnected to co-
compute and co-operate almost all aspects of modern society. As a mass product which is 
often powered exclusively by batteries, power and resource efficiency are crucial 
considerations in IoT design. Due to their configurability to perform specific tasks very well 
and their cost efficiency compared to ASICs, FPGAs are well suited for many IoT 
applications. They have been shown to surpass ASICs in reliability, cost, time-to-market, 
and maintenance [124]. Dynamic reconfigurability of FPGAs is a relatively recent 
development that has sparked new IoT specific architectures and applications [112]. 
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The emergence of IoT has already revealed numerous security problems, from plaintext 
network traffic that can easily be intercepted and read, to an IoT-based botnet that 
culminated in a massive DDoS attack that lead to widespread network outage on the U.S. 
east coast [125].   
6.2.3 Leakage through Conditional Operations 
One source of information leakage is derived from conditional operations whose 
execution depends on variables with confidential content. This type of leakage can be 
exploited without extensive computational analysis as part of an SPA attack, as the 
difference in operations following such a branching statement potentially reveals 
information about the confidential variable. 
This vulnerability was very common in early implementations of the RSA algorithm 
[116], which used the text-book implementation of the square-and-multiply algorithm. In 
this algorithm, an exponentiation of the form 𝑥𝑛 can be restated as 𝑥 ∗ (𝑥2)
𝑛−1
2  when 𝑛 is 
an odd number, or (𝑥2)
𝑛
2 when 𝑛 is even. As the operation for an odd exponent requires an 
additional multiplication with sufficiently different power signature, an adversary can 
determine each bit of the private key in a step-by-step attack. Attacks of this kind can be 
defeated by rearchitecting the implementation of algorithms to eliminate the dependency 
between executed operations and confidential values. 
As the vulnerabilities in RSA implementations show, oversight of side-channel 
implication is a common problem. Especially in IoT applications which constantly process 
privacy and confidentiality critical information, these countermeasures are of critical 
importance, yet practical considerations and the lack of automated defense mechanisms 
virtually guarantee that many implementations will suffer from similar vulnerabilities.  
6.2.4 High-level Leakage Estimation  
The strength of side-channel leakage is measured in the number of measurements to 
disclosure (MTD) for well-known and well-studied circuits such as AES, which allows 
comparison of results across different studies [126]. As an estimate of dynamic power 
consumption and hence side-channel leakage, the Hamming distance is widely employed 
[127]. Menichelli et al. [128] describe how the difficulty with high-level power simulation 
(and hence, side-channel leakage) is its focus on evaluating average power consumption. 
Even where cycle accuracy is possible, such power estimates provide little insight into side-
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channel leakage, as the absolute value of power consumption is not closely related to the 
actual signal-correlated power consumption. For accurate estimation, it was shown that only 
the internal logic values that correspond to the signal should be tracked. Hamming distance 
as the primary source for leakage estimation has successfully been used to analyze smartcard 
software for side-channel leakage [129]. 
6.2.5 Attack Goal and Involved Parties 
The explicit attack goal of the adversary studied in this chapter is to reveal one of the 
user-specified secrets through side-channel analysis by evaluating the power trace. For this 
purpose, the adversary is assumed to have sufficient physical access to the device to measure 
and extract a large number of power traces. The primary focus of this chapter is the defense 
against side-channel analysis; therefore, we reference existing work as described in the 
background for defense against hardware Trojans or physical tampering.  
As the nature of this chapter targets side-channel information leakage in active device 
operation, the designer, programmer, and end-user with confidential information are 
 
Figure 6.1 Overview of the side-channel leakage optimized synthesis flow. The flow combines 
typical HLS flows (orange) with analysis (blue) and culminates in leakage minimization 
operations (green). 
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together considered to be the first party. The goal of the first party is to produce a device 
that meets side-channel leakage requirements with highest resource efficiency, such that the 
majority of circuitry and computing power can be focused on the primary task of the device, 
e.g. cloud computation or IoT application. 
The application environment of the device is assumed to be hostile – be it in the open 
space for IoT applications, or in the datacenter of an untrusted cloud provider. This 
differentiates the security needs from those of typical network security. Due to the hostile 
nature, any adversary is assumed to have physical access to the device to extract power 
traces in large numbers. However, physical tampering of any type, or malicious 
reprogramming of the device, is outside of the scope of this chapter. 
The hardware vendor (i.e. FPGA manufacturer) or third party IP providers are an 
unrelated third party that is assumed to be neutral, and malicious intervention by this third 
party is outside of the scope of this chapter. 
6.3 Synthesis Flow 
The overall high-level synthesis flow for side-channel leakage minimization is shown in 
Figure 6.1. It consists of three primary phases: the initial synthesis, leakage characterization, 
and the final security synthesis. 
In the initial synthesis, C-code is compiled into an intermediate representation (IR). 
User-specified annotations are employed to derive all operations that act on confidential 
information. The output values of such operations are also treated as confidential. The initial 
synthesis culminates in an RTL synthesis which produces vulnerable RTL-code.  
In the leakage characterization phase, the RTL-code is simulated and the leakage of all 
operations which act on confidential information is computed from the simulation results in 
combination with entropy estimation for each operation. 
The final security synthesis selects the appropriate module for each operation based on 
available resource and estimated side-channel leakage. Additionally, branch balancing is 
performed to reduce the vulnerability due to conditionals which depend on confidential 
information. 
6.3.1 Initial Synthesis 
The initial synthesis flow consumes user-provided C-code and compiles it into LLVM’s 
intermediate representation (IR). This is an assembly-like language which is machine-
115 
 
 
independent. This compilation phase already includes code optimizations provided by the 
LLVM compiler framework. 
In addition to the code, the proposed synthesis framework consumes high-level 
annotations of variables to be treated as confidential. Such variables can include secret keys 
or authentication tokens, but can be used more widely in the IoT content to elevate the 
security treatment of user data such as the number of active operators and similar 
information.  
These high-level annotations are utilized to automatically derive all operations which act 
on confidential information. Here, all outputs of confidential operations are treated as 
Leakage driven FU assignmentDependent Secret ValuesInitial Secret Value
DIV ADD
DIV
DIVDIV
FU1 FU2
FU1
FU3FU3
DIV ADD
DIV
DIVDIV
 
Figure 6.3 Example of leakage-driven binding. High risk operations are bound against one FU, 
while low risk instructions are bound against a different FU. 
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Figure 6.2 Example of branch balancing. One branch of a conditional statement is supplemented 
with dummy instructions to minimize information leakage. 
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confidential as well. Therefore, minimal user input is sufficient to determine a graph of 
confidential operations. This graph of confidential operations is then employed to create 
targeted simulation directions which improve its time and space requirements. 
The initial synthesis flow concludes with conventional steps of RTL synthesis, which 
are focused on resource utilization and device speed. As a result, the generated RTL-code 
is vulnerable to side-channel attacks and does not contain any countermeasures. This is a 
valuable starting point for deeper analysis of operations which are prone to leakage.  
6.3.2 Leakage Characterization 
As the primary metric for side-channel leakage of a given signal, the proposed flow 
employs the Hamming distance for switching operations. This is a commonly used metric 
[127], as dynamic switching operations are a primary source of power consumption for 
modern FPGAs and integrated circuits in general. In addition to the significant leakage 
through dynamic power consumption, it has been shown that side-channel leakage can result 
from static power consumption as well, which the proposed flow can consider with minor 
modifications. 
For a high-level security analysis and defense against side-channel information, an 
overall metric of similar abstraction level is required. In the leakage characterization phase, 
the previously generated RTL-code is simulated to identify switching information for every 
operation. For this purpose, the proposed flow automatically generates simulation scripts 
that feed into professional simulation tools, and parses the simulation outputs for further 
processing. Only those operations that act on confidential information are relevant to the 
security optimization, and switching characteristics of other operations are discarded. 
The leakage is primarily derived from the Hamming distance of a switching operation. 
As an estimate for dynamic power consumption and therefore leakage power, the Hamming 
distance of operation 𝑖 is defined as 𝐻𝐷(𝑖) = |𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑡,1 − 𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑡,0|. 
In addition to estimating the side-channel leakage through the Hamming distance, the 
proposed flow also considers the confidential information content through entropy 
estimation. The previous initial synthesis phase determined all operations and variable 
values that are recursively dependent on user-specified confidential values. Resource 
efficient synthesis requires further consideration of the degree of confidentiality. For 
instance, the result 𝑦 of the operation 𝑦 = 𝑥 ≥ 25 by itself has a comparatively smaller 
amount of confidential information than the secret key 𝑥. This reduction in confidential 
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information content is reflected in the entropy estimation. Recursively, the entropy of each 
instruction 𝑖 is computed by multiplying the entropy factor of the functional type 𝜎 with the 
sum of input entropies of each parent operation: 
ℎ(𝑖) = 𝜎 ∙ ∑ ℎ(𝑝𝑖)
𝑝𝑖∈𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑖)
 
The overall leakage of a given instruction regarding the user specified secrets is thus 
specified as γi = ℎ(𝑖) ∙ 𝐻𝐷(𝑖) 
6.3.3 Security Synthesis 
6.3.3.1 Branch Balancing 
Branch balancing is a problem that can be solved through algorithm-level modifications 
by the design engineer, as well as through automated mechanisms. A potential downside of 
automated solutions is that they can be resource intensive in both power and footprint. 
Therefore, the proposed flow generates detailed reports on the detected imbalanced 
branches to allow manual mitigation in addition to implementing an automated solution. 
In branch balancing, all conditional statements of the entire synthesized device are 
searched for security sensitive information content. This encompasses the derived 
confidential operations discussed previously. Any such conditional statement triggers a code 
path for logging of a potential security breach as well as detailed analysis of the subsequent 
instructions. As discussed previously, any deviation between the subsequent paths can cause 
considerable side-channel leakage; therefore, the number of deviating operations is 
computed. An automated mitigation is attempted by inserting dummy operations with 
similar functional types to counterbalance the deviations. 
In Figure 6.2, an example of branch balancing is shown. In Figure 6.2.a), the branches 
are imbalanced, as the upper branch contains additional ADD and DIV operations. These 
are balanced through dummy ADD and DIV operations in the lower branch, which 
counteract the initial imbalance. 
6.3.3.2 Leakage-Driven Allocation and Binding 
For simple and efficient security mechanisms, the synthesis must automatically 
determine the security requirements as well as applicable countermeasures for each 
instruction and functional unit. In a typical HLS flow, the binding step is responsible for 
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assigning instructions or operations to functional units and variables to registers. Binding 
algorithms are primarily guided by cost and timing concerns. When multiple operations bind 
against the same functional unit, large multiplexers are introduced to enable sharing. Due to 
the high cost of large multiplexers in FPGAs, only the most expensive operations are 
suitable for sharing [107], such as dividers or modulo operations.  
In the proposed flow, allocation and binding are interweaved to maximize the efficiency 
of side-channel leakage reduction. The binding algorithm determines the assignment of IR 
instructions to functional units. At this stage, these functional units are the most basic and 
resource efficient implementations for a given function. As part of binding, a notable 
security enhancement is introduced: high risk operations (HROs) are assigned to the same 
FUs, whereas low risk instructions (LROs) are assigned to other FUs. This sharing pattern 
is shown in Figure 6.3 and is utilized in the allocation of more expensive side-channel 
countermeasures. The binding algorithm is driven by a weighted bipartite matching 
algorithm, and the proposed weights between operations are determined from the estimated 
leakage level. 
After all operations are assigned to FUs, the leakage per FU is computed as a sum of the 
individual leakage terms. This is a conservative approximation, as partial correlation 
between the underlying signals is common. This estimation enables weighted module 
selection for each FU. Using the module assignment vector 𝑀 ,  the vector of leakage 
estimates γ, and the total leakage metric 𝜃 , this problem can be described as a linear 
programming problem: 
Minimize: 𝜃 = γ×𝑀, 
𝑀×𝐶 ≤ 𝑟 
Through this formulation, functional units with high leakage potential are upsized in 
terms of defense mechanisms, such that the overall leakage for a given resource utilization 
is minimized. 
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6.4 Experimental Evaluation 
The proposed side-channel information leakage optimized HLS flow was implemented 
based on LLVM and the LegUp HLS tool [107]. ModelSim was employed for the 
simulations, and Altera Quartus II was utilized for synthesis of generated Verilog into a 
Cyclone V FPGA. The proposed flow is evaluated in multiple benchmarks and with regard 
to different characteristics. Several benchmarks are adapted from the CHStone benchmarks 
[108]: AES, Blowfish, SHA, and GSM. AES [130] and Blowfish [131] are symmetric-key 
block ciphers, and SHA is a secure hashing algorithm. The GSM benchmark is an 
implementation of linear predictive coding analysis for the global system for mobile 
communications. Additionally, we have adapted the reference implementation of SIMON 
[132] as a benchmark, as it is a lightweight block cipher publicly proposed by the US 
National Security Agency’s (NSA) Research Directorate with focus on efficient hardware 
implementation. SIMON is particularly interesting, as it has the expressed purpose of 
Table 6.1 Countermeasures employed in the evaluation. Resource overhead and effect on 
leakage are component-dependent – general estimates are provided. 
Logic Style Resource Overhead Leakage Factor 
Base 1 1 
SDDL 4 1/7 
WDDL 5.3 1/10 
DWDDL 10.6 1/20 
DAWDDL 13.1 1/25 
Table 6.2 Evaluation of the side-channel optimized synthesis. Compared to the baseline, 
leakage is reduced between 32% and 72% (%𝐵). Compared to the modular synthesis, leakage 
is reduced by up to 38% (%𝑀). 
Benchmark 
Res.  
Target 
Balancing 
Cost 
Baseline Modular Synthesis Proposed SC Synthesis 
Cost 𝜽𝑩 Cost 𝜽𝑴 % Cost θ %𝑩 %𝑴 
AES 187.0 0.6 187.0 394.7 187.0 323.8 0.18 186.9 202.0 0.49 0.38 
Blowfish 88.0 0 87.4 341.3 87.6 239.3 0.30 88.0 231.6 0.32 0.03 
SHA 62.0 0 61.4 99.4 60.2 64.6 0.35 61.9 49.3 0.50 0.24 
SIMON 25.0 0 24.3 80.4 24.9 77.6 0.03 25.0 54.8 0.32 0.29 
GSM 59.0 57.5 591.3 271.8 591.9 81.4 0.70 592.0 79.4 0.71 0.03 
IoT 258.0 .5 257.9 305.3 240.3 85.5 0.72 224.8 85.5 0.72 0.00 
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facilitating security for IoT [133]. It is notable that these benchmarks implement a very 
specific functionality, which does not necessarily reflect the reality of embedded system 
applications in cloud or IoT environments. Therefore, we further created an IoT benchmark 
which performs several general-purpose tasks including Fourier transformations for voice 
recognition, temperature computation with corresponding light control, and presence 
detection with control of a door lock.  
6.4.1 Evaluation Baseline 
As baseline for the evaluation, the entire device is created using a side-channel resistant 
design style. This reflects today’s design flows consisting of largely uniform technology 
and IP libraries. A second baseline is presented as the modular baseline. In this scenario, the 
proposed side-channel synthesis is applied at a modular level to represent the modular 
granularity of design engineering for large ICs in enterprises. Here, each module is selected 
to be implemented in one of the logic styles presented in Table 6.1 to achieve highest leakage 
resistance. We refer to section 6.2 and references for further background on cost and leakage 
evaluation of SDDL [118], [119], WDDL [119], [121], [134], DWDDL [121], DAWDDL 
[121]. 
6.4.2 Resource Targeting 
In Table 6.2, the benchmarks were synthesized with a resource target. Costs in bold 
italics indicate that the maximum available countermeasures were applied – further 
reduction of leakage (𝜃) was not possible despite available resources. The resource target 
was selected such that the baseline could be fully implemented in the most resource efficient 
Table 6.3 Evaluation of the proposed side-channel optimized synthesis against a modular 
baseline under more stringent resource constraints. Leakage is reduced by 20% to 40%. 
Bench- 
mark 
Res. 
Target 
Modular Synthesis Proposed SC Synthesis 
Cost 𝜽𝑴 Cost θ % 
AES 75.0 75.0 2052.5 75.0 1221.4 0.40 
Blowfish 35.0 34.6 2217.9 35.0 1691.8 0.24 
SHA 23.0 18.6 592.0 23.0 361.4 0.39 
SIMON 9.5 8.1 505.1 9.4 395.3 0.22 
GSM 235.0 235.0 763.0 235.0 536.0 0.30 
IoT 75.0 74.7 1611.1 74.8 1079.2 0.33 
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logic style with reduced side-channel leakage, which is SDDL. The strong improvements of 
the proposed side-channel synthesis are clear; leakage is reduced by up to 72% compared to 
the baseline, and up to 38% compared to the modular baseline. 
The synthesis of the GSM benchmark provided interesting results, as both the proposed 
synthesis and the modular baseline provide similar results and are significantly better than 
the full-device baseline. This can be explained by the complexity of the GSM benchmark: 
in comparison to the other CHStone benchmarks, this benchmark circuit performs more 
computations, many of which are independent of the user-specified confidential variables. 
Therefore, both the modular baseline and the proposed synthesis can be significantly more 
resource efficient and therefore achieve higher leakage reduction. Additionally, it can be 
observed that many of the confidential values (and their dependencies) are constrained to 
specific modules (basic blocks), which explains why the proposed synthesis was not 
significantly more efficient than the modular baseline. 
In contrast to the GSM benchmark, the experimental results for SIMON show limited 
improvements in the modular baseline, but significant improvements in the proposed 
synthesis compared to both the full-device and the modular baseline. This can also be 
explained by the underlying design: The share of confidential operands is roughly uniform 
across the modules in SIMON; therefore, the modular baseline cannot significantly 
outperform the baseline. However, the proposed synthesis can perform leakage optimization 
down to the instruction or functional unit level, and is therefore able to extract further 
leakage reduction. 
In addition to the resource-targeted evaluation in Table 6.2, the proposed side-channel 
optimized synthesis flow is further evaluated against the modular baseline with a 
significantly lower resource limit. For this evaluation, the simple baseline would not yield 
a result, as the low resource limit prohibits application of the side-channel reducing logic 
styles at the full-device level. The evaluation shown in Table 6.3 demonstrates the strength 
of the proposed flow under restrictive resource constraints, yielding between 22% and 40% 
reduced leakage as compared to the modular approach. Notably, the proposed flow achieved 
only a minor improvement of 3% compared to the modular approach under higher resource 
constraints for GSM, but achieves a leakage reduction of 30% for the same benchmark in a 
more constrained environment. This signifies the suitability of the proposed flow for 
embedded IoT applications. 
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6.4.3 Branch Balancing 
The results presented in Tables 6.2-6.5 include branch balancing, but it is only presented 
once in Table 6.2 as the results are identical across the experiments. Notably, several 
benchmarks did not require any branch balancing – the reason for this is the efficient and 
dedicated design. Blowfish, SHA, and SIMON all have a single purpose, namely the 
encryption or hashing of an input. As the benchmark only covers this specific functionality, 
the risk of accidental branch imbalance was greatly reduced. The results for the GSM 
benchmark provide an example of the other spectrum of branch balancing: the log area ratio 
(LAR) computed by the benchmark was considered to be the user-specified secret, and the 
benchmark code contains a large number of expensive operations that are controlled by 
conditionals which (indirectly) depend on the LAR value. Thus, branch balancing requires 
extensive resources to mitigate this situation. To illustrate the effectiveness of branch 
balancing, consider the case that virtually the full GSM benchmark is considered to be 
security critical – this can be achieved by specifying the input signal to be confidential. In 
this case, the branch balancing algorithm would require 184960 GE resources, 3.2 times as 
much as described in Table 6.2. This illustrates the significance of imbalanced branches, as 
well as the convenience of HLS. 
6.4.4 Leakage Targeting 
In addition to the evaluation of the resource-targeted synthesis flow, the leakage-targeted 
flow is extensively evaluated in Table 6.4. This mode synthesizes the provided high-level 
specification such that the estimated side-channel leakage is below a specified leakage 
Table 6.4 Evaluation of the proposed synthesis under explicit side-channel leakage target. 
Compared to the baseline, the leakage target is achieved with 31% to 81% less overhead (%𝐵). 
Compared to modular synthesis, overhead is reduced by up to 44% (%𝑀). 
Benchmark 
𝜽 
Target 
Baseline Modular Synthesis Proposed Side-Channel Synthesis 
O.H. 𝜽𝑩 O.H. 𝜽𝑴 % O.H. θ %𝑩 %𝑴 
AES 395 139740 394.7 109144 385.4 0.22 61568 395.0 0.56 0.44 
Blowfish 342 65520 341.3 45528 341.7 0.31 43012 341.9 0.34 0.06 
SHA 100 46080 99.4 28496 99.9 0.38 22160 99.9 0.52 0.22 
SIMON 81 18240 80.4 16320 80.5 0.11 12512 81.0 0.31 0.23 
GSM 272 400320 271.8 104624 271.6 0.74 93672 271.9 0.77 0.10 
IoT 306 193080 305.3 42930 304.3 0.78 36004 305.6 0.81 0.16 
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target. This flow is interesting in different practical scenarios, for instance when the sub-
module of a larger device is being synthesized. Here, it may be preferable to uniformly 
achieve a given leakage target throughout the circuit, rather than fully utilizing arbitrarily 
assigned resources. In comparison to the full-device baseline, the proposed synthesis 
achieves the leakage target with significantly reduced resource utilization. The reduction 
ranges from 31% for the highly efficient SIMON cipher to 81% for the IoT benchmark. The 
improvements over the modular baseline are more modest, ranging from 6% for the 
Blowfish benchmark up to 44% for AES. In contrast to the presented cost reduction of 56% 
over the baseline, note that manual partitioning has only achieved a reduction of 24% for 
AES [122]. The presented improvement can be attributed to the fine-grained recognition of 
leakage-prone operations. For this benchmark, the resource savings over the baseline is 
equivalent to 12,413 adaptive logic modules (ALMs) for the studied Cyclone V FPGA. 
An evaluation with more modest leakage targets is presented in Table 6.5. This scenario 
can be desirable when the priority for side-channel defense is to function as a deterrent for 
weakly motivated adversaries with comparably low resource overhead. The results show 
that the proposed synthesis flow achieves fine-grained result tuning and therefore achieves 
considerably improved resource utilization. Compared to the modular baseline, the resource 
cost is reduced by up to 42% while achieving the same leakage targets. In this experiment, 
it is notable that the modular baseline has significantly exceeded the leakage target for the 
AES and Blowfish benchmarks, resulting in a leakage that is less than half of the 
requirement. The underlying cause for this over-engineered solution is the coarse granularity 
of block-based optimization, which emphasizes the strength of the proposed security 
synthesis with FU-based leakage optimization.  
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6.5 Conclusion and Outlook 
Security is a core requirement for IoT and cloud computing due to the vast amounts of 
confidential and privacy sensitive data that is processed. Side-channel leakage is an 
important problem as it provides malicious adversaries indirect access to internal state and 
data such as secret keys. Defending against side-channel attacks such as DPA that exploit 
this leakage is an active research area, and is not easy to apply efficiently in practice without 
detailed hardware security and circuit-level understanding. In this chapter, we presented the 
first HLS flow that inherently minimizes side-channel leakage by inferring all security 
critical operations from a small number of user-specified confidential variables in their C-
code to be synthesized. The HLS flow automatically analyzes the information content for 
all relevant operations and performs detailed simulations to perform Hamming distance 
based leakage estimation. The flow identifies and corrects any imbalanced branches that 
pose easy attack targets, and selectively upgrades functional units based on leakage potential 
and available resources. An extensive evaluation showed that side-channel leakage can be 
reduced by up to 72% under identical resource constraints when compared against typical 
full-device application of countermeasures. The results further show a reduction in resource 
consumption by up to 81% compared to the baseline to achieve a given leakage limit. 
Further investigation is needed in two directions: i) detailed evaluation and consideration of 
power and operation speed during synthesis; ii) incorporation of masking to further 
strengthen the resistance against DPA.  
 
  
Table 6.5 Evaluation of leakage targeted synthesis under less severe leakage targets. Side-
channel leakage is denoted by θ. Target is achieved with up to 30% to 67% reduced overhead. 
Bench- 
mark 
Leakage 
Target 
Modular Synthesis Proposed SC Synthesis 
O.H. 𝜽𝑴 O.H. θ % 
AES 1000 90120 480.2 32160 998.2 0.64 
Blowfish 1000 39360 504.3 27532 999.9 0.30 
SHA 450 8160 398.9 5280 449.7 0.35 
SIMON 450 8640 304.2 2880 448.4 0.67 
GSM 1000 22800 984.7 15840 999.3 0.31 
IoT 1000 21600 802.3 12236 999.4 0.43 
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CHAPTER 7  
CONCLUSIONS 
In this dissertation, we have studied the security of hardware implementations and have 
introduced new defense mechanisms. The security of hardware requires special attention, 
as even widely accepted and used algorithms or protocols can be breached with limited 
effort unless proper countermeasures are implemented. There exist three primary threat to 
hardware implementations: i) physically invasive attacks which include physical 
modification of circuit behavior post-manufacturing; ii) the insertion of hardware Trojan 
horses by a malicious foundry which can leak secret information with minimal overhead; 
iii) side-channel analysis of power traces, which can reveal the values of secrets being 
processed due to the correlation between input signals and dynamic power consumption of 
the hardware. This dissertation covers all three of these areas. 
In Chapter 2, we presented a PUF design based on intrinsic physical variations of CNTs. 
It takes advantage of the metallic to semiconducting CNT ratio in CNFETs to increase 
reliability, while strongly reducing the average power consumption and energy usage per 
bit. CNPUF was experimentally evaluated with SPICE-accurate simulations and showed 
strong results for security relevant properties such as reliability and inter-chip distance. 
Furthermore, we presented and evaluated an extension of CNPUF that allows a power- 
security tradeoff for dynamic usage in high security circuits. CNPUF and ex-CNPUF 
provide the future basis for authentication and secret key generation by offering security at 
a very low area and power cost. This can open the field of PUF for a variety of new 
applications and is especially relevant for current research areas such as wireless sensor 
networks or ubiquitous computing. 
In Chapter 3, we introduced a new system-level security model that bridges the chasm 
between application-level security analysis and design of secure hardware, and models for 
isolated components. From this model, we analyzed and explained several hardware security 
requirements using existing protocols, and showed that they cannot be fulfilled without 
extensive cost. We presented a multilevel authentication protocol which is verified using 
the system-level security model and which takes advantage of a combination of different 
PUF-designs to minimize resource allocation. SoP does not require expensive error-
correction, as high reliability designs are employed where required. Furthermore, the need 
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for latency and power intensive hash functions on the PUF circuit is replaced by a 
combination of strong PUFs and off-chip cryptographic hash. With breach recognition and 
recovery, new security features are introduced and shown to increase the attack-difficulty 
while enhancing reusability. A low-cost implementation of SoP was shown to reduce the 
area by 64% in a gate-level comparison. This low resource allocation and high flexibility 
allow SoP to provide a security solution tailored for ubiquitous computing devices. 
In Chapter 4, we proposed PolyPUF, a widely applicable PUF architecture that employs 
challenge and response self-divergence to provide polymorphous PUF behavior. This 
changes the challenge-response behavior to be non-deterministic and unpredictable, while 
still being verifiable in an authentication scenario. In an extensive evaluation, this 
polymorphic behavior was shown to provide strong resistivity against model-building 
attacks while simultaneously providing very low overhead. 
In Chapter 5, the focus changed to the threat of hardware Trojan horses. We presented a 
security optimization flow that utilizes resources with high efficiency to identify and 
disperse security critical information through multiple operators and registers. Moreover, 
we introduced an obfuscation flow that is embedded in the high-level synthesis flow and 
enables threat-targeted security optimization under resource constraints. Engineers merely 
need to define the initial security critical variable, and the downstream vulnerabilities are 
automatically detected and defended. The evaluation showed security enhancements with 
up to 5-times higher information dispersion and significantly higher Trojan insertion 
difficulty under the same resource constraints as a baseline technique. A threat-targeted 
evaluation showed that the co-optimization of obfuscation and dispersion can improve 
security by a factor between 8.37 and 1932, emphasizing the strength and flexibility of 
threat-targeted synthesis. 
In Chapter 6, the problem of side-channel information leakage is further studied. We 
presented the first HLS flow that inherently minimizes side-channel leakage by inferring all 
security critical operations from a small number of user-specified confidential variables in 
their C-code to be synthesized. The HLS flow automatically analyzes the information 
content for all relevant operations and performs detailed simulations to perform Hamming 
distance based leakage estimation. The flow identifies and corrects any imbalanced 
branches that pose easy attack targets, and selectively upgrades functional units based on 
leakage potential and available resources. An extensive evaluation showed that side-channel 
leakage can be reduced by up to 72% under identical resource constraints when compared 
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against typical full-device application of countermeasures. The results further show a 
reduction in resource consumption by up to 81% compared to the baseline to achieve a given 
leakage limit. Further investigation is needed in two directions: i) detailed evaluation and 
consideration of power and operation speed during synthesis; ii) incorporation of masking 
to further strengthen the resistance against DPA. 
In conclusion, this dissertation contributed to hardware security research by introducing 
new PUF designs and systems to improve defenses against physical attacks. Furthermore, it 
introduced high-level synthesis flows that utilize existing work to increase the difficulty of 
hardware Trojan horse insertion and reduce side-channel information leakage which could 
be exploited in side-channel analysis attacks. 
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